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Abstract 
 
This thesis reports an investigation into authorisation models, as used in identity and access 
management.  It proposes new versions of an authorisation model, the Tees Confidentiality 
Model (TCM), and presents formal specifications in B, and verifications and 
implementations of the key concepts using Spec Explorer, Spec# and LinQ. 
After introducing the concepts of authorisation and formal models, a formal methods 
specification in B of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is presented.  The concepts in 
RBAC have heavily influenced authorisation over the last two decades, and most of the 
research has been with their continued development.  A complete re-working of the ANSI 
RBAC Standard is developed in B, which highlights errors and deficiencies in the ANSI 
Standard and confirms that B is a suitable method for the specification of access control. 
A formal specification of the TCM in B is then developed.  The TCM supports 
authorisation by multiple concepts, with no extra emphasis given to Role (as in RBAC).  
The conceptual framework of Reference Model and Functional Specification used in the 
ANSI RBAC Standard is used to structure the TCM formal model.  Several improvements 
to the original TCM are present in the formal specification, notably a simplified treatment 
of collections.  This new variation is called TCM2, to distinguish it from the original 
model. 
Following this, a further B formal specification of a TCM reduced to its essential 
fundamental components (referred to as TCM3) was produced.  Spec Explorer was used to 
animate this specification, and as a step towards implementation 
An implementation of TCM3 using LinQ and SQL is then presented, and the original 
motivating healthcare scenario is used as an illustration. 
Finally, classes to implement the versions of the TCM models developed in the thesis are 
designed and implemented.  These classes enable the TCM to be implemented in any 
authorisation scenario. 
Throughout the thesis, model explorations, animations, and implementations are illustrated 
by SQL, C# and Spec# code fragments.  These illustrate the correspondence of the B 
specification to the model design and implementation, and the effectiveness of using 
formal specification to provide robust code. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with research which has led to improved versions of the Tees 
Confidentiality Model (TCM), which is an access control model developed by the 
University of Teesside to provide authorisation in complex scenarios. The TCM had 
previously been developed using an iterative prototyping method, with each stage 
involving modelling, implementation and feedback. It was felt that a more rigorous 
treatment was needed to fully explore the issues, and that such a treatment would very 
likely lead to improvements to the model. 
The initial main idea was to apply formal methods to TCM to ensure that the TCM was 
rigorously defined, better understood, and without any inconsistencies. 
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
At the outset of the research programme, the overall aims and objectives for the research 
programme were as follows. 
 To conduct a literature review and investigation into the fundamental concepts of 
authorisation, and authorisation models. 
 To determine whether formal methods, and in particular B, could provide a formal 
specification of the TCM 
 To compare and contrast different methods of formal specification 
 To create a formal model of the TCM as a basis for software implementation 
 To develop software tools to enable the implementation of the TCM in complex 
authorisation scenarios 
The research would be informed by previous TCM research and development projects, and 
the resulting academic publications.  In particular, scenarios suggested by the health 
service would be used to illustrate the research results. 
The formal methods which would be used are the B-Method, Spec Explorer, and Spec#. 
Formal methods provide the kind of evidence that is needed in high-risk industries such as 
aviation.  They demonstrate responsible engineering and give solid reasons for trust in the 
product. (Hall, 2006).  The development of software for access control is an area where 
high integrity is required e.g. in access to online health records, which was a starting point 
for the development of the TCM. 
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During the initial literature review stages of the project, it was realised that the 
mathematical model forming the basis of Role-Based Access Control (INCITS 2004) could 
provide the starting point for the TCM, and for other models of authorisation.  
B was successfully applied to the RBAC model, something that had never been attempted 
before.  It was so successful that a number of errors were highlighted in the ANSI RBAC 
standard.  It was also realised that B was a powerful tool for modelling not just RBAC and 
the TCM but the fundamental basis of access control itself. 
The aims and objectives stated above were revised accordingly: 
 To conduct a literature review and investigation into the fundamental concepts of 
authorisation, and authorisation models. 
 To investigate a basic model of authorisation using the ANSI RBAC standard as a 
starting point. 
 To produce a formal specification of the well-established ANSI RBAC model, as a 
precursor to investigating the TCM and possibly other authorisation models 
 To demonstrate that this specification was an improvement over the specification in 
the standard. 
 To apply the B techniques learnt in the RBAC B specification to the rules and 
principles of the much more sophisticated TCM to produce a formal model 
The power of B was such that further objectives were added during the course of the TCM 
formal specification: 
 To simplify the mathematical basis of the TCM whilst keeping the power of the 
original model. 
 To formally specify generalisations of the TCM by removing or simplifying 
constraints in the model. 
 To specify a generalisation of RBAC which consists of the fundamental principles 
of the TCM 
 To develop tools to enable general authorisation models, including the TCM, to be 
applied to any scenario. 
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1.2 Introduction to Access Control 
Access control has existed as long as human beings had assets they wanted to protect.  
Locks, gates, and guards are all forms of access control.  Access management systems are 
usually perceived as consisting of three parts: authentication, for establishing the identity 
of the user; authorisation, for determining the resources that the user is permitted to use; 
and administration.  This thesis is mainly concerned with the second of these: 
authorisation. 
Access control is needed in virtually all systems, and imposes architectural and 
administrative challenges at all levels of software development and implementation.  From 
a business perspective, access control has the potential to optimise sharing and distribution 
of resources.  However, if poorly applied it can frustrate users by denying access to 
necessary resources, or by requiring elaborate administrative procedures with 
corresponding costs.  If applied incorrectly it can cause the unauthorised disclosure or 
corruption of valuable data. 
 In a 1987 paper (Wilson, et al., 1987) Wilson and Clark argued that while security was 
important to commercial users, their primary concern was data integrity i.e. that data could 
only be modified in certain ways by particular users.  It was to address this need that Role-
based access control (RBAC) was developed. 
1.3 History of Access Control 
Computer access control and security became increasingly important in the 1970s with the 
increase of large resource sharing systems in defence and large commercial organisations.  
The use of ATMs and other automated systems also increased the need for strong security. 
In the early 1980s the US Department of Defence defined in detail two important methods 
of access control for military systems; discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory 
access control (MAC) (Department of Defence, 1985). 
Discretionary Access Control is such that the creator or owner of an object can assign 
access rights to that object, and anyone with discretionary access to an object can pass 
those rights to another user.  However, with DAC, there is no way to be sure that some 
unauthorised user will not eventually receive inappropriate rights through some chain of 
delegation.  To provide a secure system MAC was required.  MAC‟s most important 
feature was to deny users full control over the resources they create.  The system security 
policy (as set by the administrator) entirely determines the access rights granted, and a user 
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may not grant less restrictive access to their resources than the administrator specifies.  For 
MAC, the access control decision is contingent on verifying the compatibility of the 
security properties of the data and the clearance properties of the individual (or the process 
proxying for the individual). 
The following list includes some of the most important security features, currently required 
by the U.S. Department of Defence (Department of Defence, 1985): 
 It must be possible to control access to a resource by granting or denying access to 
individual users or named groups of users.  
 Memory must be protected so that its contents cannot be read after a process frees 
it.  Similarly, a secure file system, such as NTFS, must protect deleted files from 
being read.  
 Users must identify themselves in a unique manner, such as by password, when 
they log on.  All auditable actions must identify the user performing the action.  
 System administrators must be able to audit security-related events.  However, 
access to the security-related events audit data must be limited to authorised 
administrators.  
 The system must be protected from external interference or tampering, such as 
modification of the running system or of system files stored on disk. 
1.3.1 Authorisation Models 
An authorisation model is concerned with ways in which users can access resources in a 
computer system.  Informally “who is allowed to do what to what?”  Users can be human 
end-users or other computer systems.  The operations performed on objects range from 
simple querying of data, to sophisticated application facilities. 
The simplest form of authorisation is an access control list (ACL).  The ACL contains the 
names of objects and users, together with the specific operations that the user is authorised 
to perform on the object.  If a user wants to perform an operation on an object, the system 
searches for an entry on the ACL.  If the appropriate entry exists then the operation is 
allowed. 
User Operation Object 
Bob Read, Write File A 
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Bob Read, Execute File B 
Jim Read File C 
Jim Modify File D 
 
Any authorisation model (no matter how sophisticated) can be represented and 
implemented as an ACL.  The problem when dealing directly with an ACL is the allocation 
and maintenance of what can become a very large number of entries.  The main function of 
an authorisation model then becomes to maximise administrative efficiency whilst 
allowing sufficient granularity in the granting of permissions.  In this area, role-based 
access control (RBAC) has been predominant for a number of years. 
Administrative efficiency comes from assigning permissions to groups or collections of 
users.  In RBAC, permissions are assigned to roles, and then collections of users are 
assigned to each role.  In this way, a collection of users can be assigned to a collection of 
permissions.  Inheritance in RBAC allows an even larger collection of users to be assigned 
to a collection of permissions, because the collections of users assigned to any descendant 
roles are also included.   
However, in many cases the granularity has proved insufficient and occasioned the 
development of extensions to RBAC e.g. „parameterised RBAC‟ (Ge, et al., 2004), which 
uses role plus some other factor, such as location.  The TCM takes the idea of using 
collections for administrative efficiency a step further.  Essentially, an authorisation model 
uses some form of collections to connect users, operations, and objects to simplify 
administration.  In the TCM, this is acknowledged „up front‟ and „role‟ is not given a 
special place.  The TCM allows collections of operations and objects as well as users, and 
uses classifiers and classifier values to facilitate that.  
1.3.2  Context 
An authorisation model, through its implementation within an identity and access 
management system, provides facilities to enable users, whether they are human end-users 
or other computer systems, to use resources in specified ways.  
The Tees Confidentiality Model (Longstaff, et al., 2003) (Longstaff, et al., 2006) is a 
powerful model for authorisation, and is unique in that it includes comprehensive override 
capabilities.  It can support traditional discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory 
access control (MAC) and RBAC by representing each with a TCM permission type.  
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Other concepts such as credentials and trust can be supported within the same framework.  
The TCM lends itself to implementation by database systems, and I develop elements of its 
implementation by Microsoft Transact SQL, and other means. 
1.3.3 Identity Management Infrastructures 
For large applications, the design of authorisation models must cater for federated identity 
management. 
Federated Network Identity is the concept of utilising distributed identity stores, with no 
central management of identity.  In the federated model, network identity and user 
information is distributed across a number of locations.  Each participant in the federation 
agrees common standards for authentication and authorising each other‟s users.  This is the 
model used for the Project Liberty initiative (Project Liberty, 2006), which itself uses the 
SAML standard (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards, 
2006).  Project Liberty has produced extensive models of trusted environments.  The 
SAML standard specifies how one entity passes authentication and authorisation 
information to other using XML internet standards.  
Another language is XACML, which facilitates the defining of fine-grained authorisations 
(see (Mazzoleni, et al., 2006) for a discussion and application of XACML).  These 
mechanisms permit the signing and encryption of parts of XML documents.  The 
authorisation model presented in this paper could be used within federated infrastructures 
to support powerful authorisation functionality, defined in readily understandable and 
essentially simple terms. 
Another characteristic of modern computing is the increase in mobile device usage.  More 
users will connect to the organisation‟s resources from outside the firewall e.g. working at 
home, using a laptop, using a PDA.  Many users will not be full members of the 
organisation – they might be employed in joint ventures, or might be the staff of partners, 
or contracting staff, or the staff of customers or suppliers.  Authorisation policies must 
cater for these situations. 
Finally, it must be stated that the implementation of authorisation will often take place in a 
service oriented computing infrastructure, using web services.  Therefore, the applications 
designer should be aware of these concepts, their standards and implementation 
techniques. 
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1.3.4 Role-Based Access Control 
The most widely used model of authorisation is role-based access control (RBAC), and one 
of the most comprehensive works on the RBAC model is by Ferraiolo et al. (Ferraiola, et 
al., 2001).  RBAC has been used in computing practice such as operating systems, 
databases, web access management, and more recently in Service Oriented Computing 
applications.  Extensive research literature on RBAC can be found from the ACM 
SACMAT and TISSEC web portals and elsewhere; these sources also provide many 
examples of the use of RBAC in healthcare and commercial applications.  A summary of 
the commercial and industrial application of RBAC can be found in an EEMA whitepaper 
(The Independent European Association for eBusiness, 2003).  An ANSI INCITS standard 
for RBAC exists (INCITS, 2004).  
The basic principle of the established RBAC model of authorisation is that users acquire 
permissions through being assigned to roles.  Here “permission” means the granting of 
authority to perform an operation on a protected object (i.e. a resource), e.g. the granting of 
read access for part of a patient‟s medical record.  This contrasts with identity-based 
Access Control (IBAC) in which permissions are assigned directly to users.  The IBAC 
approach suffers from problems resulting from large numbers of permission assignments; 
the main purpose of RBAC is to reduce the number of permission assignments, and to 
facilitate their management (Bacon, et al., 2001). 
RBAC generally provides the following benefits: 
 Increased scalability for numbers of users and applications, especially for web-based 
users. 
 Improved productivity and efficiency through speed of response to organisational 
change, timely availability of resources to authorised users, and delegated authority. 
 Separation of duties (a user cannot inappropriately activate two or more roles at the 
same time). 
 Principle of least privilege – users only have the authorisations they actually need. 
 „Extended enterprise‟ benefits: development of trust relationships between 
organizations based on role model mappings.  In addition, RBAC can be one of the bases 
of shared methods for authentication and authorisation in federated infrastructures. 
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1.3.5 The Basis of the TCM 
This section gives a description of the principle, which is novel to the original TCM, and to 
the improved versions developed in this thesis. 
In basic RBAC, authorisation is determined by the single concept of role.  Each role is 
associated with one or more permissions, which enable an activity to take place.  
Therefore, a role, e.g. „GP‟ can be associated with a permission that allows reading and 
updating a patient‟s medical record.  In the TCM, authorisation is determined by multiple 
concepts, of which role may be one.  No special significance is attached to role, indeed it 
could be absent if the authorisation policy required it.  In addition, the equivalent of RBAC 
can be expressed in the TCM. 
The mechanism in the TCM involves a new type of permission, which is called a 
Confidentiality Permission CP, to distinguish it from permissions as used in RBAC.  Each 
concept to be used in authorisation is specified as a Classifier, and although at the start of 
this research a CP had a much more complex structure (see 1.3.6 below), a CP essentially 
consists of a set of classifiers and associated values.  For example, a CP might contain the 
following classifier/ classifier value pairs:  
{<Identity, Fred>, <Role, GP>, <OperationType, Read>, < HealthRecordID, EHR1>} 
This CP would allow Fred, if he was acting in a GP role, read access to health record 
EHR1.  (Much greater subtlety of permission is possible than is shown in this simple 
example: this is developed later in this thesis.) 
1.3.6 Overview of the Different TCM Models 
In this section I briefly describe how the use of formal methods led to the improvements of 
the TCM and give a description of the different versions of the TCM.  It is an account of 
the evolution of the access control research, fully described in the main sections of this 
thesis.   
Essential to the TCM as defined in a variety of papers (Longstaff, et al., 2006) (Longstaff, 
et al., 2003) at the start of this thesis (I shall call this version TCM1) is a range of 
permission types, called Confidentiality Permission Types (CPTs), which are processed in 
a defined order.  With each CPT there are associated Confidentiality Permissions that may 
have negative values (i.e. they may deny access), and may be overridden by authorised 
identities in carefully specified ways. 
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A Confidentiality Permission Type consists of a set of classifiers that together are 
considered useful for authorisation e.g. 
{Identity, Role, OperationType, HealthRecordID} 
N.B. although this notation is different from that used in the original papers it is essentially 
the same, except that the original notation enforced the TCM1 requirement that there be at 
least one of each set of user, operation, and object classifiers in a CPT.  This requirement 
was dropped for TCM3. 
In TCM1 a single concept of Collection is used for structuring classifier values, including 
roles. Confidentiality Permissions were defined using these collections and included the 
specification of inheritance within their definition.  This inheritance could be upward or 
downward through the collections. 
The application of formal specification to TCM1 brought about a number of 
rationalisations to the model.  It was realised that: 
 There was no need for upward and downward inheritance because every mixture of 
upward and downward inheritance applied to different collections within a CP, 
could be rewritten as all downwards inheritance. 
 The concept of collections itself was duplicating and overlapping the concept of 
classifiers i.e. an identity (or operation, or object) could be „classified‟ as belonging 
to a collection.  Thus, inheritance could be applied directly to the classifier values 
(as in RBAC). 
 There was no need for different inheritance relationships for different classifiers 
(e.g. role and location) but all inheritance for all classifiers (including operation and 
object classifiers could be modelled by a single inheritance relationship. 
TCM2 is TCM1 with the rationalisations as detailed above applied.  The inner workings of 
TCM2 are thus much simpler than those of TCM1.  Although CPTs and CPs could still be 
created through a user interface as in TCM1 (i.e. using collections, and upward and 
downward inheritance), these would be translated to an internal model based on TCM2. 
Further, it was realised that the TCM (in both the TCM1 and TCM2 specification) was in 
fact a generalisation of RBAC.  It was natural to ask which of the features of the TCM 
were part of a first step generalisation, and which were additional (perhaps unnecessary) 
extra add-ons.  It also became clear that the TCM had something to say about the 
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fundamental workings of an authorisation system in general.  This led to the development 
of TCM3. 
TCM3 is described in parts of this thesis as a simplification of TCM2.  It would be more 
correct to describe it as both a generalisation and a simplification of TCM2 which I believe 
has all the power of TCM2 without some of the extra complications.  The following 
features of TCM2 are not included in TCM3: 
 TCM2 ties every CP to a fixed set of CPTs.  Thus, the CPTs act as a constraint on 
what can be considered a valid CP.  In addition, there must be at least one of each 
set of user, operation, and object classifiers.  For TCM3 any set of <classifier, 
value> pairs can be a CP e.g. just {<Role, Administrator>}.  This is discussed more 
fully later, but this CP would allow any user in the role of Administrator to perform 
any operation on any object.  Interesting questions such as what would a CP equal 
to the empty set do?   It can be shown that this allows any user to perform any 
operation on any object.  If it were a prohibition it would prevent all operations. 
 TCM2 has the concept of CPT ordering which effectively makes some CPs more 
important than others.  This is thought valuable in order to implement the override 
features of the TCM.  In TCM3 we say that every CP has equal value, and explore 
the implementation of override through a system classifier. 
TCM3 is fully discussed in the relevant section (4).  It is a generalisation of RBAC and of 
TCM2 which I believe contains valuable mechanisms applicable to all authorisation 
systems. 
1.4 Introduction to Formal Methods 
Formal methods are used to provide software without bugs, rather than write software with 
lots of bugs and then spending time removing bugs from it.  Programs written using formal 
methods can be considerably smaller than those without.  The application of mathematics 
enforces compactness and non-duplication.  It is intended to demonstrate this with the 
TCM. 
The application of formal methods does delay coding.  In addition, much of the recent 
development approach has concentrated on coding very quickly, and in general, this has 
produced good results, even though many bugs have to be sorted out later through service 
packs and patches. 
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However, formal methods are heavily used in the development of military systems, and in 
safety-critical software.  B was used in the development of signalling software for the 
French railway system. 
Microsoft, one of the main proponents of rapid application development has lately been 
taking formal methods more seriously, as can be shown by their employment of Sir Tony 
Hoare.  The company developed a tool called Abstract State Machines Language.  The 
current version of this is applied through Spec Explorer and will be applied to the TCM, as 
an alternative to the B-Method.  Spec# is current Microsoft research, which applies formal 
methods as an extension of C#.  This will be applied as part of the development of TCM 
classes in C#. 
1.4.1 Overview of the B-Method  
The B-Method (Abrial, 1996) is a formal approach to the specification and development of 
computing that draws together advances in formal methods spanning the last thirty years.  
It is based on a wide-spectrum pseudo-programming notation, the Abstract Machine 
Notation (AMN), which provides a common framework for the construction of 
specifications, refinements, and implementations.  More importantly, it permits the formal 
verification of such systems. (Schneider, 2001)  
The B-Method is recommended for safety-critical software because it allows proof 
obligations to be discharged, thus validating the software for the entire domain.  (For a 
definition of ‟proof obligations‟, see 2.3.6.)  This is contrasted with normal software 
testing, which can show up the presence of bugs, but cannot conclusively prove their 
absence.  A B specification can be faithfully implemented in code, by means of refinement 
and other techniques.  
The B notation places an emphasis on simplicity: it deliberately rules out complex 
programming constructs, forcing the designer to use clear and well-understood program 
statements.  An example of the mathematics found in the ANSI INCITS standard for 
RBAC (INCITS, 2004), and said to be a form of Z, is given in Figure 1 below.  
Specification in B compares favourably with this, as will be demonstrated later in this 
thesis. 
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Figure 1: Maths in the RBAC Standard 
 
In B systems are modelled as a collection of interdependent abstract machines, for which 
an object-based approach is employed at all stages of development.  
An abstract machine is described using the Abstract Machine Notation (AMN).  A uniform 
notation is used at all levels of description, from specification, through design, to 
implementation.  Large machines can be constructed from other machines using the 
includes, uses and sees constructs.  
A B-development contains invariant assertions that provide consistency conditions within 
and between components, such as machines.  These invariants hold the development 
together and give rise to proof obligations that can be used to guarantee its correctness.  
The B-Method further prescribes how to structure large designs and large developments, 
and promotes the re-use of specification models and software modules.  Individual pieces 
of software systems are easy to understand, enabling verification of their combination and 
relationships with each other.  
The B-Toolkit (B-Core) is a configuration tool that manages developments under the B-
Method, generating proof obligations and supplying supporting tools for the discharge of 
those proof obligations (see 2.3.6).  There is also support for the generation of 
documentation, and for the browsing of developments. 
1.4.2 Spec Explorer 
Spec Explorer (Campbell, et al., 2005) is a software development tool for advanced model-
based specification and conformance testing.  Spec Explorer can help software 
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development teams detect errors in the design, specification, and implementation of their 
systems.  The tool is intended to be used by software testers, designers, and implementers.  
The core ideas behind Spec Explorer are:  
 To encode a system's intended behaviour (its specification) in machine-executable 
form (as a "model program").  The model program typically does much less than 
the implementation; it does just enough to capture the relevant states of the system 
and show the constraints that a correct implementation must follow.  The goal is to 
specify from a chosen viewpoint what the system must do, what it may do and what 
it must not do.  
 To explore the possible runs of the specification-program as a way to 
systematically generate test suites.  
 To compare the behaviour of the model program to the system's implementation in 
each of the scenarios discovered by algorithmic exploration. 
Spec Explorer consists of the following components:  
 The software modelling languages Spec# and AsmL.  
 An explicit-state model checker, which allows the user to search the  space of all 
possible sequences of method invocations that 1) do not violate the pre- and post-
conditions and invariants of the system's contracts and 2) are relevant to a user-
specified set of test properties.  
 A traversal engine, which unwinds the resulting finite state machine to produce 
behavioural tests that cover all explored transitions.  
 A binding mechanism allows users to associate actions of the model with methods 
of an implementation written .NET language.  
 A conformance checker that executes the generated behavioural tests.  
1.4.3 Spec# 
The Spec# programming system (Barnett, et al., 2004) is a new attempt at a more cost 
effective way to develop and maintain high-quality software.  Spec# is pronounced "Spec 
sharp" and can be written (and searched for) as the "specsharp" or "Spec# programming 
system".  The Spec# system consists of: 
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 The Spec# programming language.  Spec# is an extension of the object-oriented 
language C#.  It extends the type system to include non-null types and checked 
exceptions.  It provides method contracts in the form of pre- and post-conditions as 
well as object invariants.  
 The Spec# compiler.  Integrated into the Microsoft Visual Studio development 
environment for the .NET platform, the compiler statically enforces non-null types, 
emits run-time checks for method contracts and invariants, and records the 
contracts as metadata for consumption by downstream tools.  
 The Spec# static program verifier.  This component (codenamed Boogie) generates 
logical verification conditions from a Spec# program.  Internally, it uses an 
automatic theorem prover that analyzes the verification conditions to prove the 
correctness of the program or find errors in it.  
 A unique feature of the Spec# programming system is its guarantee of maintaining 
invariants (Barnett, et al., 2004) in object-oriented programs in the presence of 
callbacks, threads, and inter-object relationships. 
1.4.4 .NET Language-Integrated Query (LinQ) 
.NET Language-Integrated Query defines a set of general-purpose standard query operators 
that allow traversal, filter, and projection operations to be expressed in a direct yet 
declarative way in any .NET-based programming language.  The standard query operators 
allow queries to be applied to any IEnumerable<T>-based information source i.e. an 
information source with a mechanism to iterate over the elements of a sequence, generally 
with the ultimate goal of applying to such sequences the foreach programming pattern.  
LINQ allows third parties to augment the set of standard query operators with new domain-
specific operators that are appropriate for the target domain or technology.  
More importantly, third parties are also free to replace the standard query operators with 
their own implementations that provide additional services such as remote evaluation, 
query translation, optimisation, and so on.  By adhering to the conventions of the LINQ 
pattern, such implementations enjoy the same language integration and tool support as the 
standard query operators. 
The extensibility of the query architecture is used in the LINQ project itself to provide 
implementations that work over both XML and SQL data.  The query operators over XML 
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(LINQ to XML) use an efficient, easy-to-use, in-memory XML facility to provide 
XPath/XQuery functionality in the host programming language.  
The query operators over relational data (LINQ to SQL) build on the integration of SQL-
based schema definitions into the common language runtime (CLR) type system.  This 
integration provides strong typing over relational data while retaining the expressive power 
of the relational model and the performance of query evaluation directly in the underlying 
store.  (For further reading in this area, see (Rattz, 2007)) 
1.5 The Development of the TCM 
Prior to the commencement of the research project (in October 2004) which has resulted in 
this thesis, the TCM had been developed as follows: 
In 1998, a project started to model Electronic Patient Records (EPR).  The participants 
were Dr Jim Longstaff (coordinator), Graham Capper, Professor Mike Lockyer from the 
University of Teesside; Mr Michael Thick (then a transplant surgeon and head of the Liver 
Transplant Unit at the Freeman Hospital, Newcastle-upon-Tyne); and Dr David Jones 
(from the NHS Information Authority). 
 Authorisation was recognised as a key issue, and some key concepts of the TCM appeared 
in the early UML models.  The basic illustrative scenario (3.1.1) was devised by Mr. 
Thick, and the concept of overriding was devised by Dr. Longstaff.  The first 
implementations were developed by Dr. Longstaff in 1999 (Ontos OO database, and also 
SQL Server).  Due to internal promotion within the NHS by Mr. Thick and Dr. Jones, and 
several workshop and conference presentations, mostly by Dr. Longstaff, the TCM became 
recognised as being able to handle the most demanding authorisation scenarios in 
healthcare. 
In 2000, the Tees Health Authority successfully bid for ERDIP funding, with patient 
confidentiality, based on the TCM, as one of the three main projects.  Dr. Longstaff made a 
presentation of the SQL TCM demonstrator to the visiting ERDIP evaluation panel during 
the bidding process.  Over the next three years, considerable recognition was afforded to 
the TCM, with several other ERDIP projects implementing their own versions of it.  Such 
was the influence of the TCM that one bid for developing the Care Records System listed a 
TCM implementation as part of the proposed work programme.  A further major project at 
Teesside University was directly funded by the NHSIA.  This was the Health Records 
Infrastructure Programme project, for which Dr. Longstaff and Professor Lockyer 
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implemented a TCM demonstration on NHS computers at the Tees Health Authority, and 
this was accessed by other HRI projects in England.  Subsequently, many presentations 
were given to the NHS National Programme for IT - NPfIT, with the general objective of 
showing how complex scenarios could be modelled and implemented. 
Several high profile publications were also achieved, with very favourable feedback being 
obtained from leading academics and industry researchers. 
Despite its success up until the start of this research project, there were a number of 
weaknesses that the developers recognised.  The TCM was overly complex, with too many 
options available to model and implement authorisation scenarios.  This was particularly 
true in the notion of collections.  It was hoped that this project would identify and simplify 
the basic modelling and processing concepts.  This has actually been achieved, and the 
results of this research project, reported in section 3 onwards, have very much influenced 
the most recent practical application of the TCM (by Dr. Longstaff), which I now briefly 
summarise. 
On the basis of TCM publications, Dr Longstaff was approached by Private Access LLC, a 
start-up company in the USA (www.PrivateAccess.info ).  This company is developing a 
range of tools and services which have a Privacy Preferences Database (so called) as its 
core technology.  This will be a central repository for patient‟s (Consumers) privacy 
requirements for their health data, and will be used by Health Record Holders to verify that 
disclosures of health data to Record Seekers are in accordance with the patients‟ 
requirements.  (In the USA, there are many independent healthcare providers, who 
regularly have to process requests for health data from other providers, insurance 
companies, and other Record Seekers.)  The Privacy Preferences Database will have other 
uses, such as facilitating participation in clinical trials.  The TCM is being investigated as 
the model for the Privacy Preferences Database. 
It soon became apparent that the TCM as previously published would be unable to handle 
the complexity of this new application.  In the TCM prototype that has been developed for 
this application by Dr Longstaff, two key results of my research project as reported in this 
thesis were used.  These were firstly the simplification of Collections, and secondly the use 
of partially completed permissions, with much less emphasis on type.  Therefore, the 
present Privacy Preference Database prototype directly uses concepts derived from 
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theoretical considerations carried out during this project, and described in sections 3 and 
following below. 
1.6 Authorisation Models for Health Informatics 
1.6.1 Health Informatics Systems 
There are many computerised health and social care records systems, with some major new 
developments.  The NHS Care Records System (NHS Portal) (NHS Care Records), under 
development since 2004, is a major part of the largest non-military IT project in the world.  
In the USA, several high profile „Personal Health Records‟ systems (AHIMA) are already 
in use, and are being further developed: these include Microsoft HealthVault 
(HealthVault), and Indivo Health (Indivo) (Simons, et al.).  A definition of a personal 
health record (PHR) taken from the AHIMA site is given in Appendix B. 
One major function of PHRs is that they can import data from other providers, e.g. 
laboratory test data.  In addition, PHRs can import data from other PHR systems.  For 
example, HealthVault can import data from Indivo. 
A less-ambitious PHR-equivalent in England is HealthSpace (Healthspace), which is a 
secure website where patients can store their personal health information; however 
HealthSpace will eventually provide a patients‟ interface to their Summary Care Record 
(held in the NHS Care Records System).  
A key issue for all health informatics systems is the national infrastructure that supports 
them.  The NHS in England and Wales has a central registry system for patients, and a 
unique patient identifier (the NHS Number).  In addition, there is a central registry for 
doctors and other health care professionals.  No equivalent registries exist in the USA.  Dr. 
Longstaff recently visited the Indivo Health team at Harvard Medical School, and was told 
that one of the biggest obstacles to the development of data sharing and request facilities in 
the Indivo system is validating the requestor – it is difficult to know whether the requestor 
is a legitimate doctor because of the lack of a central registry. 
Authorised health care professionals are only able to access patient records through the 
NHS Care Records Service once they have satisfied robust access control mechanisms.  
These include: 
 A strong authentication process using smartcards that have chip and pass code 
technology, without which the system is inaccessible. 
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 They must have a Legitimate Relationship with any given patient (for example, be 
their registered GP or have been referred by an authenticated NHS clinician) before 
that patient record can be viewed. 
 Role Based Access Control limits what functions can be used within a given 
application.  For example the ability to view sealed data with patient permission. 
Many hospital and GP systems have variants of Role Based Access Control as the 
authorisation component of their security systems.  They are often supplied with a small 
number of pre-defined roles, e.g. GP, Senior GP, Receptionist, Administrator.  Extra roles 
can be defined and implemented as required.  
1.6.2 The NHS CRS Authorisation Model 
In 2004, the first writings on an authorisation model for the CRS appeared on NHS 
Connecting for Health websites.  It was described as the „Sealed Envelope‟ model, and it is 
the stated intention of the NHS to provide this during 2008 as part of the Care Records 
Service.  The basic concepts of „Sealing‟, and „Sealing and Locking‟ data has not changed 
since 2004, though their presentation on NHS websites often has.  There is a direct 
equivalent of the TCM concept of override, as researched as part of the NHS-funded 
ERDIP and HRI Programmes (see section 1.5 above), in the Sealed Envelope model. 
The assumptions for the Sealed Envelope model are that 
 Clinicians work in teams/work groups 
 Confidential information needs to be shared within the team and protected from 
wider access 
 Sealed Information is not seen by administrative roles unless local customisation 
redefines for particular roles and with appropriate training (RBAC) 
There are two levels of sensitivity: 
 A sensitive level – “sealed” 
 A  sensitive invisible level that is locked down and not available outside the clinical 
team/workgroup – “sealed and locked” 
Clinicians in the workgroup in which the sealed data was created can see this data, 
although it is marked as sensitive.  However, clinicians in another workgroup in the same 
organisation, or clinicians in a separate organisation, would have to „break the seal‟, 
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meaning invoking an override, in order to access the data.  The existence of sealed data 
would have been communicated to them by means of a message or flag; it is up to their 
professional judgement whether they break the seal or not. 
For sealed and locked data, clinicians in the workgroup in which the data was created can 
access the data, which is again marked as sensitive.  However, members of other 
workgroups, in the same or other organisations, cannot access the data, and are not even 
aware of its existence – no message or flag is displayed to them when they access the 
patient‟s record. 
It is worth noting that an almost identical concept, called „Breaking the Glass‟, is being 
implemented as part of the Canadian Infoway Programme (Infoway, 2005).  The TCM 
Model is referenced in this reference (Infoway, 2005). 
1.6.3 The Indivo Health Sharing Model 
Indivo health (Indivo) provides a simple sharing model, inviting users to choose one of 
five pre-installed authorisation policies.  Sharing can only take place with a person who 
already has an Indivo account.  The sharing policies are as follows. 
 Primary Care Provider (allows reading of record, and adding of comments and 
updates) 
 Family Member (allows reading of record) 
 School (allows a university to read immunisation records) 
 Research Administrator (allows this user to access data for research projects) 
 Friend (allows reading of contact information, and sending of secure messages) 
No fine-grained authorisation, as proposed for the Sealed Envelope Model, or supported by 
the TCM, is available in the Indivo PHR. 
1.7 Overview of Thesis 
Chapter 2 is a complete specification of the RBAC ANSI standard using B.  The published 
standard uses a form of Z.  It contains several errors.  The B specification is a distinct 
improvement, and provides a better basis for programming.  This chapter really needs to be 
studied together with the original documents (Ferraiola, et al., 2001) (INCITS, 2004) as the 
main area of innovation here is in the application of the B-Method.  This Chapter also 
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includes some Spec# to demonstrate how the pre- and post-conditions from the B 
specification can be applied in a programming environment. 
Chapter 3 is a complete specification of the TCM following the same format as the RBAC 
standard.  Several improvements to the TCM as originally published are made, and the 
resulting (improved) model is called TCM2.  TCM2 represents the state of the TCM at the 
present time i.e. as it has been developed through a series of papers, and as it has been 
applied by Dr. Longstaff in a number of real-life scenarios.  Spec Explorer is introduced as 
another method of formal specification.  The different methods are contrasted and 
compared.  Some SQL is shown to demonstrate the link between the formal specification 
and the code.  A demonstration application is produced which demonstrates some of the 
key features of TCM2. 
Chapter 4 introduces a generalised and simplified version of TCM2, which for 
convenience I call TCM3.  This retains the key features of the TCM whilst making it more 
accessible to administration.  A justification for this is provided.  The main operations 
(methods, functions) are described in both B and Spec#.  TCM3 could be described as the 
bare bones of the TCM and it is demonstrated that even in this bare-bone state it represents 
a significant improvement to RBAC, of which it is a generalisation.  It is shown that this 
generalisation gives increased flexibility and power over RBAC.  Features of TCM2 which 
are not included in this bare-bone version such as Confidentiality Permission Type 
ordering can be added back if thought desirable in a particular situation.  Some of the 
features of TCM3 are being used by Dr. Longstaff in his current work with Private Access 
LLC. 
Chapter 5 is a case study showing how TCM3 can be applied to the running „Fred and 
Alice‟ scenario without a lot of the detail of TCM2.  It includes comparisons of TCM3 
with RBAC, TCM1, and TCM2. 
Chapter 6 details a TCM3 class which can be applied to any authorisation scenario.  For 
completeness, a TCM2 class is also detailed.  The classes are specified using LinQ (1.4.4) 
to link to an SQL Server database. 
1.8 Research Contributions 
 Exploration of B as a tool for access control, with a complete re-specification of the 
RBAC formal model.  This research was presented at a B Method conference held 
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at Nantes in 2008 (Dunne, et al., 2008).  This conference was attended by the 
inventor of the B formal method: Jean-Raymond Abrial. 
 A new technique for structuring the formal description of access control 
mechanisms which reduces overall complexity 
 Examination of the mathematical basis of the TCM using B as the main tool 
 The simplification of and the removal of inconsistencies from the TCM whilst 
keeping the power of the original model. 
 The development of more general models of the TCM driven by the underlying 
mathematics 
 The formalisation of a general model of access control which is a generalisation of 
Role Based Access Control and can be used in any authorisation scenario.  
 The development of tools to enable the implementation of general authorisation 
models including the TCM. 
1.9 Summary 
The aims and objectives have been described.  There has been some general discussion on 
the history of access control and the development of the TCM in particular.  The tools that 
are to be applied, initially to RBAC and then to the TCM, have been described, and the use 
of new technologies, such as LinQ, have been mentioned. 
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2  Role-Based Access Control 
2.1 Introduction 
The starting point for the TCM specification was the ANSI INCITS standard for Role-
Based Access Control (INCITS, 2004), and therefore it was natural for the underlying 
model in the RBAC standard to be specified as the first step.  
However, the application of the B-Method, using the B-Toolkit development system, 
resulted in a new, comparatively readable, and understandable formal specification for 
RBAC.  In addition, several improvements in the RBAC Standard were contained in the B 
specification, namely corrections to operations; the ensurance of consistency; simpler 
specification of separation of duties; and a better basis for implementation.  Hence, this 
work forms a contribution to RBAC and its formal specification.  
During this work, a new approach to structuring B specifications, which is appropriate for 
large applications such as RBAC, was also developed and used.  Our re-specification in B 
is intended to provide a foundation for additional work that includes the extension of 
RBAC, in particular our own work on the TCM. 
2.1.1 Core RBAC 
Core RBAC embodies the essential aspects of RBAC.  The basic concept of RBAC is that 
users are assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to roles, and users acquire permissions 
by being members of roles.  Core RBAC includes requirements that user-role and 
permission-role assignment can be many-to-many.  Thus, the same user can be assigned to 
many roles and a single role can have many users.  Similarly, for permissions, a single 
permission can be assigned to many roles and a single role can be assigned to many 
permissions.  
Core RBAC includes requirements for user-role review whereby the roles assigned to a 
specific user can be determined as well as the users assigned to a specific role.  A similar 
requirement for permission-role review is imposed as an advanced review function.  Core 
RBAC also includes the concept of user sessions, which allows selective activation and 
deactivation of roles.  Finally, Core RBAC requires that users be able simultaneously to 
exercise permissions of multiple roles.  
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2.1.2 Hierarchical RBAC 
Hierarchical RBAC adds requirements for supporting role hierarchies.  A hierarchy is 
mathematically a partial order defining a parent/ child relation (the closure of which 
defines an ancestor/ descendant relationship) between roles, whereby descendant roles 
acquire the permissions of their ancestors.  A medical example would be that the role 
“Health Care Professional” could be the parent of “GP”, and the role “GP” could be the 
parent of role “Head of Practice”.  Thus, “Head of Practice” would be a descendant of 
“Health Care Professional”.  “GP” would acquire the permissions of “Health Care 
Professional” in addition to permissions of their own.  “Head of Practice” would acquire 
the permissions of “GP” in addition to permissions of their own.  There are generally two 
types of role hierarchies: 
 Limited Hierarchies: This is a simple tree structure where a parent role can have 
several children roles, but every child role can have only one parent role.  
 General Hierarchies: A parent role can have several children roles, and every child 
role can have several parent roles.  Throughout this document, I have chosen to 
work with general hierarchies, this being consistent with the methodology of 
specifying the most general case possible throughout. 
2.1.3 Constrained RBAC 
2.1.3.1 Static Separation of Duty 
In RBAC, separation of duty is used to enforce conflict of interest policies.  Conflict of 
interest in a role-based system may arise as a result of a user gaining authorisation for 
permissions associated with conflicting roles.  One means of preventing this form of 
conflict of interest is though static separation of duty (SSD), that is, to enforce constraints 
on the assignment of users to roles.  An example of such a static constraint is the 
requirement that two roles be mutually exclusive; for example, if one role requests 
expenditures and another approves them, the organization may prohibit the same user from 
being assigned to both roles.  The SSD policy can be centrally specified and then 
uniformly imposed on specific roles: 
 Static Separation of Duty.  SSD places constraints on the assignments of users to 
roles.  Membership in one role may prevent the user from being a member of one or 
more other roles, depending on the SSD rules enforced. 
 35 
 Static Separation of Duty in the Presence of a Hierarchy.  This type of SSD relation 
works in the same way as basic SSD except that both inherited roles as well as 
directly assigned roles are considered when enforcing the constraints. 
With respect to the constraints placed on the user-role assignments for defined sets of 
roles, the RBAC standard defines SSD as a pair (roleset, n) where no user is assigned to n 
or more roles from the role set.  
2.1.3.2 Dynamic Separation of Duty 
In RBAC dynamic separation of duty (DSD), like SSD, limits the permissions that are 
available to a user.  However, DSD differs from SSD relations by the context in which 
these limitations are imposed.  DSD requirements limit the availability of the permissions 
by placing constraints on the roles that can be activated within or across a user‟s sessions.  
(A user‟s activated roles for a particular session are a subset of their assigned roles.) 
Similar to SSD relations, DSD defines constraints as a pair (roleset, n) with the property 
that no user session may activate n or more roles from the role set. 
2.2 RBAC Reference Model 
I define the RBAC reference model following the same outline as the NIST standard.  
However, I take the B-Method as our means of definition.  This is an improvement over 
the Z used in the standard and exposes some of the errors.  It also has the advantage of 
generating and requiring the discharge of proof obligations.  Even disregarding the 
mathematical simplification provided by the B-Model, the increased validity provided by 
the discharge of proof obligations means that this specification is significantly better than 
the NIST standard, although this may not be apparent in just comparing specifications. 
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Figure 2: Core RBAC 
2.2.1 Core RBAC 
Core RBAC model sets and relations are shown in Figure 2.  Core RBAC includes five 
basic set types called USER, ROLE, OPN (operation), OBJ (object), and SESSION.  The 
set type PRM (permission) is the cross product of the types operation and object: PRM = 
OPN x OBJ.  The RBAC standard has PRM as a separate type, but if anything, permissions 
would be a variable i.e. a subset of OPN x OBJ consisting of valid operations on objects.  
In this treatment, it has not been found necessary to have a permissions variable separate 
from the permission to role relation. 
The RBAC model as a whole is fundamentally defined in terms of roles being assigned to 
users and permissions being assigned to roles.  In addition, the Core RBAC model includes 
a set of sessions where each session is a mapped to an activated subset of the roles that 
have been assigned to the user. 
A user is thought of as a human being.  However, the concept of a user can be extended to 
include machines, networks, or intelligent autonomous agents.  A role is a job function 
within the context of an organization with some associated semantics regarding the 
authority and responsibility conferred on the user assigned to the role.  Permission is an 
approval to perform an operation on one or more RBAC protected objects.  An operation is 
an executable image of a program, which upon invocation executes some function for the 
user. 
The types of operations and objects that RBAC controls are dependent on the type of 
system in which they will be implemented.  For example, within a file system, operations 
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might include read, write, and execute; within a database management system, operations 
might include insert, delete, append, and update. 
2.2.2 Hierarchical RBAC 
Hierarchical RBAC introduces role hierarchies through a parent/ child relationship (pc) as 
indicated in  
Figure 3.  The relation ad defines the ancestor to descendant relationships as the reflexive 
transitive closure of the parent/ child relationship: ad = pc *. 
 
 
Figure 3: Hierarchical RBAC 
2.2.3 Constrained RBAC 
Constrained RBAC introduces two partial functions: 
  ssd ∈ F1 (Roles) ⇸ n1 
  dsd ∈ F1 (Roles) ⇸ n1 
F1 (Roles) is the set of all non-empty finite subsets of Roles.  n1 is the set of non-zero 
natural numbers.  The function ssd defines the maximum number of members of each 
Roles subset that can be concurrently authorised by user assignment and role hierarchies.  
The function dsd defines the maximum number of members of each Roles subset that can 
be contained in the set of roles for a session. 
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2.3 Specification in B 
The basic building block of specification in B is an abstract machine.  An abstract machine 
is usually a specification of part of a system.  A machine is not unlike a description of an 
object in an object-oriented sense.  It has a name, some internal state, and a set of 
operations.  Machines can be included in other machines.  Figure 4 shows the machines 
and their inclusion structure for the modelling of the RBAC Standard.  Each rectangle 
represents a machine, and the arrows show their inclusion structures (i.e. that a machine is 
specified in terms of any included machines). 
Figure 4 also shows our new technique for specifying complex B applications such as 
RBAC.  The machine icrbac contains the specification of essential RBAC functionality 
(which corresponds to Core RBAC in the RBAC Standard); this machine is then included 
in the ihrbac machine which contains the specification of hierarchical RBAC 
(corresponding to Hierarchical RBAC in the RBAC Standard).  However the machine 
crbac just addresses the functionality of Core RBAC, for the purposes of a user who  
 
Figure 4: Abstract Machines for RBAC 
 
just wants to use Core RBAC –It is a ‟shell‟ providing a Core RBAC interface and 
including those invariants and preconditions which are only applicable to Core RBAC.  
The machines ihrbac and hrbac perform a similar function for Hierarchical RBAC.  The 
machine sdrbac is RBAC with Separation of Duties or Constrained RBAC. 
The following sections consist of the actual specification of machines for RBAC, as devel-
oped using the B-Toolkit.  The specification follows the layout of the B-Toolkit, which 
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allows comments to be included with the machine specifications.  These specifications can, 
and have been verified, using the B-Toolkit.  
2.3.1 Inner Core RBAC (icrbac)  
This machine is the inner core of core RBAC.  It consists of those variables and operations 
which can be included in core RBAC, or included in RBAC with general or limited 
hierarchies.  
MACHINE 
Every B machine has a name which can be used to include the machine in other machines 
 icrbac 
SEES  
Bool_ TYPE is a basic machine which adds Boolean functionality. 
 Bool_ TYPE 
 SETS  
Sets introduced in this clause are types available for use in the rest of the machine.  They 
can be named here without any further information being provided, deferring their 
definition until some later state of the development.  There are five types declared here in 
contrast to the ANSI standard, which has everything of type NAME.  This gives a more 
exact verification when type checking is performed by the B-Toolkit 
 USER; ROLE; OPN; OBJ; SESSION  
VARIABLES  
An abstract machine maintains its state information in variables.  The following are the 
variables used in RBAC and defined in the ANSI standard. 
 Users, Roles, ua, pa, su, sr  
INVARIANT  
The invariant clause provides all of the information about the variables of the machine.  It 
must give all of their types, and their relationship with each other.  The values of variables 
will change as the machine executes, but the invariant describes the properties of the 
variables, which must be always true as the machine executes.  The invariant clauses below 
closely follows the ANSI standard. 
Users ⊆ USER ⋀  
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Roles ⊆ ROLE ⋀ 
ua ∈ Users ↔ Roles ⋀  
pa ∈ PRM ↔ Roles ⋀ 
 
The variable su is defined as a partial function from SESSION to the set of users.  The set 
Sessions is defined as the domain of su in DEFINITIONS 
 and UserSessions is defined as the inverse of su.  The variable sr (session roles) is a 
relation between Sessions and Roles. 
 su ∈ SESSION ⇸ Users ⋀ 
sr ∈ Sessions ↔ Roles 
 
INITIALISATION  
The initialisation clause describes the possible initial state of the machine.  All variables 
listed in the variables clause must be assigned some value.  The initialisation state must 
satisfy the invariant. 
Users, Roles, ua, pa, su, sr  
≔ {} , {} , {} , {} , {} , {}  
DEFINITIONS 
This section defines derived variables.  There is no need for them to be separately updated 
from the variables they derive from as is done in the RBAC standard.  PRM is the type for 
permissions and is the cross product of operation (OPN) and object (OBJ): 
PRM = OPN x OBJ;  
The permissions (prms) in use i.e. the operations on objects that are assigned to all the 
different roles in the system are derived from the permission to role relation pa: 
prms = dom (pa);  
The set of Sessions is derived from session to user function su: 
Sessions = dom (su);  
The set of sessions belonging to the user u: 
UserSessions (u) = su 
-1 
[{u}];  
Roles active in a session s: 
Activeroles (s) = sr [{s}];  
All roles active for a user u in all sessions belonging to the user: 
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Rolesactive (u) = sr [su
-1
[{u}]; 
Roles assigned to a user u: 
Assignedroles (u) = ua [{u}];  
Users assigned to a role r: 
Assignedusers (r) = ua
-1
[{r}];  
Assigned permissions for a role r: 
Assignedpermissions (r) = pa
-1
[{r}];  
Permissions assigned to a set of roles s: 
Permissionsassigned (s) = pa
-1
[s]  
 
OPERATIONS  
This clause contains a list of operation definitions.  The B description of an operation pro-
vides preconditions, input parameters, output parameters, and the effects or behaviour of 
the operation.  It is in a form suitable for software specification. 
2.3.1.1 Administrative Commands  
AddUser: This operation creates a new RBAC user.  The user must be of type USER and 
not already, a member of the Users set.  There is no need to update UserSessions as in the 
RBAC standard because UserSessions is derived from su and initially maps the user to the 
empty set by definition. 
AddUser (user) ≙  
PRE  
user ∈ USER − Users  
THEN  
Users: = Users ⋃ {user} 
END;  
 
DeleteUser: This operation deletes an existing user from the RBAC database.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the user to be deleted is a member of Users.  The user 
assignment relation (ua) and the session user function (su) are updated.  The user‟s 
sessions are removed from the session role (sr) relation.  The maths in the RBAC standard 
is over complicated.  The effect of DeleteUser, DeleteRole, and DeassignUser on sessions 
and session roles are left in the ANSI standard as implementation decisions.  The 
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alternatives are sessions could be allowed to continue, forced to terminate, or disallowed 
roles removed from the session.  Particular choices have been made in the operations 
below but others could be equally well implemented.  In fact B allows indeterminate 
assignment, with precise specification at a later refinement stage. 
 DeleteUser (user) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users  
THEN  
Users := Users – {user} ||
 
ua := {user} ⩤ ua || 
su := su ⩥ {user} || 
sr := User_Sessions (user) ⩤ sr 
END;  
 
AddRole: This operation creates a new RBAC role.  The role must be of type ROLE and 
not already a member of the Roles set.  There is no need to update user assignment and 
permission assignments as in the RBAC standard because these are automatically mapped 
to the empty set by definition. 
AddRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ ROLE - Roles  
THEN  
Roles := Roles ⋃ {role} 
END; 
 
XDeleteRole: This operation deletes an existing role from the RBAC database.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the role to be deleted is a member of Roles.  The user 
assignment relation (ua) and the permission assignment relation (pa) are updated.  The role 
is removed from the session role (sr) relation.  The operation is named XDeleteRole 
because this specification is going to be included in a higher order machine.  This is the 
case for all operations beginning with X.  The maths in the RBAC standard is vastly 
overcomplicated and a lot of it is unnecessary.  
XDeleteRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles  
THEN  
Roles := Roles - {role} || 
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ua := ua ⩥{role} || 
pa := pa ⩥{role} || 
sr := sr ⩥{role} || 
END; 
 
“XAssignUser: This operation assigns a user to a role.  The operation is valid if and only if 
the user is a member of Users, the role is a member of Roles, and the user is not already 
assigned to the role.  For the definition of Assignedroles see DEFINITIONS 
There is no need to update the derived function Assignedusers as is done in the RBAC 
standard.” 
XAssignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
  role ∈ Roles – Assignedroles (user) 
THEN  
ua := ua ⋃ {user ↦ role} 
END; 
 
XDeassignUser: This operation deletes the assignment of the user to the role.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of Users and the role is one of the 
user‟s assigned roles.  In this case, it has been decided that a role cannot be deassigned 
whilst it is one of the user‟s active roles.  For a definition of Rolesactive see 
DEFINITIONS 
XDeassignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
 role ∈ Assignedroles (user) – Rolesactive (user) 
THEN  
ua := ua - {user ↦ role} 
END; 
 
GrantPermission: This operation grants a role the permission to perform an operation on 
an object.  The permission must not already be one of the role‟s Assignedpermissions.  For 
the definition of Assignedpermissions see DEFINITIONS 
. 
GrantPermission (op, obj, role) ≙ 
PRE 
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op ∈ OPN ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ ⋀ role ∈ Roles ⋀ 
op ↦ obj ∉ Assignedpermissions (role) 
THEN  
pa := pa ⋃ {op ↦ obj ↦ role} 
END; 
 
RevokePermission: This operation revokes the permission to perform an operation on an 
object from the set of permissions assigned to a role.  The permission must be one of the 
role‟s Assignedpermissions.  For a definition of Assignedpermissions see DEFINITIONS 
. 
RevokePermission (op, obj, role) ≙ 
PRE 
op ∈ OPN ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ ⋀ role ∈ Roles ⋀ 
op ↦ obj ∈ Assignedpermissions (role) 
THEN  
pa := pa - {op ↦ obj ↦ role} 
END; 
2.3.1.2 Supporting System Functions 
XCreateSession: This operation creates a new session for a given user as owner with an 
active role set ars.  The operation is valid if and only if user is a member of Users, and the 
active role set is a subset of Roles.  The requirement that the active role set is a subset of 
the session user‟s assigned roles is enforced through the invariant sr ⊆ (su ; ua) 
in crbac.  This invariant is different when „inner core rbac‟ is included in „hierarchical 
rbac‟.  The set Sessions is defined as the domain of su in DEFINITIONS 
XCreateSession (user, session, ars) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ session ∈ SESSION - Sessions ⋀ ars ⊆ Roles  
THEN  
su (session) := user ||  
sr := sr ⋃ session
 
x ars  
END;  
 
DeleteSession: This operation deletes a given session.  The function is valid if and only if 
session is a member of Sessions.  The relations, session user (su) and session roles (sr) are 
modified using domain subtraction.  There is no need to input the user as an additional 
parameter as is done in the NIST standard. 
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DeleteSession (session) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions  
THEN  
su := {session} ⩤ su || 
sr  := {session} ⩤ sr 
END;  
 
XActivateRole: This operation adds a role as an active role of a session.  The requirement 
that role is one of the session user‟s assigned roles is enforced through the invariant sr ⊆ 
(su ; ua) 
 in crbac.  There is no reason to add user to the operation as a parameter (as done in the 
standard) as the session belongs to one and only one user.  For a definition of Activeroles 
see DEFINITIONS 
 
XActivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋃
 
role ∈
 
Roles ⋀  
role ∈ Roles - Activeroles (session)  
THEN  
sr := sr ⋃ {session ↦ role} 
END;  
 
DeactivateRole: This function deletes a role from the active role set of a session.  The 
function is valid if and only if the session is a member of Sessions, and the role is an active 
role of that session.  There is no reason to have user in the operation as a parameter (as 
done in the standard) as the session belongs to one and only one user. 
DeactivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
Session ∈ Sessions ⋃ role ∈ Roles ⋀  
role ∈ Activeroles (session)  
THEN  
sr := sr - {session ↦ role} 
END;  
 
CheckAccess: This operation returns a Boolean value as to whether the user of a given 
session is or is not allowed to perform a given operation on a given object.  The function is 
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valid if and only if the session is a member of Sessions, the object is of type OBJ, and the 
operation is of type OPN.  For a definition of Permissionsassigned see DEFINITIONS 
. 
bb ← CheckAccess (session, op, obj) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋀ op ∈ OPN ⋀ obj ∈
 
OBJ  
THEN  
bb := bool (op ↦
 
obj ∈ Permissionsassigned (Activeroles (session)))  
END;  
2.3.1.3 Review Functions   
AssignedUsers: This function returns the set of users assigned to a given role.  The 
function is valid if and only if the role is a member of Roles.  For a definition of 
Assignedusers see DEFINITIONS 
 
au ← AssignedUsers (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles  
THEN  
au := Assignedusers (role)  
END; 
  
AssignedRoles: This operation returns the set of roles assigned to a given user.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of Users.  For a definition for 
Assignedroles is see DEFINITIONS 
 
ar ← AssignedRoles (user) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users  
THEN  
ar := Assignedroles (user)  
END;  
2.3.1.4 Advanced Review Functions  
SessionRoles: This operation returns the active roles associated with a session.  The 
operation is valid if and only if session is a member of Sessions. 
sr ← SessionRoles (session) ≙ 
PRE  
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session ∈ Sessions  
THEN  
sr := Activeroles (session)  
END;  
 
“SessionPermissions: This operation returns the permissions of the session, that is, the 
permissions assigned to its active roles.  The operation is valid if and only if session is a 
member Sessions.” 
sp ← SessionPermissions (session) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions  
THEN  
sp := Permissionsassigned (Activeroles (session))  
END  
 
2.3.2 Core RBAC (crbac)  
Core RBAC is the outer shell needed to implement RBAC without hierarchies or 
separation of duties.  It includes Inner Core RBAC (icrbac), and has additional invariants 
and preconditions required for implementation.  These invariants and preconditions are 
different for hierarchical and constrained RBAC which is why they are just part of the 
outer shell 
MACHINE 
 crbac 
INCLUDES 
icrbac 
PROMOTES 
 The promotes section includes the operations from an included machine without 
alteration: 
AddUser, DeleteUser, AddRole, GrantPermission, RevokePermission,  
DeleteSession, DeactivateRole, CheckAccess, AssignedUsers, AssignedRoles, 
SessionRoles, SessionPermissions  
INVARIANT  
sr ⊆ (su ; ua) 
 
This expression enforces the requirement that a session‟s roles must be a subset of the 
session user‟s assigned roles.  In order to satisfy this requirement the preconditions of 
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some operations have to be altered.  In discharging the proof obligations any preconditions 
that do not satisfy the invariant are highlighted, and can be altered until all the proof 
obligations are discharged.  
The power of this procedure was not available to the producers of the RBAC standard, 
with the result of many errors – usually minor – in the standard.  However, there is a case 
for saying that a standard that is going to be used as a basis for programming and 
development should be free of all errors even minor ones.  
As an example of the type of error found, there is no special handling of „DeleteRole‟ for 
Hierarchical RBAC in the RBAC standard: it being assumed that it would be the same as 
in Core RBAC.  However, if the deleted role is contained within the inheritance 
relationship, then this has to be addressed as part of role deletion (see 2.3.3.1). 
It is primarily because of the discharge of the proof obligations that it is said that this 
specification is a better basis for programming than the standard.  In fact, code can be 
directly produced in C from the specification using the B-Toolkit.  However, because I am 
using SQL and C#, the code parallels the specification rather than being directly produced, 
but the correlation and the help given by the formal specification is clear. 
OPERATIONS  
2.3.2.1 Administrative Commands  
DeleteRole: This operation deletes an existing role from the RBAC database and has the 
same preconditions as XDeleteRole.  The effect in Core RBAC is that the included 
operation is renamed to give the final operation. 
DeleteRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles  
THEN 
XDeleteRole (role) 
END; 
 
AssignUser: This operation assigns a user to a role and has the same preconditions as 
XAssignUser.  The effect in Core RBAC is that the included operation is renamed to give 
the final operation. 
AssignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
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user ∈ Users ⋀ 
  role ∈ Roles – Assignedroles (user) 
THEN  
XAssignUser (user, role) 
END; 
 
“DeassignUser: This operation deletes the assignment of the user to the role and has the 
same preconditions as XDeassignUser.  The effect in Core RBAC is that the included 
operation is renamed to give the final operation” 
    DeassignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
 role ∈ Assignedroles (user) – Rolesactive (user) 
THEN  
XDeassignUser (user, role)  
END; 
2.3.2.2 Supporting System Functions 
CreateSession: This operation creates a new session for a given user as owner with an 
active role set (ars).  There is an additional precondition which is required to satisfy the 
invariant sr ⊆ (su; ua), and that is that the active role set (ars) must be a subset of the roles 
assigned to that user. 
CreateSession (user, session, ars) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ session ∈ SESSION - Sessions ⋀  
ars ⊆ Assignedroles (user) 
THEN  
XCreateSession (user, session, ars) 
END;  
 
ActivateRole: This operation adds a role as an active role of a session and has the same 
preconditions as XActivateRole.  To satisfy the invariant sr ⊆ (su; ua) the role must be one 
of the session user‟s assigned roles. 
 ActivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
role ∈ Roles - Activeroles (session) ⋀ 
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role ∈ Assignedroles (su (session))  
THEN  
XActivateRole (session, role) 
END; 
2.3.2.3 Advanced Review Operations 
RolePermissions: This operation returns the set of all permissions (op, obj), granted to a 
given role.  The operation is valid if and only if the role is a member of Roles. 
rp ← RolePermissions (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈
 
Roles 
THEN  
rp := AssignedPermissions (role)  
END; 
  
UserPermissions: This operation returns the permissions a given user gets through his or 
her assigned roles.  The operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of Users. 
up ← UserPermissions (user) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈
 
Users 
THEN  
up := Permissionsassigned (Assignedroles (user))  
END; 
 
RoleOperationsOnObject: This operation returns the set of operations a given role is 
permitted to perform on a given object.  The operation is valid only if the role is a member 
of Roles, and the object is of type OBJ. 
ro ← RoleOperationsOnObject (role, obj) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈
 
Roles ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ 
THEN  
ro: = {op | op ∈
 
OPN ⋀ op ↦ obj ∈ Assignedpermissions (role)} 
END; 
 
UserOperationsOnObject: This operation returns the set of operations a given user is 
permitted to perform on a given object, obtained either directly or through his or her 
assigned roles.  The operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of Users and the 
object obj is of type OBJ. 
uo ← UserOperationsOnObject (user, obj) ≙ 
 51 
PRE  
user ∈
 
Users ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ 
THEN  
ro := {op | op ∈
 
OPN ⋀ op ↦ obj ∈ Permissionsassigned(Assignedroles (user))} 
END 
 
2.3.3 Inner Hierarchical (ihrbac)  
MACHINE  
This machine is the inner core of RBAC with general hierarchies.  It consists of those 
operations which can be included in hierarchical RBAC or in a higher machine which also 
has separation of duties: 
ihrbac  
SEES  
Bool TYPE  
INCLUDES 
Inner Hierarchical RBAC includes Inner Core RBAC: 
icrbac  
PROMOTES 
The promotes section includes the operations from an included machine without alteration: 
AddUser , DeleteUser , AddRole , XAssignUser , GrantPermission , RevokePermission , 
DeleteSession , DeactivateRole , CheckAccess , AssignedUsers , AssignedRoles , 
SessionRoles , SessionPermissions 
VARIABLES  
The additional variable in Hierarchical RBAC is the parent/ child relation pc which is used 
to implement General or Limited Role Hierarchies. 
pc  
INVARIANT  
The pc relation is a mapping from Roles to Roles.  The expression r1 ↦ r2 ∈ pc implies 
that r1 is a parent of r2 and conversely r2 is a child of r1.  E.g. doctor would be the parent 
of paediatrician if there were no intervening roles, or engineer the parent of chief engineer. 
pc ∈ Roles ↔ Roles 
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It is necessary to avoid a cycle so that a role cannot be an ancestor of itself.  The invariant 
below enforces that.  The definition of cycles is in DEFINITIONS 
  below.  
cycles (pc) = {}  
The following invariant enforces the condition that a user‟s session roles are a subset of 
their authorised roles either by assignment or through role hierarchies.  In Core RBAC, the 
expression was sr ⊆ (su ; ua) but now we must include roles acquired through the parent/ 
child relation pc.  The definition of cycles uauth is given in DEFINITIONS 
. 
sr ⊆ (su ; uauth)  
 
 
 
INITIALISATION  
The initialisation clause describes the possible initial state of the machine.  All variables 
listed in the variables clause must be assigned some value.  The initialisation state must 
satisfy the invariant.  
pc := {} 
 
DEFINITIONS  
The definition of ad gives the ancestor to descendant relationships as the reflexive 
transitive closure of the parent to child relationship pc: 
ad = pc *;  
The definition of da gives the descendant to ancestor relationships as the inverse reflexive 
transitive closure of the parent to child relationship pc: 
da = pc * -1; 
The descendant to ancestor relationship together with initial user assignment ua enables the 
definition of user authorisation uauth as below: 
uauth = (ua ; pc * -1);  
The definition below gives the roles authorised to a user u through assignment and 
inheritance based on the definition of uauth above: 
Authorisedroles (u) = ua ; pc * -1
 
[{u}];  
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The definition below gives the users authorised to a role r through assignment and 
inheritance. 
Authorisedusers (r) = pc * ; ua-1
 
[{r}];  
The definition below gives the authorised permissions for a role r: 
Authorisedpermissions (r) = (pa ; pc *) -1
 
[{r}];  
The definition below gives the permissions authorised to a set of roles s: 
Permissionsauthorised (s) = (pa ; pc *) -1
 
[s];  
The relation cycles (r) identifies the cycles of a homogeneous relation r.  It consists of 
maplets of the form x ↦ x where x is in the domain of r and is related directly or indirectly 
by r to itself: 
cycles (r) = id (dom (r)) ⋂ ∐ii.  (ii ∈ N1 | (r) ii) 
END;  
 
 
 
 
 
OPERATIONS 
2.3.3.1 Administrative Commands  
XXDeleteRole: The precondition for XXDeleteRole is that the role is in Roles, and that 
there is no inheritance with role as a child i.e. any inheritance with role as a child must be 
deleted before role is removed.  This ensures that the invariant sr ⊆ (su ; uauth) is not 
broken.  The ROLE role is removed from permission assignment (pa), user assignment 
(ua) and session roles (sr) by XDelete (role) and from the inheritance relation by pc := 
{role} ⩤ cp. 
XXDeleteRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles – ran (pc) 
THEN  
pc := {role} ⩤ pc || 
XDelete (role) 
END; 
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DeassignUser: The preconditions for DeassignUser are the same as for XDeassignUser 
with the additional requirement that there are no sessions involving the user.  This is to 
avoid breaking the invariant sr ⊆ (su ; uauth) where uauth = (ua ; pc * -1). 
DeassignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
role ∈ AssignedRoles (user) ⋀ 
su ▷ {user} = {} 
THEN  
XDeassignUser (user, role) 
END; 
 
XAddInheritance: The XAddInheritance operation establishes a parent/ child relationship 
between rp and rc.  The precondition (rp ↦ rc ∉ da)   avoids cycle creation.  For a 
definition of da see DEFINITIONS. 
XAddInheritance (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ Roles ⋀ rc ∈ Roles ⋀ 
rp ↦ rc ∉ pc ⋀ 
rp ↦ rc ∉ da  
THEN  
pc := pc ⋃ {rp ↦ rc} 
END; 
 
DeleteInheritance: This command deletes an existing parent/ child inheritance maplet rp 
↦ rc.  The command is valid if and only if the roles rp and rc are members of Roles.  The 
requirement sr ⊆ (su ; ua ; (pc – {rp ↦ rc})* -1 ensures that the invariant sr ⊆ (su ; uauth) 
isn‟t broken. 
DeleteInheritance (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ Roles ⋀ rc ∈ Roles ⋀ 
rp ↦ rc ∈ pc ⋀ 
sr ⊆ (su; ua; (pc – {rp ↦ rc})* -1 
THEN  
pc := pc ⋃ {rp ↦ rc} 
END; 
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AddAscendant: This operation creates a new role rp, and inserts it in the role hierarchy as 
the parent of the existing role rc.  The command is valid if and only if rp is of type ROLE 
but not a member of Roles and rc is a member of Roles. 
AddAscendant (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ ROLE - Roles ⋀ rc ∈ Roles  
THEN 
 AddRole (rp) ||  
pc := pc ⋃ {rp ↦ rc} 
END; 
 
AddDescendant: This operation creates a new role rc, and inserts it in the role hierarchy as 
the child of the existing role rp.  The command is valid if and only if rc is of type ROLE 
but not a member of Roles and rp is a member of Roles. 
AddDescendant (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ Roles ⋀ rc ∈ ROLE - Roles 
 THEN 
 AddRole (rc) ||  
pc := pc ⋃ {rp ↦ rc} 
END; 
 
2.3.3.2 Supporting System Operations  
XXCreateSession: This operation creates a new session with a given user as owner and a 
given set of active roles.  The operation is valid if and only if user is a member of Users, 
and the active role set is a subset of the roles authorised for that user.  In Hierarchical 
RBAC, authorised roles are those assigned to the users and also those allowed from that 
assignment through inheritance.  For a definition of Authorisedroles see DEFINITIONS.  
XXCreateSession (user, session, ars) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ session ∈ SESSION - Sessions ⋀ 
 ars ⊆ Authorisedroles (user)  
THEN  
XCreateSession (user, session, ars) 
END;  
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XXActivateRole: This operation adds a role as an active role of a session.  The 
preconditions are the same as Core RBAC except that role can be a member of the user‟s 
authorised roles which includes roles gained through inheritance, not just the user‟s 
assigned roles. 
XXActivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
role ∈ Roles - Activeroles (session) ⋀ 
role ∈ Authorisedroles (su (session))  
THEN  
XActivateRole (session, role) 
END; 
2.3.3.3 Review Operations  
AuthorisedUsers: This operation returns the set of users authorised for a given role, either 
by assignment or through inheritance.  The operation is valid if and only if the given role is 
a member of Roles.  For a definition of Authorisedusers see DEFINITIONS. 
au ← AuthorisedUsers (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈
 
Roles  
THEN  
au := Authorisedusers (role)  
END;  
 
AuthorisedRoles: This operation returns the set of roles authorised for a given user.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of Users.  For a definition of 
Authorisedroles see DEFINITIONS. 
ar ← AuthorisedRoles (user) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈
 
Users  
THEN  
ar := Authorisedroles (user)  
END;  
2.3.3.4 Advanced Review Operations for General Role Hierarchies  
RolePermissions: This operation returns the set of all permissions (op, obj), granted to the 
given role, or inherited from the given role‟s ancestor roles.  The operation is valid if and 
only if the role is a member of the Roles.  For a definition of Authorisedpermissions see 
DEFINITIONS. 
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rp ← RolePermissions (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles 
THEN  
rp := Authorisedpermissions (role)  
END; 
 
UserPermissions: This operation returns the set of permissions a given user gets through 
his or her authorised roles.  The operation is valid if and only if the user is a member of 
Users.  For a definition of Authorisedroles and Permissionsauthorised see 
DEFINITIONS. 
up ← UserPermissions (user) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users 
THEN  
up := Permissionsauthorised (Authorisedroles (user))  
END; 
 
RoleOperationsOnObject: This operation returns the set of operations a given role is 
permitted to perform on a given object.  The set contains all operations granted directly to 
that role or inherited by that role from ancestor roles.  The operation is valid only if the 
role is a member of Roles, and the object is of type OBJ. 
ro ← RoleOperationsOnObject (role, obj) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ 
THEN  
ro := {op | op ∈ OPN ⋀ op ↦ obj ∈ Authorisedpermissions (role)} 
END; 
 
UserOperationsOnObject: This operation returns the set of operations a given user is 
permitted to perform on a given object.  The set consists of all the operations obtained by 
the user, either directly or through their authorised roles.  The operation is valid if and only 
if the user is a member of the Users and the object is of type OBJ. 
uo ← UserOperationsOnObject (user, obj) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ obj ∈ OBJ 
THEN  
ro := {op | op ∈ OPN ⋀ op ↦ obj ∈ Permissionsauthorised (Authorisedroles(user)) 
END 
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2.3.4 Hierarchical (hrbac)  
MACHINE  
This machine is the outer layer of RBAC with General Hierarchies.  It includes inner 
hierarchical RBAC (ihrbac) which in turn includes inner core rbac (icrbac). 
hrbac  
SEES  
Bool TYPE  
INCLUDES 
 ihrbac  
PROMOTES  
AddUser, DeleteUser, AddRole, DeassignUser, GrantPermission, RevokePermission, 
DeleteInheritance, AddAscendant, AddDescendant, DeleteSession, DeactivateRole, 
CheckAccess, AssignedUsers, AssignedRoles, AuthorisedUsers, AuthorisedRoles, 
RolePermissions, UserPermissions, SessionRoles, SessionPermissions, 
RoleOperationsOnObject, UserOperationsOnObject 
 
OPERATIONS  
2.3.4.1 Administrative Commands  
DeleteRole: This operation deletes an existing role from the RBAC database and has the 
same preconditions as XXDeleteRole.  The effect in Hierarchical RBAC is that the included 
operation is renamed to give the final operation. 
DeleteRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles – ran (pc) 
THEN  
XXDeleteRole (role) 
END; 
 
AssignUser: This operation assigns a user to a role and has the same preconditions as 
XAssignUser.  The effect in Hierarchical RBAC is that the included operation is renamed 
to give the final operation. 
AssignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
  role ∈ Roles – Assignedroles (user) 
 59 
THEN  
XAssignUser (user, role) 
END;  
 
AddInheritance: The AddInheritance operation establishes an immediate pair relationship 
between rp and rc and has the same preconditions as XAddInheritance.  The effect in 
Hierarchical RBAC is that the included operation is renamed to give the final operation. 
AddInheritance (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ Roles ⋀ rc ∈ Roles ⋀ 
rp ↦ rc ∉ pc ⋀ 
rp ↦ rc ∉ da  
THEN  
XAddInheritance (rp, rc) 
END; 
2.3.4.2 Supporting System Operations  
CreateSession: This operation creates a new session with a given user as owner and a 
given set of active roles and has the same preconditions as XXCreateSession.  The effect in 
Hierarchical RBAC is that the included operation is renamed to give the final operation. 
CreateSession (user, session, ars) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ session ∈ SESSION - Sessions ⋀ 
 ars ⊆ Authorisedroles (user)  
THEN  
XXCreateSession (user, session, ars) 
END;  
 
ActivateRole: This operation adds a role as an active role of a session, and has the same 
preconditions as XX ActivateRole.  The effect in Hierarchical RBAC is that the included 
operation is renamed to give the final operation. 
ActivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
role ∈ Roles - Activeroles (session) ⋀ 
role ∈ Authorisedroles (su (session))  
THEN  
XXActivateRole (session, role) 
END; 
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2.3.5 Separation of Duties (sdrbac)  
MACHINE  
This machine is the outer layer of the onion.  It includes inner hierarchical RBAC (ihrbac) 
which in turn includes inner core RBAC (icrbac).  This machine implements all of the 
features of RBAC contained in the NIST standard. 
sdrbac  
INCLUDES  
ihrbac  
PROMOTES  
AddUser, DeleteUser, AddRole, DeassignUser, GrantPermission, RevokePermission, 
DeleteInheritance, AddAscendant, AddDescendant, DeleteSession, DeactivateRole, 
CheckAccess, AssignedUsers, AssignedRoles, AuthorisedUsers, AuthorisedRoles, 
RolePermissions, UserPermissions, SessionRoles, SessionPermissions, 
RoleOperationsOnObject, UserOperationsOnObject 
VARIABLES  
ssd, dsd  
INVARIANT  
A partial function ssd (static separation of duties) is defined from the set of all non-empty 
finite subsets of Roles to the set of non-zero natural numbers.  This function defines the 
maximum number of members of each Roles subset that can be concurrently authorised by 
user assignment and role hierarchies.  The invariant ensures that the stipulated number of 
roles must be less than the cardinality of the roleset and that every user and authorised 
roleset satisfies the requirement given by the ssd function. 
ssd ∈ F1 (Roles) ⇸ n1 ⋀ 
∀ rs. (rs ∈ dom (ssd) ⇒ ssd (rs) < card (rs))  ⋀ 
∀ (user, rs). (user ∈
 
Users ⋀ rs ∈ dom (ssd) ⇒ card ({user} ◁ uauth ▷ rs) ≤  ssd 
(rs))  ⋀ 
 
A partial function dsd (dynamic separation of duties) is defined from the set of all non-
empty finite subsets of Roles to the set of non-zero natural numbers.  This function defines 
the maximum number of members of each Roles subset that can be contained in the set of 
authorised roles for a session.  The invariant ensures that the stipulated number of roles 
must be less than the cardinality of the roleset and that every user and authorised roleset 
satisfies the requirement given by the dsd function. 
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dsd ∈ F1 (Roles) ⇸ n1 ⋀ 
∀ rs. (rs ∈ dom (dsd) ⇒ dsd (rs) < card (rs))  ⋀ 
∀ (session, rs). (session ∈ Sessions ⋀ rs ∈ dom (dsd) ⇒ card ({session} ◁ sr ▷ rs) 
≤  dsd (rs))  
 
INITIALISATION  
ssd, dsd := {},{} 
 
OPERATIONS  
2.3.5.1 Administrative operations 
DeleteRole: This operation deletes an existing role from the RBAC database and has the 
same preconditions as XXDeleteRole with the additional requirements that role does not 
exist in any of the ssd or dsd rolesets i.e. role must be removed from these rolesets before 
the operation is carried out. 
DeleteRole (role) ≙ 
PRE  
role ∈ Roles – ran (pc) ⋀ 
 ( rs. (rs ∈ dom (ssd) ⋀ role ∈ rs))  ⋀ 
 ( rs. (rs ∈ dom (dsd) ⋀ role ∈ rs)) 
THEN  
XXDeleteRole (role) 
END; 
 
AssignUser: This operation requires an SSD precondition that the new set of authorised 
roles for the user after adding a new inheritance does not contain more than the allowed 
number of members of any SSD roleset. 
AssignUser (user, role) ≙ 
PRE 
user ∈ Users ⋀ 
  role ∈ Roles – Assignedroles (user) ⋀ 
 ∀ rs. (rs ∈ dom (ssd) ⇒ card ({user} ◁ (ua ⋃ {user ↦ role} ; da) ▷ rs) ≤ ssd (rs)) 
THEN  
XAssignUser (user, role) 
END; 
 
AddInheritance: This operation requires an SSD precondition that the new set of authorised 
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roles for any user after adding a new inheritance does not contain more than the allowed 
number of members of any SSD roleset. 
AddInheritance (rp, rc) ≙ 
PRE 
rp ∈ Roles ⋀ rc ∈ Roles ⋀  
rp ↦ rc ∉ pc ⋀ 
 rp ↦ rc ∉ da ⋀ 
 ∀ (user, rs). (user ∈ Users ⋀ rs ∈ dom (ssd) ⇒ 
 card ({user} ◁ ua ; (pc ⋃ {rp ↦ rc})*-1) ▷ rs) ≤ ssd (rs)) 
THEN  
XAddInheritance (rp, rc) 
END; 
2.3.5.2 Administrative operations for SSD Relations  
CreateSsdSet: This operation takes a set of roles rs and sets the associated maximum 
number nn of its roles that any user can be authorised to using the partial function ssd.  The 
operation is valid if and only if rs is a non-empty subset of Roles; and nn is a natural 
number less than the cardinality of the roleset rs.  Additionally, no user in Users must 
break the ssd requirement for their currently authorised roles.  If they did, this would have 
to be adjusted as part of creating the SSD set.  
If we compare this approach to that in the NIST standard we can see that this is simpler 
and more complete.  Also for some reason the NIST standard defines the function by 
saying that no user can be assigned to nn or more roles and that nn ≥ 2.  I prefer to say that 
nn is the maximum (not nn-1) and that nn is a natural number which by definition is ≥ 1. 
CreateSSDSet (rs, nn) ≙ 
PRE 
rs ∈ F1 (Roles) ⋀ nn ∈ N1 ⋀ 
  rs ∉ dom (ssd) ⋀ nn < card (rs) ⋀ 
∀ user. (user ∈ Users ⇒ card ({user} ◁ uauth ▷ rs) ≤ nn) 
THEN  
ssd (rs) := nn 
END; 
 
DeleteSsdSet: This operation deletes an SSD maplet from the partial function ssd.  It is 
valid if and only if the roleset rs is already a member of the domain of ssd. 
DeleteSSDSet (rs) ≙ 
PRE 
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rs ∈ dom (ssd)  
THEN  
ssd := {rs} ⩤ ssd 
END; 
2.3.5.3 Administrative operations for DSD Relations  
CreateDsdSet: This operation takes a set of roles rs and sets the associated maximum 
number nn of its roles that any user can have in a session using the partial function dsd.  
The operation is valid if and only if rs is a non-empty subset of Roles; and nn is a natural 
number less than the cardinality of the rs.  Additionally that every user in Users must not 
break the DSD requirement for their currently held session roles.  If they did, this would 
have to be adjusted as part of creating the DSD set. 
CreateDSDSet (rs, nn) ≙ 
PRE 
rs ∈ F1(Roles) ⋀ nn ∈ N1 ⋀ 
  rs ∉ dom (dsd) ⋀ nn < card (rs) ⋀ 
∀ session. (session.∈ Session ⇒ card (sr ▷ rs) ≤ nn) 
THEN  
dsd (rs) := nn 
END; 
 
DeleteDsdSet: This operation deletes a DSD maplet from the partial function dsd.  It is 
valid if and only if the roleset rs is already a member of the domain of dsd. 
DeleteDSDSet (rs) ≙ 
PRE 
rs ∈ dom (dsd)  
THEN  
dsd := {rs} ⩤ dsd 
END; 
 
2.3.5.4 Supporting System Operations  
CreateSession: this operation requires an additional DSD precondition that the set of 
session roles ars does not contain more than the allowed number of members of any DSD 
roleset. 
CreateSession (user, session, ars) ≙ 
PRE  
user ∈ Users ⋀ session ∈
 
SESSION - Sessions ⋀ 
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 ars ⊆ Authorisedroles (user) ⋀ 
∀ rs. (rs ∈
 
dom (ssd) ⇒ card (rs ⋂ ars) ≤ dsd (rs)) 
THEN  
XXCreateSession (user, session, ars) 
END;  
 
ActivateRole: This operation requires an additional DSD precondition that the new set of 
session roles after a role activation does not contain more than the allowed number of 
members of any DSD roleset. 
ActivateRole (session, role) ≙ 
PRE  
session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
role ∈ Roles - Activeroles (session) ⋀ 
role ∈ Authorisedroles (su (session)) ⋀ 
∀ rs. (rs ∈
 
dom (ssd) ⇒ card (rs ⋂ (Activeroles (session) ⋃ {role})) ≤ dsd (rs)) 
THEN  
XXActivateRole (session, role) 
END; 
2.3.5.5 Review Operations for SSD 
SsdRoleSets: This operation returns the set of all SSD rolesets. 
srs ← SsdRoleSets (rs) ≙ srs := dom (ssd) 
 
SsdRoleSetRoles: This operation returns the set of roles of a SSD role set. The operation is 
valid if and only if the roleset rs exists in the domain of ssd. 
srsr ← SsdRoleSetRoles (rs) ≙ 
PRE  
rs ∈ dom (ssd) 
THEN  
srsr := rs 
END;  
 
SsdRoleSetCardinality: This operation returns the natural number associated with a role set 
rs. The operation is valid if and only if the role set rs exists in the domain of ssd. 
srsc ← SsdRoleSetCardinality (rs) ≙ 
PRE  
rs ∈ dom (ssd) 
THEN  
srsc := ssd (rs) 
END;  
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2.3.5.6 Review Operations for DSD 
DsdRoleSets: This operation returns the set of all DSD role sets. 
drs ← DsdRoleSets (rs) ≙ drs := dom (dsd) 
 
DsdRoleSetRoles: This operation returns the set of roles of a DSD role set. The operation is 
valid if and only if the role set rs exists in the domain of dsd. 
drsr ← DsdRoleSetRoles (rs) ≙ 
PRE  
rs ∈ dom (dsd) 
THEN  
srsr := rs 
END;  
 
DsdRoleSetCardinality: This operation returns the natural number associated with a role 
set rs. The operation is valid if and only if the role set rs exists in the domain of dsd. 
drsc ← DsdRoleSetCardinality (rs) ≙ 
PRE  
rs ∈ dom (dsd) 
THEN  
srsc := dsd (rs) 
END;  
 
2.3.6 Proof Obligations  
A B specification of a system of machines is a mathematical construct and precisely 
defines the state properties of the machines and their operations.  There has to be certain 
properties of consistency i.e. initialisation must establish the invariants, and operations 
must preserve the invariants both within and between machines.  These properties are 
called proof obligations, and the B-Toolkit can build them using a proof obligation 
generator.  These obligations can be discharged using the B-Toolkit‟s autoprover.  Failure 
to discharge the obligations is either because the rules used by the prover are not subtle 
enough, or because the machine definition contains mistakes or omissions.  E.g. the prover 
would point out that deleting a role in Hierarchical RBAC changes a user‟s authorised 
permissions and thus their permitted session roles.  
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  Figure 5: B-Toolkit Prover 
 
 
Core RBAC specification generated only 46 proof obligations that were relatively easy to 
discharge.  As even a simple system specification can generate many more proof 
obligations this is a good indication that RBAC is ideally suited to specification with the B-
Method.  Hierarchical RBAC generated an additional 30 proof obligations, again a low 
total.  The increased complexity of RBAC with separation of duties generated a further 72 
proof obligations.  Figure 5 shows that all 148 proof obligations have been discharged.  
2.4 Application of Spec# to RBAC 
 
The following is some C# code with the addition of the Spec# superset.  The main method 
calls other methods that interact with an SQL database.  Each of the methods has pre-
conditions and some have post-conditions.  The methods (operations) closely follow the B 
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specification.  This work is still very experimental.  It is included here as an example of a 
possible way ahead in which formal methods can be included in mainstream programming 
to give robust code.  If the code is examined it can be seen how it closely correlates to the 
B.  
using System; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Collections.Specialized; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Data.SqlClient; 
using Microsoft.SpecSharp; 
using Microsoft.Contracts; 
 
 
class TestRBAC 
{ 
 public static void Main() 
 {    
  try 
  { 
 string cs = "workstation id=COMP; 
 packet size=4096;integrated security=SSPI; 
 data source=COMP;persist security info=False; 
 initial catalog=RBACdb"; 
 RBAC RBAC1 = new RBAC("Users","Roles",cs); 
 RBAC1.AddUser("JimmySmith"); 
 RBAC1.AddUser("AdamWatson"); 
 RBAC1.AddRole("GP"); 
 RBAC1.AddRole("Doctor"); 
 RBAC1.AddRole("Psychiatrist"); 
 RBAC1.AddRole("Healthworker"); 
 RBAC1.AddInheritance("Doctor","Psychiatrist"); 
 RBAC1.AddInheritance("Healthworker","Psychiatrist"); 
 RBAC1.AssignUser("JimmySmith","Healthworker"); 
 RBAC1.AssignUser("JimmySmith","GP"); 
 RBAC1.AssignUser("AdamWatson","Psychiatrist"); 
 RBAC1.AssignUser("AdamWatson","GP"); 
 StringCollection ars = new StringCollection(); 
 ars.Add("GP"); ars.Add("Healthworker"); 
 RBAC1.CreateSession("JimmySmith","S0000001",ars); 
 ars.Clear(); 
 ars.Add("GP"); ars.Add("Psychiatrist"); 
 RBAC1.CreateSession("AdamWatson","S00000226",ars); 
 Console.ReadLine(); 
  } 
 catch(Microsoft.Contracts.RequiresException mcre) 
  { 
   Console.WriteLine(mcre.Message); 
   Console.Read(); 
  } 
 catch(Microsoft.Contracts.EnsuresException mcee) 
  { 
   Console.WriteLine(mcee.Message); 
   Console.Read(); 
  } 
 } 
} 
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class RBAC 
{ 
 private string! Roles; 
 private string! Users; 
 private SqlCommand cmd; 
 private SqlConnection cn; 
 private DataSet dsCycles; 
  
  
  
 public RBAC(string! u, string! r, string! cs) 
 { 
 Users = u; 
 Roles = r; 
 cn = new SqlConnection(cs); 
 base(); 
 cmd = cn.CreateCommand(); 
 dsCycles = new DataSet(); 
 } 
   
 public void AddUser(string! user) 
 requires CountUser(user) == 0; 
 { 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert into " + Users + " values ('" + user + "')"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 cn.Close(); 
 } 
  
 public void AddRole(string! role) 
 requires CountRole(role) == 0; 
 { 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert into " + Roles + " values ('" + role + "')"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 cn.Close(); 
 } 
  
 public void AssignUser(string! user, string! role) 
 requires CountUser(user) == 1; 
 requires CountRole(role) == 1; 
 requires CountUserAssignment(user,role) == 0; 
 { 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert into ua values ('" +user+ "','" +role+ "')"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 cn.Close(); 
 } 
  
 public void AddInheritance(string! rp, string! rc) 
 requires CountRole(rp) != 0; 
 ensures Cycles() == 0; 
 { 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert into pc values ('" +rp+ "','" +rc+ "')"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
 cn.Close(); 
 } 
  
 public void CreateSession(string! user, string session, 
 StringCollection! ars) 
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 requires CountUser(user)==1; 
 requires forall{int i in (0:ars.Count); CountRole(ars[i])==1 &  
          
 CountUserAuthorisation(user, ars[i])==1};  
 { 
 cn.Open(); 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert [session_user] values ('" +session+ "','"  
 +user+ "')"; 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
   
 for(int i=0; i < ars.Count; i++) 
  { 
 cmd.CommandText = "insert session_roles values ('" +session+ "','"  
 +ars[i]+ "')"; 
 cmd.ExecuteNonQuery(); 
  } 
 cn.Close(); 
 } 
  
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 CountUser(string user) 
 {  
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from "  + Users + " where [User] = 
 '" + user + "'"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cu  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cu; 
 }  
  
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 CountRole(string role) 
 {  
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from "  + Roles + " where Role = '" 
 + role + "'"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cr  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cr; 
 } 
  
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 CountSession(string session) 
 {  
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from  Sessions where Session = '" + 
 session + "'"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cr  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cr; 
 } 
 
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 CountUserAssignment(string user, string role) 
 {  
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from ua where [User] = '" + user + 
 "'  and Role = '" + role + "'"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cua  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cua; 
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 } 
  
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 CountUserAuthorisation(string user, string role) 
 {  
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from uauth() where [User] = '" +  
 user + "' and Role ='" + role + "'"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cua  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cua; 
 } 
  
 [Microsoft.Contracts.Confined] 
 public Int32 Cycles() 
 { 
 cmd.CommandText = "select count(*) from cycles()"; 
 cn.Open(); 
 Int32 cc  =  Convert.ToInt32(cmd.ExecuteScalar()); 
 cn.Close(); 
 return cc; 
 } 
} 
 
Violating a precondition or postcondition brings up a message e.g. 
 
 
Console 1: Error Message 
Errors can then be handled as appropriate for the application. 
2.5 Summary 
The RBAC NIST standard was completely specified in B.  During the specification process 
and the discharge of the proof obligations, numerous errors were discovered in the 
standard.  The B-Toolkit was instrumental in producing a more robust RBAC specification 
without those errors, which is suitable as a basis for modelling extensions and variations of 
RBAC.  The RBAC specification produced is used as a starting point for the TCM 
specification in the next chapter.  A small amount of Spec# has been introduced to explore 
the correlation between the model and the implementation code. 
 
 71 
3 The Tees Confidentiality Model (TCM2) 
The Tees Confidentiality Model (Longstaff, et al., 2003) (Longstaff, et al., 2006) is a 
powerful model for authorisation.  It has been developed at the University of Teesside over 
a period of ten years.  TCM1 was the application of formal methods to the Tees 
Confidentiality Model exactly as represented in the various papers produced up to the start 
of this work (Longstaff, et al., 2003) (Longstaff, et al., 2002).  During the course of this 
work it was realised that it was possible to simplify the fundamental model without losing 
the power of the original.  This simplified model became TCM2. 
Also it was realised that although the TCM had been developed essentially as a piece of 
practical work to address a practical problem, it was in fact something more.  It was 
essentially a generalisation of RBAC that also enabled authorisation to be looked at afresh 
from first principles. 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns the formal specification of the TCM.  The approach mirrors the 
RBAC specification.  The main sections of core, hierarchical and separation of duties are 
exactly as in RBAC, and the chapter is divided into reference model and functional 
specification, also as in RBAC.  Some of the operations are the same as in RBAC, whilst 
others can be seen to be simple generalisations of RBAC operations.  The TCM as 
currently applied, and as described in many papers, is completely specified.   
3.1.1 Motivating Health Care Scenario 
The health service in England is developing a national IT computer service which includes 
a central database (the Care Records Service, or CRS) to hold and provide continuous 
access to summary electronic heath records for over 50 million people (Department of 
Health, 2005).  The original TCM has significantly contributed to this programme in that 
the TCM was implemented by several suppliers to the NHS as part of the Electronic 
Research and Development Programme (ERDIP), and it heavily influenced the CRS 
requirements specification (NHS, 2003).  Henceforward I shall generally refer to an 
Electronic Health Records or EHR application, which is based on the CRS concept. 
I now describe an EHR scenario for use as an example.  The first part of the scenario was 
written by a Consultant Transplant Surgeon (Mr Michael Thick), and was used in the early 
TCM researches.  It concerns a fictitious patient who will be referred to as Alice, and her 
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GP, who we will call Fred.  Alice is 50; some of the major events in Alice‟s medical 
history are summarised as follows: 
 She had a pregnancy termination when she was 16 
 Was diagnosed diabetic at 25 
 End Stage renal failure when she was 45 
 Renal transplant at 48 
 Acutely psychotic at 49 
 Crush fracture of T12 aged 50 
Let us now suppose, not unreasonably, that Alice expresses the desire to place the 
following confidentiality restrictions on the availability of her medical records data about 
two of these conditions (i.e. she wishes to place them in a patient‟s Sealed Envelope, in 
CRS terminology): 
1. My GP, Fred, can see all my data.  
2. Nobody must know about my termination except my GP, any Gynaecological 
Consultant, and the Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon who operated on me.  
3. My GP, Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon, and Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon 
can see my psychosis data, but no one else. 
Let us add the following contrived requirement (but still one that a health records 
authorisation system must be capable of implementing): 
4. I do not wish the members of the hospital team who carried out my termination 
operation to ever be able to see my psychosis data, except if they are viewing in a 
psychiatric role.  
In one of the TCM demonstrators, these confidentiality requirements can be specified 
using electronic consent forms (Longstaff, et al., 2002).  We also include the major CRS 
requirement that Health Care Practitioners (HCPs) will be entitled to access data based on 
their role, and a „Legitimate Relationship‟ with the patient, generally meaning that the 
patient is registered with them, or has been referred to them. 
This scenario is relevant to medical records access in static primary care and secondary 
care environments.  It is also relevant to distributed processing, in which summary records 
may be stored on central systems, and more detailed data on other systems (this is the 
approach for CRS development).  
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In addition, we could envisage future situations where access is granted to GPs who need 
to access medical records from mobile devices, during home visits to patients.  Portions of 
medical records may be downloaded, subjected to access controls, updated, and then 
merged back to the central database.  GPS tracking could be used by to locate and assign 
GPs for patient home visits. 
3.2 TCM2 Reference Model 
3.2.1 Basic Concepts 
The TCM Reference Model defines the scope and concepts of the TCM, and gives a 
precise, unambiguous terminology for defining the TCM Functional Specification (3.3) 
3.2.1.1 RBAC Basis 
The TCM can be applied within both simple and complex organizations.  Therefore, 
following the presentation of the RBAC model in (Ferraiola, et al., 2001) (INCITS, 2004), 
I describe the TCM in terms of component models which I call Core, Hierarchical, 
Constrained and Extended; these components have use in different applications according 
to their increasing sophistication and complexity. 
The TCM is based on the RBAC concepts of users, operations, and objects.  The purpose 
of the TCM is to permit or deny access for a user to an operation on an object. 
 A user is usually defined as a human being, but generally includes machines, networks, 
and autonomous agents.  The users of the EHR1 system will be Health Care Professionals 
(including doctors, GPs, nurses), patients, and administrators.  We write these as 
EHRsys_users. 
 An operation is an executable image of a program, which upon invocation executes some 
function for the user.  The types of operations and objects that the TCM controls are 
dependent on the type of system in which they will be implemented.  For example, within a 
file system, operations might include read, write, and execute; within a database 
management system, operations might include insert, delete, append, and update.  More 
specifically, an EHR system might have the operations EHRsys_op_query, 
EHRsys_op_query_medication, EHRsys_op_add_treatment, etc. defined for EHRs. 
Generally speaking, an object is an entity that contains or receives information.  The TCM 
works with protected objects in that authorisation controls apply to such objects; we shall 
                                                 
1 Electronic Health Record 
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henceforward simply refer to objects for brevity.  Objects can represent information 
containers and also system resources.  A patient‟s medical record maintained by an EHR 
system, an example of which is EHRsys_obj_Alice, is the object, together with its 
constituent sub-objects, that is used for illustrative purposes. 
3.2.1.2 TCM2 New Concepts 
In addition to the RBAC concepts described above, the TCM introduces additional 
concepts.  Firstly, it is the concept of classifier and its associated classifier values 
(sometimes abbreviated to „cvalues‟), which is used to specify authorisation.  In the TCM, 
„Role‟ would be an example of a user classifier, and „Engineer‟ a classifier value for Role.  
The ordered pair <Role, Engineer> is denoted as a cvalue. 
Another user classifier is EHR_users, with values having associations to users 
(EHRsys_users), thereby identifying collections of users.  Classifiers are also specified for 
operations (e.g. EHR_ops, EHR_op_type) and objects (EHR_objs, EHR_obj_type).  If 
authorisation is to be granted or denied to individual sub objects within an EHRsys_obj 
complex object, then this can be achieved using the classifier EHR_objs.  (This might be 
required for denying access to any EHR data which would suggest a particular health 
condition, which might be found in many places in an EHRsys_obj object, e.g. sub-objects 
containing clinic appointments, medications, as well as diagnoses.) 
A classifier quite often corresponds to a property of a user, operation, or object.  However, 
classifier values can be any value available in the system that is useful for authorisation.  
There is a proposal that the concept of Legitimate Relationship be made central to 
authorisation in the NHS, with dedicated servers providing this information, as it exists 
between system users and patients.  In this the classifier LegRel, for „Legitimate 
Relationship‟ is derived from both user (e.g. an individual GP) and object (a patient‟s 
EHR).  In distributed systems, the classifier values can be tokens or derived values passed 
from one computer to another. 
Permissions in the TCM are called confidentiality permissions (abbreviated to CPs), and 
the types for CPs are called confidentiality permission types (CPTs).  This is a 
development of the RBAC model, which is essentially a single confidentiality permission 
type.  A CPT consists of a set of classifiers, for example: 
CPT1= {Role, EHR_op_type, EHR_objs}. 
A CP consists of a set of classifier values e.g. 
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CP1= {<Role, GP>, <EHR_op_type, EHR_query_medication>, <EHR_objs, EHR_Alice}, 
together with a mapping to a value of Permit or Deny.  (Here EHR_Alice is a value 
associated with Alice‟s complete EHR, i.e. EHRsys_obj_Alice).  The determination of an 
authorisation outcome is made when the classifier values of a CP match the user classifier 
values activated for the session together with the classifier values assigned to the operation 
and object being used.  Therefore, the CP example above would permit GP Fred (and other 
GPs) to query Alice‟s medical record.  These concepts are shown in Figure 6 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Core TCM 
 
Figure 6 shows the basic elements of Core TCM.  The double-headed solid arrow 
represents a relation (or a many-to-many relationship).  The single headed solid arrow 
represents a function (or a many-to-one relationship).  In this, there is correspondence with 
the RBAC model.  However, although this diagram has a basic resemblance to the 
diagrams for RBAC, there is an essential difference in the way permissions are given or 
denied. 
The set of Classifiers is the domain of the set of all classifier values (this is represented by 
one of the dashed arrows).  The classifiers are derived from the persistent classifier values 
made available in the system e.g. there is a role classifier because the roles GP, Engineer 
etc. exist and are useful for authorisation.   
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Users are assigned to one or more classifier values (ua).  These could be roles, locations or 
any other user classifier values useful for authorisation in the particular model under 
consideration.  Each session is associated with a single user (session_user) and is related to 
possibly many classifier values (session_values).  The classifier values that a user uses 
during a session must be a subset of the user‟s assigned classifier values. 
There is a many-to-many relationship between the set of classifiers and the set of 
confidentiality permission types.  The function of CPTs (in TCM2) is to constrain the 
Confidentiality Permissions that can be created to ones belonging to those particular types.  
This is represented by a dashed arrow in the diagram. 
The diagram attempts to represent the relationship between user classifier values, operator 
classifier values, object classifier values, and confidentiality permissions.  The relationship 
is simple but subtle, and represents an expansion of the RBAC view of authorisation. 
 In RBAC, permissions are assigned to roles.  This allows the permissions to follow an 
organisation‟s structure and simplifies administration e.g. if someone leaves then the new 
person has to be simply assigned to the former user‟s role.   
However the TCM is able to model statements like “Joe Smith is allowed access to Alice 
Johnson‟s Obstetric Records at James Cook University Hospital if Joe Smith belongs to 
Alice‟s GP Practice and is accessing the Data from the Practice Premises” .The TCM is 
able to handle this (and any other authorisation statement) in a straightforward way and 
does not need to be confined to a simpler role-structured model. 
The TCM is a generalisation of RBAC because an RBAC statement is of the form, “Joe 
Smith in the role of GP can access Alice Johnson‟s Obstetric records” is also a valid TCM 
statement.  The TCM is able to model any authorisation statement by asking 
 What are the classifiers in the statement? 
 Are they available in the system under consideration? 
 If not, how can they be made available? 
The following expression gives the set of classifier values that are used for authorisation.  
In RBAC, it would be just the session user‟s set of roles with which he created the session.  
In the TCM, it is the user‟s classifier values (roles, team membership, location etc.)  
together with the classifer values for the requested operation and the classifier values for 
the object upon which the operation is to be performed. 
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AssignedCValues (session, op, ob) ≙ 
 session_values [{session}] ⋃ opa [{op}] ⋃ oba [{obj}] 
 
The small circles within the larger circle represent the user classifier values, operator 
classifier values, object classifier values included in this expression for a particular session, 
operation, and object. 
Permission is given for the particular user in the session to perform the operation on the 
object through the confidentiality permissions, of which there may be many. 
The larger circle represents the set of confidentiality permissions through which 
permission is given or denied.  The reason that this diagram is not relatable to the RBAC 
diagram is because this occurs in a much more subtle way (although still corresponding to 
the real world) than in RBAC.  
The expression below is the essence of the matter, although there are other connotations 
and variations depending on whether you are dealing with TCM2 or TCM3 and including 
hierarchies or not etc.  
 It says that, if for every classifier in the confidentiality permission cp, there exists at least 
one classifier value common to both cp and the assigned classifier values acvals then cp 
permits access.  Examples are given throughout this document. 
CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
where acvals is the AssignedCValues from the first expression. 
 
Although this expression is more subtle than RBAC, if simplified, it becomes RBAC.   
TCM2 was developed to have a fixed set of Confidentiality Permission Types (CPTs) 
following the pattern of the original TCM ideas.  An ordering on the CPTs is used to 
process the permissions given by the different types.  There is a default ordering on the 
CPTs that is derived from a user defined ordering on the classifiers.  This default ordering 
is based on the complexity of the corresponding CPTs, as measured by the number of 
classifiers in the CPT; and where two CPTs have the same number of classifiers, the 
relative importance of the classifiers in the two CPTs (see 3.2.2.11).   
This default ordering allows first consideration to be given to exceptional circumstances, 
before authorisations that are more general are invoked.  Therefore, a CP granting access to 
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GP Fred for Alice‟s psychosis data might be processed before a CP occurring lower in the 
processing order, which denied access to this data for all GPs.  
The TCM is defined in terms of four model components: Core TCM, Hierarchical TCM, 
Constrained TCM, and Extended TCM.  Core TCM defines those concepts (variables, 
functions and relations) required to achieve authorisation through classifier values.  
Additionally those invariants required for consistency are specified, and the preconditions 
that need to be attached to operations for those invariants to hold. 
Hierarchical TCM introduces inheritance of permissions according to classifier values 
through a parent/ child relation.  A single parent/ child relation for classifier values in the 
TCM models inheritance structures for all user, operation, and object classifiers.   
Constrained TCM introduces constraints on the classifier values, which can be used for 
modelling separation of duties and other requirements. 
Extended TCM adds derived classifier values such as <Legitimate_Relationship, Yes> as 
well as other classifier values for example <Security_Code, Red>.  A classifier value can 
be any persistent value in the system that is useful for authorisation. 
3.2.2 Core TCM2 
3.2.2.1 Types 
The B specification of Core TCM uses six types or classes: 
  USER; OP; OB; CFIER; VALUE; SESSION 
A type in B is used for type checking during verification.  They would correspond to 
classes in dotnet.  Thus, there is a user class, an operation class etc. 
3.2.2.2 Classifiers 
A classifier is a concept that is used to define authorisation functionality for a user, 
operation, or object.  It corresponds to a property that is considered useful for giving or 
denying access either on its own or in combination with other classifiers.  Examples of user 
classifiers would be Role, Team, Location, and Work_Area.  Examples of object classifiers 
could be data type, data location. 
3.2.2.3 Classifier Values (CValues) 
The type for classifier value is defined as the cross product of CFIER and VALUE 
  CVALUE ≙ CFIER x VALUE 
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Examples of user classifier values would be <Team, Surgical>, <Role, Administration>, 
<Role, GP>, <Location, Tees Valley Health Authority>, and <Location, James Cook 
University Hospital>. 
3.2.2.4 Users, Operations, Objects 
The variable users refers to people, machines, networks, or intelligent autonomous agents. 
  users ⊆ USER 
i.e. users is a collection (set) of type USER, or in dotnet terms users is a set of instances of 
the class USER.  The set of users are assigned to classifier values (cvalues) using the 
relation ua.   
  ua ∈ users ↔ CVALUE 
Examples of user assignment would be the triples <Fred, Role, Administration>, <Fred, 
Team, Surgical>, <Bob, Location, James Cook University Hospital >.  Operations and 
objects are similarly assigned to classifier values, where the classifiers are considered 
useful for authorisation. 
  opa ∈ OP ↔ CVALUE 
  oba ∈ OB ↔ CVALUE 
 
An example of object assignment would be the triple <EHR1, PatientId, YS440953C>.  
This states that the object EHR1 (where EHR stands for Electronic Health Record) is 
assigned to the CValue <PatientId, YS440953C>, where YS440953C is a National 
Insurance Number.  Of course, in a database this is just saying there is a many-to-one 
relationship between Electronic Health Records and Patients.  However, it is useful to look 
at in this way, because we go on to gather all of the classifier values together, from 
whatever source, and it is those classifier values that are used for authorisation. 
3.2.2.5 Sets of Classifier and Classifier Values   
The expression ran(ua) gives the set of all user classifer values e.g. <Team, Surgical>, 
<Role, Administration>,  <Location, Newlands Medical Practice> etc.  Similarly ran (opa) 
gives the set of all operation classifer values and ran (oba) gives the set of all object 
classifer values.  Therefore, the set of all classifier values (cvalues) is given by: 
  cvalues ≙ ran (ua) ⋃ ran (opa) ⋃ ran (oba) 
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The expression dom (ran (ua)) extracts the set of user classifiers from the set of user 
classifier values.  Similarly, the operation and object classifiers are given by dom (ran 
(opa)) and dom (ran (oba)).  
  user_cfiers ≙ dom (ran (ua)) 
  op_cfiers    ≙ dom (ran (opa)) 
  obj_cfiers   ≙ dom (ran (oba)) 
The set of all classifiers is given by: 
  cfiers ≙ user_cfiers ⋃ op_cfiers ⋃ obj_cfiers 
3.2.2.6 Confidentiality Permission 
A Confidentiality Permission (CP) is a set of classifier values by which authorisation is 
permitted or denied.  An example could be: 
CP = {<Team, Surgical>, <Role, Anaesthetist>, <EHR_objs, Jane>, <EHR_obj_type, 
Obstetrics>}  
where Team and Role are user classifiers, EHR_objs and EHR_obj_type are object 
classifiers.  The CP is assigned to permit or deny access.  If the example given above were 
created to permit access, then it would allow the anaesthetist member of the surgical team 
access to patient Jane‟s obstetric data. 
F(S) is the set of all finite subsets of S.  As each CP is a subset of the set of classifier 
values cvalues, then the set of all Confidentiality Permissions cps is given as follows: 
  cps ⊆ F (cvalues) 
As stated above CPs can either permit or prohibit authorisation.  There is a function from 
the set of CPs to the set {permit, deny} which establishes the authorisation value of each 
CP.  Because it is a function, a CP cannot simultaneously permit and deny authorisation.  
  acps ∈ cps → {permit, deny} 
It is sometimes easier to work with permit and deny CP sets (or views in database 
terminology).  The sets are defined as follows using the range restriction operator (⊳): 
  permit_cps ≙ dom (acps ⊳ {permit}) 
  deny_cps    ≙  dom (acps ⊳ {deny}) 
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3.2.2.7 Sessions 
Every user can have a number of sessions.  A partial function is defined from SESSION to 
users: 
 session_user ∈ SESSION ⇸ users 
The set of sessions is defined as the domain of this function: 
 sessions ≙ dom (session_user) 
and userSessions as its inverse: 
 userSessions (user) ≙ session_user-1[{user}] 
Each session has an associated set of user classifier values that must be a subset of the 
user‟s assigned classifier values: 
 session_values ∈ SESSION ↔ cvalues 
 session_values ⊆ (session_user ; ua) 
 
This follows the RBAC specification with classifier values being used instead of roles. 
3.2.2.8 Permitting or Denying Permission   
The assigned classifier values for a particular session, operation, and object are given as 
follows: 
AssignedCValues (session, op, ob) ≙ 
session_values [{session}] ⋃ opa [{op}] ⋃ oba [{ob}] 
 
These classifier values together with the CPs determine whether the operation op can be 
performed on the object ob in the given session.  A particular permit_cp cp permits access 
according to the following expression: 
 CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
where acvals is the assigned classifier values (AssignedCValues (session, op, ob) as 
defined above), and cp is a confidentiality permission which grants access.  Access is 
permitted if for every classifier in the CP, there is at least one classifier value common to 
the CP and the Assigned Classifier Values.  
The domain of any CP is the set of classifiers used by that CP.  For example the CP 
{<Role, GP>, <Location, James Cook Hospital>, <EHR_obj_type, Obstetrics>} 
uses the classifiers 
 82 
{Role, Location, EHR_obj_type}. 
The expression for CPPermitAccess above states that access is permitted if for every 
classifier in the CP there is at least one classifier value common to the CP and the assigned 
classifier values.  As an example, suppose that: 
session_values ={<Role, GP>, <Role, Administrator>, <Location, James Cook Hospital>} 
op_value = {<EHR_ops, EHR_Update>} 
obj_values = {<EHR_objs, Jane>, <EHR_obj_type, Obstetrics>} 
then either of the two following permit_cps would permit the given operation on the given 
object because for every classifier in the CP there is a match between the session, operator 
and object classifier values, and the Confidentiality Permission classifier values. 
PCP1={<Role, Administrator>, <EHR_ops, EHR_Update>, <EHR_obj_type, Obstetrics>} 
PCP2={<Role, GP>, <EHR_ops, EHR_Update>, <EHR_objs, Jane>} 
A CP would normally contain at least one user, operator, and object classifier value and in 
early versions of the TCM, this was a requirement.  As an aside, it is worth noting here that 
the operator and object classifiers could be simply operator and object identifiers, and these 
together with Role as a user classifier would correspond to RBAC. 
During the formal specification of the TCM, it was realised that a CP could be any set of 
classifier values and did not have to be restricted to having at least one user, operation, and 
object classifier value.  This flexibility allows a CP to be specified as: 
PCP3 = {<Role, GP>, <Location, James Cook Hospital>, <EHR_objs, Jane>} 
or even just 
PCP4 = {<Role, Administrator>} 
PCP3 would allow any GP at James Cook Hospital to perform any operation on Jane‟s 
data.  PCP4 would allow the administrator to perform any operation on any object.  Note 
that if the above were deny_cps then the operation on the object would be denied. 
3.2.2.9 Confidentiality Permission Type 
With each Confidentiality Permission there is associated a set of classifiers e.g. {Role, 
Location, EHR_obj_type}.  A Confidentiality Permission Type (CPT) is defined as this set 
of classifiers.  Any set of classifiers can be a CPT.  In the TCM as first developed and in 
TCM2 as specified here there is a fixed set of CPTs to which the CPs had to belong.  So 
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the CPTs acted as a constraint on which CPs could be created.  However in keeping with 
the generalisation theme of the formal specification, in further development we can say 
that any set of classifier values can be a CP, and therefore any set of classifiers can be a 
CPT.  (This is explored more fully in TCM3 (Section 4)).  Any particular CPT permits 
access if there exists a CP belonging to that CPT which permits access. 
CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
bool ( cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cpt)) 
 
i.e. if there exists at least one CP cp which is of type cpt (this is given by dom (cp) = cpt) 
and for every classifier in cpt, there is at least one classifier value common to the CP cp 
and the Assigned Classifier Values acvals.  Similarly, for CPTDeniesAccess except that cp 
has to be a deny_cp. 
CPTDenyAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
bool ( cp. (cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cpt)) 
 
The CPT {Role, EHR_ops, EHR_objs} is equivalent to authorisation by role, because the 
corresponding CPs take the form (for example):   
 {<Role, GP>, <EHR_ops, update>, < EHR_objs, Alice‟s Records>}, 
which is just the role to permission assignment pa in RBAC. 
3.2.2.10 Confidentiality Permission Type Ordering 
A TCM application in its original form (and in its development to TCM2, which is what 
we are considering here) will normally define several CPTs.  These CPTs have an ordering 
which determines which are processed first.  Authorisation is given or denied according to 
the first match of a CPT in the ordering i.e. the first CPT for which there exists a CP that 
either permits or denies access.  This means that lower priority CPTs do not have to be 
considered once a match is found. 
If a match succeeds and the CPT denies access then the TCM denies access and no further 
CPTs are considered.  If a match succeeds and the CPT permits access and does not deny 
access then the TCM permits access and no further CPTs are considered.  If there is no 
match then the next CPT is examined to see if it permits or denies access.  If there is no 
match after all the CPTs have been examined then the default is that permission is denied.  
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3.2.2.11 CPT Default Ordering 
For the default processing order in the original TCM papers, it was stated that more 
complex CPTs were processed before less complex.  One reason was that CPs 
corresponding to the more complex were intuitively more restrictive than the less complex 
CPs;  here „complexity‟ is measured as the number of classifiers in the CPT e.g. {Team, 
Role, EHR_objs} is more complex than {Role, EHR_objs}, and precedes it. 
Also in the original TCM papers, there was an ordering on the classifiers that determined 
the CPT ordering for equally complex CPTs i.e. those with the same number of classifiers.  
The ordering on the classifiers is a user-defined „importance rating‟ e.g. the user can decide 
that role is more important than location or vice versa.  So {Role, EHR_obj_type} would 
precede {Location, EHR_obj_type} if the designer had judged that authorisation by role 
was more important (and therefore should be processed before) authorisation by location. 
This has to be stated with mathematical precision for the purposes of this exercise.  
Although the rules above give a default CPT ordering this ordering can be changed by the 
designer, and in fact, this has been done in some practical applications.  The sequence of 
cpts (cptsq) is given as follows where iseq (cpts) is the set of injective sequences from the 
set cpts.  It is a mapping of the integers 1, 2, 3, 4… to the set cpts. 
cptsq ∈ iseq (cpts) 
 If the default ordering applies, it is enforced as shown below. 
1. The more complex CPT is processed first.  The expression below states that for any 
two CPTs (cpt1, cpt2) in the range of cptsq: if the number of classifiers in cpt1 (card 
(cpt1)) is greater than the number in cpt2 (card (cpt2)) then the order number in the 
sequence of cpt1 is less than that of cpt2. 
∀ (cpt1, cpt2). (cpt1 ∈ ran (cptsq) ⋀ cpt2 ∈ ran (cptsq) ⋀ card (cpt1) > card (cpt2) 
⇒  
cptsq-1 (cpt1) < cptsq-1 (cpt2) 
2. For CPTs of equal cardinality, there is an ordering on the classifiers that determines the 
ordering on the CPTs. Cfiersq is set by the designer and is a mapping of the set of 
integers 1,2,3,4....  to the set of classifiers. 
Cfiersq ∈ iseq (cfiers) 
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The expression below states that given any two CPTs (cpt1, cpt2) in the range of cptsq 
where the number of classifiers in each are equal – then having removed from each 
CPT the classifiers they have in common – if the lowest order classifier in cpt1 
precedes the lowest order classifier in cpt2 then cpt1 comes before cpt2 in the CPT 
ordering 
∀ (cpt1, cpt2). (cpt1 ∈ ran (cptsq) ⋀ cpt2 ∈ ran (cptsq) ⋀ card (cpt1) = card (cpt2) 
⋀ 
min (cfiertsq- 1[cpt1 - cpt1 ⋂ cpt2]) < min (cfiertsq-1 [cpt2 - cpt1 ⋂ cpt2]) 
⇒  
cptsq- 1(cpt1) < cptsq- 1(cpt2) 
For example, if Role is considered higher in precedence than Team, and Team is 
considered higher in precedence than Location.  Given cpt1= {Role, Team, 
EHR_obj_type} and cpt2= {Role, Location, EHR_obj_type} then removing the 
classifiers in common gives {Team} for cpt1 and {Location} for cpt2.  Because Team 
is higher in precedence than Location then cpt1 comes before cpt2 in the CPT ordering. 
3.2.2.12 First Matched CPT 
As discussed above (3.2.2.10) the TCM looks for the first matched CPT in the CPT 
ordering.  This is given by: 
FirstMatchCpt (acvals) ≙ 
cptsq (min ({nn | nn ∈ dom (cptsq) ⋀ 
cp. (cp ∈ cps ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cptsq (nn))})) 
where 
cps ≙ permit_cps ⋃ deny_cps 
i.e. the first CPT in the sequence cptsq for which there exists at least one CP that either 
permits or denies access. 
3.2.2.13 TCM Permit Access 
The TCM permits access if and only if the first match CPT permits access and does not 
also deny access.  This assumes that the system default is that "deny overrules permit" 
which is the normal practice in authorisation systems.  However, the default can be easily 
changed in the TCM if required. 
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TCMPermitAccess (acvals) ≙ CPTPermitAccess (FirstMatchCpt (acvals), acvals) ⋀ 
       CPTDenyAccess (FirstMatchCpt (acvals), acvals) 
3.2.3 Hierarchical TCM2 
Hierarchies are introduced into the TCM in terms of a collection structure or inheritance 
relationship.  e.g. Teams or Roles.  The TCM uses a parent/child relationship on classifier 
values to model this: 
 pc ∊ cvalues ↔ cvalues 
This is similar to the hierarchical relationship in RBAC except this relationship applies to 
any set of classifier values, with the added requirement that any mapping in pc would 
belong to the same classifier.  Thus, the single variable pc can model a role hierarchy, a 
team hierarchy, and a data type hierarchy etc.  The variable pc holds hierarchies for every 
classifier in the TCM application we are considering. 
Examples could be 
<Operating Theatre A Team, Surgical Team 1>  
for a Team user classifier, or 
< Health Care Professional, Registrar>  
< Registrar, Consultant>  
for a Role user classifier, or  
  < Tees Valley Health Authority, James Cook University Hospital> 
 for a Location user classifier, or 
< Medical, Psychiatric> 
for a Data Type classifier. 
Inheritance is a valuable part of RBAC, allowing appropriate permissions assigned at the 
correct level to be distributed throughout the roles of an organisation.  It is much more 
valuable that through a single inheritance relation permissions can be distributed through 
any number of classifiers, according to this simple model. 
The reflective transitive closure of the parent/ child relationship defines an ancestor/ 
descendant relationship as in RBAC: 
ad ≙ pc* 
The descendant/ ascendant relationship da is its inverse 
 da = pc * -1 
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3.2.3.1 Confidentiality Permission Access with Inheritance 
The definition for CPPermitAccess is exactly the same as in (3.2.2.8) except that all CP 
classifier values and all inherited classifier values (given by ad [cp]) are used to test for 
access, not just the classifier values of cp.  The set ad [cp]) contains the original ancestor 
classifier values as well as the set of all descendant classifier values. 
CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp]) =dom (cp)) 
That is access is granted if for every classifier in the domain of cp there exists at least one 
classifier value in common between the assigned classifier values acvals and the classifier 
values of cp and all their descendants.  Similarly for CPDeniesAccess. 
3.2.3.2 Confidentiality Permission Type Access with Inheritance 
The definition for CPTPermitAccess is exactly the same as in (3.2.2.9) except that as above 
all CP classifier values and all inherited classifier values (given by ad [cp]) are used to test 
for access, not just the classifier values of cp. 
 CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 boo l (cp .(cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom(cp )= cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad[cp]) = cpt)) 
Similarly for CPTDenyAccess: 
 CPTDenyAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 bool (cp.(cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom(cp) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad[cp]) = cpt)) 
3.2.3.3 Confidentiality Permission Type Refinement 
In TCM2, there are two ways in which permissions and prohibitions interact with each 
other.  The first we have already considered – that there is an ordering on the CPTs and 
access is given according to whether the first match for a CPT in the CPT ordering permits 
or denies access.  However, in the presence of a hierarchy, we also consider the interaction 
of permit_cps and deny_cps within a single CPT and this determines whether the CPT 
itself permits or denies access.  This could be considered unnecessarily overcomplicated, 
and it was partly to address this that TCM3 was developed.  However, in fairness it must 
be said that usually, in practice, there are only a small number of CPTs and the complexity 
does not cause any great practical problems. 
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In Core TCM2, a CPT permits access if there exists a CP belonging to that CPT which 
permits access.  Similarly, for deny access.  In this treatment a CPT can both permit and 
deny access and this is resolved when deciding whether the TCM as a whole permits 
access. 
In the presence of hierarchies, the authorising CP is selected according to the nearest match 
within classifier value hierarchies.  As an example of this, deny_cps can act to modify or 
refine permit_cps i.e. to allow general overall permissions to be applied, but then to 
remove some detailed permissions using deny_cps.  We could have the following 
permit_cp: 
PCP={<Role,HCP>,<Location, Tees Valley Health Authority>,<EHR_obj_type, Admin>} 
together with the following inheritances in pc: 
< HCP, Locum> for Role 
 <Tees Valley Health Authority, James Cook Hospital> for Location 
 <Admin, Finance> for EHR_obj_type 
The deny_cp: 
DCP = {<Role, Locum>, <Location, James Cook Hospital>, <EHR_obj_type, Finance>} 
could be specified to remove the permission given by inheritance.  This process of 
refinement is further illustrated in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: CPT Refinement Example 
A B 
 
A. {<Role, HCP>, <Location, JCUH>, <EHR_type, Orthopaedic>} 
minus 
B. {<Role, TraineeNurse>, <Location, JCUH>, <EHR_type, Orthopaedic>} 
plus 
C. {<Role, TraineeNurse>, <Location, JCUH_Training>, <EHR_type, Orthopaedic>} 
equals C 
Permit CPs 
Deny CPs 
 89 
Figure 7 above shows how complicated permissions can be built using simple permit and 
deny CPs conforming to the same CPT.  This represents a situation where a trainee nurse is 
denied access to some data normally available to a Health Care Professional (HCP) in 
James Cook Hospital because of their trainee status, but is allowed access in the James 
Cook Hospital Training Block.  Discrete points in the shaded areas represent individual 
authorisations.  The expression for CPTPermitAccess becomes, for Hierarchical TCM: 
CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
bool ( cp1. (cp1 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp1) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp1]) = cpt ⋀ 
     ( cp2. (cp2 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp2) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp2]) = cpt ⋀ 
        ad [cp2] ⊂ ad [cp1])))) 
 
I.e. access is given if there exists a CP cp1 belonging to cpt which permits access, and 
there does not exist a CP cp2 belonging to cpt which denies access, and where the 
descendants of cp2 are a subset of the descendants of cp1.  The requirement that the 
descendants of cp2 are a subset of the descendants of cp1 means that for every classifier in 
the cpt the classifier value for cp2 is a descendant of the classifier value for cp1.  If cp2 
existed, we would say that cp2 refines cp1.   
If there is any CP at all that permits or denies access then there will exist a (nearest match) 
CP which is not refined by another CP.  This is what has been meant by „nearest match‟ in 
previous TCM papers, although this was discussed in the context of an SQL 
implementation and described as „moving upwards until a match was found‟.  In „limited 
hierarchies‟ a unique first match would be found.  However, in general hierarchies there 
may be a number of first matches.  This causes no difficulties providing a CPT is allowed 
to both permit and deny access (or a default „deny overrules permit‟ rule is applied). 
CPTDenyAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
bool (cp1. (cp1 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp1) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp1]) = cpt ⋀  
     (cp2. (cp2 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp2) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp2]) = cpt ⋀ 
      ad [cp2] ⊂ ad [cp1])))) 
 
In accordance with Core TCM a CPT can both permit and deny access and this is 
eventually resolved when deciding whether the TCM as a whole permits access. 
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3.2.3.4 TCM2 Permit Access 
Having redefined CPTPermitAccess, CPT Ordering and TCMPermitAccess are processed 
exactly as in Core TCM (3.2.2.12). 
3.2.4 Constrained TCM2 
In the RBAC standard (Ferraiola, et al., 2001) static and dynamic separation of duties are 
defined.  Static separation determines those duties to which a user cannot be 
simultaneously assigned e.g. bank manager and bank teller.  Dynamic separation specifies 
those duties that a user cannot hold simultaneously within a session, even though they may 
be assigned those duties.  By duties is meant roles, and although the RBAC standard 
specifies a particular way of implementing separation of duties, essentially there are sets of 
roles which together are prohibited, either on assignment or within a session.  The TCM 
specification varies from the RBAC approach to reflect this. 
Otherwise the RBAC approach is extended quite naturally in the TCM to static and 
dynamic separation of classifier values (as opposed to roles), and two variables are 
implemented which contain the banned sets of classifier values.  Although I use ssv and 
dsv as in RBAC, the terms stand for different things i.e.  banned sets of classifier values, 
rather then a partial function between classifier values (in RBAC roles) and a natural 
number nn.   
 ssv ⊆ F(cvalues) 
 dsv ⊆ F(cvalues) 
 
As in RBAC, static separation requires an additional precondition to AssignUser and 
dynamic separation requires an additional precondition to both CreateSession and 
ActivateValue. 
3.2.5 Extended TCM2 
Extended TCM2 includes extra classifier values in addition to those directly related to user, 
operator, or object.  For example <Legitimate_relationship, yes> is derived from the 
session and the object.  System classifier values such as <Security_code, red> can also be 
included.  The relation ea (extended assignment) is defined below.  Although included here 
as part of TCM2 these ideas are developed more fully in TCM3 (Section 4), and it was 
some of this thinking about TCM2 that partly led to TCM3‟s development. 
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 ea ∈ SESSION x OP x OB ↔ CVALUE 
The extended classifiers are given by: 
 ext_cfiers ≙ dom (ran (ea)) 
and the set of all classifiers becomes 
 cfiers ≙ user_cfiers ⋃ op_cfiers ⋃ obj_cfiers ⋃ ext_cfiers  
The extended classifier values are added to the assigned classifier values for session, 
operator and object and are used for authorisation together with the session, operator and 
object classifier values 
AssignedCValues (session, op, ob) ≙ 
session_values [{session}] ⋃ opa [{op}] ⋃ oba [{obj}] ⋃ ea [{session ↦op ↦ob}] 
 
3.2.6 TCM2 Overrides 
The TCM2 user can apply an override in two basic ways and in a combination of the two.  
The overrides act to remove denial effects. 
 CP Override.  The removal of the denial effect of a deny CP upon a permit CP within a 
CPT.  An example could use teams and sub teams.  e.g. we could have the permit_cp 
PCP1 = {<Team, T1>, <EHR_obj_type, Surgical>}  
with the following team inheritance relations in pc: 
<T1, T2> 
<T2, T3>   
If there exists a deny_cp 
 DCP1 = {<team, T3>, <EHR_obj_type, Surgical>}  
then this cancels the collection to sub-collection inheritance at level T3.  The override 
would allow any users classified as belonging to T3 to inherit from the permit_cp.  CP 
Override can be used with any user classifier or combination of user classifiers.  It is 
equivalent to substituting the session value in acvals with the level to which the CP 
Override takes place, in this example replacing T3 with T2.  Additional examples could be 
given for Role (e.g. substituting GP for Junior GP), or other session values.  
 CPT Override.  This has the effect of cancelling any denials produced by CPs 
corresponding to earlier CPTs to a specified „override level‟ in the CPT processing order.  
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The first match would only look at permit CPs in the given set and then permit or deny CPs 
thereafter.  CPT Override can be applied in a number of ways depending on the 
application.  It might remove denials by specialist permissions, leaving the user to access 
information granted by a more general permission providing role-based access.  The first 
matched CPT for a set of assigned classifier values now becomes: 
FirstMatchCpt (acvals, cpt_override_level) ≙ 
cptsq (min ({nn | nn ∈ dom (cptsq) ⋀ 
(nn <= cpt_override_level ⋀ cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cptsq (nn))} 
⋁ 
(nn > cpt_override_level ⋀ cp. (cp ∈ cps ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cptsq (nn))))}))  
 
where 
cps ≙ permit_cps ⋃ deny_cps 
 Global Override.  The removal of all denial effects, so that the expression for 
TCMPermitAccess simplifies to: 
TCMPermitAccess (acvals) ≙ 
bool (cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = dom (acvals ⋂ cp))) 
 
3.2.7 Positive/ Negative Permissions Conflict Solving 
The procedure for handling conflicts between positive and negative permissions is restated 
here, although it is contained in the descriptions and mathematics below.  This is because 
this topic has been the subject of a number of papers, and because TCM3 handles this 
differently to TCM2 so the differences need to be highlighted. 
In TCM2, there are two areas where positive and negative permissions interact: 
 Within a Confidentiality Permission Type 
 Between Confidentiality Permission Types 
3.2.7.1 Within a Confidentiality Permission Type 
A particular CPT denies access if and only if there exists a CP belonging to that CPT 
which denies access and that CP is not refined by a CP that permits access.  Refines is 
given by 3.2.3.3 
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A particular CPT permits access if and only if there exists a CP belonging to that 
CPT which permits access and that CP is not refined by a CP that denies access. 
In the light of the above two statements a CPT can permit access, deny access, both permit 
or deny access, or neither permit or deny access.  (In deference to some comments, you 
could apply the default that „deny overrules permit‟ or vice versa within a CPT, so then a 
CPT can be said to only permit or deny access.  However, what matters is whether the 
TCM overall permits or denies, and this logic would still achieve the same outcome but by 
a slightly different route.) 
3.2.7.2 Between Confidentiality Permission Types 
There is an ordering on the CPTs that determines whether the TCM as a whole grants or 
denies access.  This is known as the first match principle.  Each CPT is examined in order 
of priority.  The following rules apply: 
 If the first match CPT denies access then access is denied by the TCM, irrespective 
of whether the CPT also permits access 
 If the first match CPT permits access and does not deny access then access is 
permitted by the TCM 
 If the CPT neither permits access nor denies access then the next CPT in the 
ordering is examined. 
 If all the CPTs are examined and no CPT is found which permits access or denies 
access then the TCM denies access. 
3.3 TCM2 Functional Specification in B: Overview 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section defines features required of a TCM system.  These features fall into three 
categories: administrative operations, administrative reviews, and system-level 
functionality.  
The administrative operations define requirements in terms of an administrative interface 
and an associated set of semantics that provide the capability to create, delete, and maintain 
TCM  elements and relations (e.g., to create and delete classifier value to CP assignments).  
The administrative review features define requirements in terms of an administrative 
interface and an associated set of semantics that provide the capability to perform query 
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operations on TCM  elements and relations, for example, return the set of users assigned to 
a classifier value  or the set of classifier values  that are either assigned to or inherited by a 
user.  
System-level functionality defines features for the creation of user sessions to include 
classifier value activation/ deactivation, the enforcement of constraints on classifier 
activation, and for calculation of an access decision. 
3.3.2 Core TCM2 Operations 
3.3.2.1 Administrative Operations for Core TCM 
Administrators create and delete users, assign and deassign users to classifier values 
(which could include roles), and add or remove Confidentiality Permissions.  
Confidentiality Permissions give authorisation through user classifier values in 
combination with operation and object classifier values. 
 AddUser: adds a user to the set users.  Details of users are usually inputted before any 
authorisation is assigned, and may be kept on the system after they have left the company. 
 DeleteUser: deletes a user. 
 AssignUser: assigns a user to a classifier value.  This could be a role, location, team, or 
any attribute the user could have. 
 DeassignUser: deassigns a user from a classifier value. 
 AddCP: adds a Confidentiality Permission. 
 RemoveCP: removes a Confidentiality Permission. 
3.3.2.2 Supporting System Operations for Core TCM 
 CreateSession: creates a user session and gives the user a set of classifier values, which 
must be a subset of the user‟s assigned classifier values. 
 DeleteSession: terminates a session. 
 ActivateValue: adds a classifier value as an active classifier value for the current 
session. 
 DeactivateValue: deletes a classifier value from the active value set of the current 
session. 
 CPPermitAccess: returns TRUE if the given CP permits access. 
 CPDenyAccess: returns TRUE if the given CP denies access. 
 CPTPermitAccess: returns TRUE if the given CPT permits access. 
 95 
 CPTDenyAccess: returns TRUE if the given CPT denies access. 
 TCMPermitAccess: returns TRUE if the Tees Confidentiality Model as a whole permits 
access. 
3.3.2.3 Review Operations for Core TCM2 
 AssignedUsers: returns the set of users assigned to a given classifier value. 
 UserCValues: returns the set of classifier values assigned to a given user. 
 AssignedCValues: returns the set of classifier values assigned for given session, 
operation, and object.  These classifier values together with the CPs determine whether the 
operation is allowed on the object in the session. 
 SessionPermissions: returns the set of permissions available in the given session: 
 SessionOperationsOnObject: returns the set of operations that can be performed on the 
given object in the given session: 
3.3.3 Hierarchical TCM2 Operations 
The operations CPPermitAccess and CPDenyAccess are modified to enable authorisation 
by a CP and all inherited values i.e. using ad [cp] instead of cp.  Additionally there is a 
„nearest match‟ rule operating i.e. the permission is determined by the CP in the nearest 
order in the classifier value hierarchies.  CPPermitAccess is modified to enable this.  
Where CPPermitAccess and CPDenyAccess are included in other operations, these are also 
modified.  All other operations remain the same. 
3.3.3.1 Additional Administrative Operations for Hierarchical TCM2 
The additional administrative operations for Hierarchical TCM are concerned with the 
creation and maintenance of the parent child relationship pc. 
 AddInheritance: establishes a new immediate inheritance relationship between two 
classifier values.  The classifier values must both belong to the same classifier. 
 DeleteInheritance: deletes an existing immediate inheritance relationship between two 
classifier values. 
3.3.4 Constrained TCM2 Operations 
The operation AssignUser is modified to ensure that the set of assigned user values does 
not contain a set of statically prohibited classifier values after the operation.  The 
operations CreateSession and ActivateValue are modified to ensure that the set of session 
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values does not contain a set of dynamically prohibited classifier values after those 
operations.  All other operations remain the same. 
3.3.4.1 Additional Administrative Operations for Constrained TCM2 
The additional operations are to do with the creation and deletion of prohibited sets of 
classifier values, either static i.e.  prohibited for user assignment, or dynamic i.e. prohibited 
for use within a session. 
 AddSSVSet: adds a set of statically prohibited classifier values. 
 RemoveSSVSet: deletes a set of statically prohibited classifier values. 
 AddDSVSet: adds a set of dynamically prohibited classifier values. 
 RemoveDSVSet: deletes a set of dynamically prohibited classifier values. 
3.4  TCM2 Functional Specification in B 
Many of these operations in the TCM parallel the RBAC specification e.g. instead of 
dealing with session roles for a user, we are dealing with session values.  The main 
differences occur in the operations that grant or deny access. 
3.4.1 Core TCM2 
3.4.1.1 Administrative Operations for Core TCM2 
AddUser 
This operation creates a new TCM user.  The operation is valid only if the new user is of 
type USER and not already a member of users.  The new user is created before classifier 
values are assigned or sessions are created for that user. 
AddUser (user) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ USER - users 
 THEN 
  user ≔ users ⋃ {user} 
 END 
DeleteUser 
This operation deletes a user from the TCM.  The user assignment relation (ua) and the 
session_user function are updated.  The user‟s sessions are removed from the 
session_values relation.   
 DeleteUser (user) ≙ 
 PRE 
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  user ∈ users 
 THEN 
  users ≔ users - {user} || 
  ua ≔ {user} ⩤ ua || 
  session_user ≔ session_user ⩥ {user} || 
  session_values ≔ userSessions (user) ⩤ session_values 
 END 
AssignUser 
This operation assigns a classifier value to a user.  The operation is valid if the user is a 
member of users and the assignment does not already exist. 
AssignUser (user, cfier, val) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀ cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ val ∈ VALUE ⋀ 
  user ↦ (cfier ↦ val) ∉ ua 
 THEN 
  ua ≔ ua ⋃ {user ↦ (cfier ↦ val)} 
 END 
DeassignUser 
This operation deletes the assignment of a classifier value to a user.  The classifier value 
must be one of the user‟s assigned classifier values and not currently active in a session. 
DeassignUser (user, cval) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀ 
  cval ∈ UAssignedcvalues 2(user) – CValuesActive3 (user) 
 THEN 
  ua ≔ ua – {user ↦ cval} 
 END 
AddCP 
This operation adds a Confidentiality Permission that acts to permit or deny access.  A CP 
consists of a set of classifier values i.e. is in F (CVALUE) which is the set of all finite 
subsets of CVALUE and must not already be in the set cps.  There is a function acps from 
each CP to BOOL according to whether the CP permits or denies access. 
AddCP (cvals, PorD) ≙ 
                                                 
2 UAssignedcvalues(u) == ua[{u}]   
3 CValuesActive(u) == session_values[session_user~[{u}]] 
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 PRE 
  cvals ∈ F(CVALUE) - cps ⋀ 
  PorD ∈ {permit, deny} 
 THEN 
  cps ≔ cps ⋃ {cvals} || 
  acps (cvals) ≔ PorD 
 END 
 
RemoveCP 
This operation removes a CP, which by definition is a set of classifier values.  The CP 
must already be a member of cps; and the acps function, which assigns permit or deny to 
the CP, is updated using the domain anti-restriction operator. 
RemoveCP (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ cps 
 THEN 
  cps ≔ cps - {cvals} || 
  acps ≔ {cvals} ⩤ acps 
 END 
3.4.1.2 Supporting System Operations for Core TCM 
CreateSession 
This operation creates a new session for the given user, with the given set of user classifier 
values.  (This is similar to RBAC except that RBAC uses a set of roles.)  The operation is 
valid if and only if the user is a member of the users set, the session is a new session, the 
active value set (avs) is a subset of the user‟s assigned classifier values, and there is at least 
one classifier value for each user classifier.  In RBAC, this last condition is always met 
because there is only one classifier „role‟ and there is always a value for it.  Here it must be 
enforced to enable the permissions to be correctly calculated.  In a database 
implementation this could be done by having default values for all the user classifiers 
CreateSession (user, session, avs) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀ 
  session ∈ SESSION – Sessions4 ⋀ 
  avs ⊆ UAssignedcvalues (user) ⋀ 
  dom (avs) = user_cfiers 
                                                 
4 Sessions == dom (session_user) 
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 THEN 
  session_user (session) ≔ user || 
  session_values ≔ session_values ⋃ {session} x avs 
 END 
DeleteSession 
This operation deletes a session.  It is valid if the session belongs to the set Sessions, which 
is defined as the domain of session_user.  The relations session_user and session_values 
are modified using domain subtraction 
DeleteSession (session) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions 
 THEN 
  session_user ≔ {session} ⩤ session_user || 
  session_values ≔ {session} ⩤ session_values  
 END 
ActivateValue 
This operation activates a given classifier value for a session.  The session must already 
exist and the classifier value must be one of the session user‟s assigned classifier values, 
and not currently active in the session. 
ActivateValue (session, cvalue) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
  cvalue ∈ Uassignedcvalues (session_user (session)) - 
  ActiveCvalues (session) 
 THEN 
  session_values ≔session_values ⋃ {session ↦ cvalue} 
 END 
DeactivateValue 
This operation deletes a classifier value from the active classifier values of a session.  The 
operation is valid if and only if the session is a member of Sessions, and the classifier value 
is an active classifier value of that session. 
DeactivateValue (session, cvalue) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
  cvalue ∈ ActiveCvalues (session) 
 THEN 
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  session_values ≔ session_values - {session ↦ cvalue} 
 END 
CPPermitAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP cp permits access for the given set of assigned 
classifier values acvals.  The set acvals is the set of user, operation, and object classifiers, 
which are used for permission determination.  Access is given if cp is a permit_cp and for 
every classifier in cp there is at least one classifier value in common between acvals and 
the cp (3.2.2.8). 
CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
 END 
CPDenyAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP cp denies access for the given set of assigned 
classifier values acvals.  The set acvals is the set of user, operation, and object classifiers 
that are used for permission determination.  Access is given if cp is a deny_cp and for 
every classifier in cp there is at least one classifier value in common between acvals and 
the cp (3.2.2.8). 
CPDenyAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
 END 
CPTPermitAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CPT (cpt) permits access for the given set of 
assigned classifier values acvals.  This is true if there is at least one CP cp belonging to the 
CPT that permits access.   
CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cpt ∈ cpts ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔ bool (∃cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ 
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  dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cpt)) 
 END 
CPTDenyAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CPT (cpt) denies access.  This is true if there is at 
least one CP cp belonging to the CPT that denies access. 
CPTDenyAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cpt ∈ cpts ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔bool (∃cp. (cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cpt)) 
 END 
FirstMatchCpt 
This operation returns the first CPT in cptsq that either permits or denies access.  
fmCpt ← FirstMatchCpt (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  fmCpt ≔ cptsq (min ({nn | nn ∈ dom (cptsq) ⋀ 
  ∃cp. (cp ∈ cps ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = cptsq (nn))})) 
 END 
TCMPermitAccess 
This operation returns true if the TCM permits access.  Access is permitted if and only if it 
is permitted by the first CPT for which there is a match (fmCpt) and is not also denied by 
that CPT. 
pa ← TCMPermitAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔ CPTPermitAccess(fmCpt, acvals) ⋀ CPTDenyAccess(fmCpt,acvals) 
 END 
3.4.1.3 Review Operations for Core TCM2 
SessionPermissions 
This operation returns the permissions of a given session. 
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sp ← SessionPermissions (session) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions 
 THEN 
  sp ≔ {op, obj | op ∈ OP ⋀ obj ∈ OB ⋀ 
  TCMPermitAccess (AssignedCValues5(session, op, obj))} 
 END 
 
SessionOperationsOnObject 
This operation returns the operations allowed in a given session on a given object. 
 so ← SessionOperationsOnObject (session, obj) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions ⋀ obj ∈ OB  
 THEN 
  so ≔ {op | op ∈ OP ⋀  
  TCMPermitAccess (AssignedCValues (session, op, obj))} 
 END 
3.4.2 Hierarchical TCM2 
Hierarchies are added to the TCM through an immediate parent/ child relationship pc.  
This can apply to collections where the child is a member of the parent collection e.g. 
teams and team members, or to inheritance as in RBAC, e.g. GP inherits from Health Care 
Professional.  There are new operations to add or delete inheritance, and other operations 
are modified so that classifier values and inherited classifier values are used for 
authorisation not just the classifier values themselves.  All other operations remain the 
same. 
3.4.2.1 Administrative Operations 
AddInheritance 
This operation establishes a new parent child relationship.  The preconditions are that the 
relationship does not already exist and that cycle creation is avoided i.e. that the parent 
does not inherit from the child through ad. 
AddInheritance (cvp, cvc) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvp ∈ cvalues ⋀ cvc ∈ cvalues ⋀ 
  cvp ↦ cvc ∉ pc ⋀ 
                                                 
5 AssignedCValues(s,p,b) == session_values[{s}] ⋃ opa[{p}] ⋃ oba[{b}] ⋃ sa[{s}] 
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  cvc ↦ cvp ∉ ad 
 THEN 
  pc ≔ pc ⋃ {cvp ↦ cvc} 
 END 
 
DeleteInheritance 
This operation deletes a parent child relationship.  This operation affects a user‟s 
authorised classifier values, which in turn affects the allowed session classifier values.  For 
simplicity I  have used the precondition Sessions = ϕ.  In practice the Session Permissions 
could be modified, could be allowed to remain until the end of the session or the session 
forced to terminate. 
DeleteInheritance (cvp, cvc) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvp ∈ cvalues ⋀cvc ∈ cvalues ⋀ 
  cvp ↦ cvc ∈ pc ⋀ 
  Sessions = ϕ 
 THEN 
  pc ≔ pc - {cvp ↦ cvc} 
 END 
 
3.4.2.2 Supporting System Operations for Hierarchical TCM2 
The ancestor/ descendant relation ad is defined as the closure of the parent/ child relation 
and is used in the following operations so that all inherited classifier values are included 
for authorisation. 
CPPermitAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP permits access. 
pa ← CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp]) = dom (cp)) 
 END 
 
CPDenyAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP (including inherited values) denies access. 
da ← CPDenyAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
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  cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  da ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp]) = dom (cp)) 
 END 
 
CPTPermitAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CPT permits access.  This is true if there is at least 
one CP associated with the CPT that permits access (with inheritance) and there is no deny 
CP refining the permit CP to deny access.  In CP override, this denial effect would be 
removed. 
pa ← CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
   cpt ∈ cpts ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
 pa ≔ bool (cp1. (cp1 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp1) = cpt ⋀ 
dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp1]) = cpt ⋀    
 (cp2. (cp2 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp2) = cpt ⋀ 
 dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp2] ) = cpt ⋀ 
 ad [cp2] ⊂ ad [cp1] )))) 
 END 
 
CPTDenyAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CPT denies access.  This is true if there is at least 
one CP associated with the CPT which denies access (with inheritance) and there is no 
permit CP refining the deny CP to permit access. 
da ← CPTDenyAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cpt ∈ cpts ⋀ acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
pa ≔ bool (cp1. (cp1 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ dom (cp1) = cpt ⋀ 
dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp1]) = cpt ⋀    
 (cp2. (cp2 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp2) = cpt ⋀ 
dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp2]) = cpt ⋀ 
ad [cp2] ⊂ ad [cp1])))) 
 END 
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3.4.3 Constrained TCM2 
Additional operations are required to add and remove sets of statically and dynamically 
prohibited classifier values.  Additional preconditions are required for AssignUser, 
CreateSession, and ActivateValue to ensure that prohibited sets are not activated. 
3.4.3.1 Administrative Operations 
AddSSVset 
This operation adds a set of classifier values to which a user is not allowed to be assigned 
at the same time. 
AddSSVset (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ F(cvalues) - ssv 
 THEN 
  ssv ≔ ssv ⋃ {cvals} 
 END 
 
RemoveSSVset 
This operation removes a set of classifier values, to which a user is not allowed to be 
assigned at the same time. 
RemoveSSVset (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ ssv 
 THEN 
  ssv ≔ ssv - {cvals} 
 END 
 
AddDSVset 
This operation adds a set of classifier values, to which a user is not allowed to hold 
concurrently in a session even though the user may be assigned the classifier values. 
AddDSVset (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ F(cvalues) - dsv 
 THEN 
  dsv ≔ dsv ⋃ {cvals} 
 END 
 
RemoveDSVset 
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This operation removes a set of classifier values, which a user is not allowed to hold 
concurrently in a session. 
RemoveDSVset (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ dsv 
 THEN 
  dsv ≔ dsv - {cvals} 
 END 
 
AssignUser 
Static separation of values requires an additional precondition to this operation, which is 
that a banned set of static values cannot be contained in the user‟s new set of assigned 
values. 
AssignUser (user, cfier, val) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀ cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ val ∈ VALUE ⋀ 
  user ↦ (cfier ↦ val) ∉ ua ⋀ 
  ∀cvs. (cvs ∈ ssv ⇒ cvs ⊈ UAssignedcvalues6(user) ⋃ {cfier ↦ val}) 
 THEN 
  ua ≔ ua ⋃ {user ↦ (cfier ↦ val)} 
 END 
3.4.3.2 Supporting System Operations for Constrained TCM2 
CreateSession 
Dynamic separation of values requires an additional precondition to this operation, which 
is that a prohibited set of classifier values cannot be contained in the active value set avs. 
CreateSession (user, session, avs) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀session ∈ SESSION –Sessions ⋀ 
  avs ⊆ UAssignedcvalues (user) ⋀ 
  dom (avs) = user_cfiers ⋀ 
  ∀cvs. (cvs ∈ dsv ⇒ cvs ⊈ avs) 
 THEN 
  session_user (session) ≔ user || 
  session_values ≔ session_values ⋃ {session} x avs 
 END 
                                                 
6 UAssignedcvalues(u) == ua[{u}] 
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ActivateValue 
Dynamic separation of values requires an additional precondition to this operation, which 
is that a banned set of classifier values cannot be contained in the new active value set.  
ActivateValue (session, cvalue) ≙ 
 PRE 
  session ∈ Sessions ⋀ 
  cvalue ∈ UAssignedcvalues (session_user (session)) 
  - ActiveCValues7(session) ⋀ 
  ∀cvs. (cvs ∈ dsv ⇒ cvs ⊈ ActiveCValues (session) ⋃ {cvalue}) 
 THEN 
  session_values ≔ session_values ⋃ {session ↦ cvalue} 
 END 
 
3.5 Comparison with RBAC and related work 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Because the TCM is a generalization of RBAC, it can provide all the benefits of RBAC.  A 
CPT with a single user classifier of Role, and with operation and object identity classifiers, 
directly implements the concept of role authorisation found in the NIST standard.  
A large research development in RBAC can be described under the term parameterised 
RBAC. Part of this work involves using external (sometimes called contextual,  
environmental) information to control the processing of roles, and therefore provides 
additional functionality over standard RBAC, including what could be described as an 
override capability (Stermbeck, et al., 2004) (Bacon, et al., 2001). 
The TCM provides aspects of external parameter handling as part of its basic model and 
design framework (in that classifiers can represent external parameters).  This approach is 
similar to that advocated in (Goh, et al., 1998), which prefers the use of „role attributes‟ to 
the use of external policy-enforcing systems (where this is possible). 
The modelling of users and user groups for RBAC systems was reported in (Osborn, et al., 
2000).  However the objective in this work is to design RBAC authorisation systems, in 
that user groups are associated with roles.  The TCM provides the functionality to 
                                                 
7 ActiveUCValues(s) == session_values[{s}] 
 108 
authorise by user groups with the same hierarchical structure as used in (Osborn, et al., 
2000), in conjunction with Role and other classifiers.  
An approach to authorising by team and role was investigated in the TMAC model 
(Thomas, 1997).  This relied on ultimately authorising by RBAC roles and permissions, 
though permission activation was constrained to individual users and objects.  The TCM 
could be used to model and implement this approach within its confidentiality permissions 
processing framework. 
RBAC models for role administration (i.e. for assigning roles to users) have been 
extensively researched, e.g. the ARBAC02 model (Oh, et al., 2006).  The ARBAC02 
model includes models of organisation structures for user pools and permission pools that 
are independent from role hierarchies.  These concepts could in principle be modelled in 
the TCM by classifiers, which are independent.  The development of a system for TCM 
administration is beyond the scope of this thesis, and is a topic for continuing research. 
The TCM can straightforwardly support a central concept of usage control (Zhang, et al., 
2005) in that mutable attributes can be modelled as classifiers, and can participate in CPTs.  
Legitimate Relationship is similar to a mutable attribute, and can determine and change 
access during a session.  Additionally, Extended TCM can model the relationship between 
a user and a protected object, unlike UCON; the Legitimate Relationship classifier is an 
example of this. 
Access control based on credentials, and modelling of trust has been reported in the 
TrustBAC system (Chakraborty, et al., 2006).  Here trust levels, based on credentials and 
other information, are mapped onto RBAC roles.  The TCM provides the additional 
capability to model and use these concepts directly and independently for authorisation, if 
such functionality were to be required.  
Neumann and Strembeck (Neumann, et al., 2002) have advocated using scenarios and 
sequence diagrams to derive permissions, and assign permissions to functional roles (as 
opposed to organisational roles).  Their approach has had a significant effect on healthcare 
computing (Science Applications International Corporation, SAIC, 2005).  The TCM 
design procedure is similar in that we use models developed during systems analysis, but 
we depart from RBAC permissions and roles. 
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3.5.2 Separation of Duties 
In relation to static separation of duties: in the RBAC standard (INCITS, 2004) this is 
specified by giving a set of roles together with an integer n, with the requirement that you 
can‟t have n or more of these roles assigned at the same time.  This same basic algorithm 
applies whether the roles are statically or dynamically assigned. 
However, if you take this back to basics, all that is really happening, is that there are a 
number of sets of roles that are not allowed to be assigned.  Of course, the disallowed sets 
can be specified as in the RBAC standard by using rolesets and natural numbers, but 
mathematically all that is happening is that there are a number of particular sets of roles 
that are prohibited.  One review of this work (an unsuccessful ACM Tissec submission in 
2007) says:  
“The authors talk about separation of duties.  The formalization of 
separation of duties doesn't seem correct.  Separation of duty is 
specified between users, objects, and operations - this doesn't seem 
intuitive” 
The formalisation is correct, and reflects the discussion above.  Perhaps I could have 
explained it better in the paper.  If in RBAC, separation of duties is really Sets of {Sets of 
Roles} that are not allowed then the corresponding idea in the TCM is Sets of {Sets of 
Classifier Values} that are not allowed (Section 3.4.3.1).  If we confine the classifier 
values to just user classifier values, then I think the generalisation is easily seen: in 
addition to sets of roles that are not allowed, there may be (for example) certain roles that 
are not allowed in certain locations. 
However, in keeping with the generic nature of the TCM, there is no restriction that the 
classifier values have to be user classifier values.  Although less immediately applicable, a 
moment‟s thought could give examples where certain roles are not allowed to interact with 
particular data types, or certain operations are not allowed in certain locations.   
This reviewer has failed to grasp the breadth of the TCM, which is made possible by taking 
Access Control back to first principles.  This was made possible by formal specification. 
3.5.3 Attributes 
Some criticism of the TCM has said that classifiers are only attributes by another name and 
that RBAC with attributes is well covered elsewhere and provides a more powerful model 
than the TCM.  This does not take into account Classifiers that are not dependant simply 
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on a single attribute.  E.g., Legitimate Relationship depends on Role and the Data.  The 
TCM is generic and allows fundamental redesign of how authorisation is given.  What 
happens if it is decided that Role is not a factor in Authorisation e.g. Authorisation only 
depends on location.  Of course, you can define a role „LocationPerson‟ but you are 
already adding unnecessary complexity.  It would be my contention that the TCM starts by 
accepting intrinsic authorisation complexity, and that thereafter authorisation application is 
simpler, whereas RBAC starts by simplifying authorisation and that thereafter the demands 
of real authorisation scenarios require increasingly complex layers.   
3.6 Comparison with Original TCM (TCM1) 
As a result of the formal specification, some changes (which I believe are improvements) 
were made to the original TCM specification.  The first of these concerns the fact that 
collections were widely used in TCM1 e.g. a CP would be applied to a collection of 
identities, or a collection of objects.  The following is a definition used in this early work: 
“A Collection has Elements, which may be Members or other collections. Collections and elements are 
uniquely identified.  Collections are inherently hierarchical in that they can contain sub-collections, which in 
turn can have their own sub-collections. Elements can participate in more than one collection.” 
However, it was realised that belonging to a collection is just another classifier: in fact, 
access control is all about using collections to simplify administration – so a better way of 
looking at the above statement is that Members are classified as belonging to a collection 
(Team, Workgroup, Data Type etc.) and that inheritance is through collections and sub-
collections.  
TCM1 also included inheritance within a CP.  To each classifier value within a CP was 
attached upward or downward inheritance.  This was specified at the time of the CP‟s 
creation.  It was realised (after lengthy discussion) that that all upward inheritance can be 
rewritten as downward inheritance, and any inheritance applied within a CP, can be split 
into specifying the CP without inheritance and specifying the inheritance in a relation.  
Specifying a CP as originally envisaged is still possible as part of the GUI, but the 
underlying programming means that all inheritance can be handled by one relation, the 
parent / child relation pc. 
TCM has a first match principle for deciding which CPT to apply.  Within the CPT, the 
original TCM (TCM1) also applied a nearest match principle to decide which CP within 
that CPT took priority.  This worked as follows: given an ordering on the classifiers e.g. if 
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Role is more important than Location, which is more important  then Data Type, then 
starting with the inheritance tree for Role and given the role of the user, you would look up 
the inheritance tree until a CP was found and that CP would apply.  Given two CPs with 
the same role value you would then additionally look up the inheritance tree for Location.  
And so on, until a unique CP was found. 
The first comment is that this obviously limits the TCM to „limited‟ rather than „general‟ 
hierarchies and this is not desirable if we wish to provide a generic formal specification. 
However, the approach is consistent and can be described mathematically, but the 
additional questions that have to be asked are “Does this correspond to the real world?” 
and “Does this help or hinder the system administrator?”  As an example suppose we have 
the following CPs shown in Figure 8: 
A permit cp: 
 PCP1 = {<Role, Consultant>, <DataLocation, TVHA8>, <DataType, Admin>} 
A deny cp:  
DCP1 = {<Role, HCP>, <DataLocation, JCUH>, <DataType, Finance>} together with the 
following inheritance relationships: 
<HCP, Registrar> and <Registrar, Consultant> for the classifier Role. 
<TVAH, JCUH> and <TVAH, NTUH> for the classifier DataLocation. 
<Admin, Finance> for the classifier DataType. 
     
                                                 
8 TVAH = “Tees Valley Health Authority”  HCP = “Health Care Professional”  JCUH = 
“James Cook University Hospital”  NTUH = “North Tees University Hospital” 
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<Role, HCP>
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<DataLocation, 
TVHA>
<DataLocation, 
JCUH>
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<DataType, 
Admin>
<DataType, 
Finance>
pc
PCP1
PCP1
DCP1
DCP1
 
Figure 8: Confidentiality Permissions 
 
Then for a consultant at North Tees University Hospital trying to access financial data at 
James Cook University Hospital the first match is PCP1 (where Role has the highest 
priority) and therefore access would be allowed.  It is difficult to follow the logic that 
because Role has the highest priority PCP1 has preference over DCP1.  DCP1 still contains 
a role i.e. HCP and this is meant to apply to all Roles including that of Consultant. 
For TCM2 we look at first match in a slightly different way, and the benefits of this are: 
1. We are not restricted to „limited hierarchies‟. 
2. We use the concept of one CP refining another (3.2.3.3) which makes sense from a 
„real world‟ and an administrative point of view. 
3. We do not need to rely on an ordering on the classifiers. 
First match for TCM2 means that we look up all the inheritance paths for all the classifiers 
simultaneously.  If a deny CP is found then the default applies that „deny overrules permit‟ 
so access is denied.  If no deny CP is found and a permit CP is found then access is 
permitted. 
So in the example above for a consultant at North Tees University Hospital trying to access 
financial data at James Cook University Hospital a deny CP would be found and so access 
would be denied.  If for some peculiar reason we actually wanted to permit access then we 
would have to set up a permit CP of the form: 
PCP2 = {<Role, Consultant>, <DataLocation, JCUH>, <DataType, Finance>} 
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PCP2 then refines DCP1 as described in 3.2.3.3.  The CPs PCP1 and PCP2 (not DCP1) are 
found when applying the nearest match principle and so access is granted.  An advantage 
of this type of refinement is that it can be verbally or visually described and a reason for it 
given e.g. „all health care professionals except consultants are denied access to financial 
data at James Cook University Hospital.  Consultants are allowed access because …….. 
whatever the reason is‟ 
Obviously, what is described above is a simplified and contrived example.  The complexity 
in the original TCM increases significantly with the number of classifiers.  However 
TCM2 fits in with the stated aim of „simplifying administration whilst at the same time 
providing sufficient granularity for the most complex „real life‟ authorisation scenarios‟ in 
a way that TCM1 does not, and also allows a generic specification using general 
hierarchies. 
3.7 Specification in Spec Explorer 
3.7.1 Introduction  
Spec Explorer allows specification of variables and methods using sets and relations as in 
B.  The project can be compiled producing an executable that can be run using test data.  
The methods can be linked, using a wrapper, to the methods in the actual application.  
Unlike B, the specification is not verified using a prover (although there is a static prover 
in Spec#).  Instead, the specification is verified using random method calls on the full 
range of data.  The specification here is applied in a limited way, as an introduction to how 
the different models compare.  A full specification is developed when considering TCM3 
(see 4.4). 
3.7.2 Testing 
The main method can call different scenarios, which allows the testing of data.  In 
Scenario1 below I am testing (as part of development) the methods (operations in B) 
AddUser, DeleteUser, AddCValue, DeleteCValue, and AssignUser.  I am also testing 
methods, which return the sets of user, operation, and object classifiers.  Also, domain 
restriction (domRes) and relational composition (relComp) are tested.  Relational 
Composition consists of three overridden methods to accommodate both functions (Maps) 
and relations.  The variable setone tests relational composition. 
3.7.3 Model  
type USER = string; 
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type OP = string; 
type OB = string; 
type CFIER = string; 
type VALUE = string; 
type SESSION = string; 
 
type CV = <CFIER,VALUE>; 
 
type UA = <USER,CFIER,VALUE>; 
type OPA = <OP,CFIER,VALUE>; 
type OBA = <OB,CFIER,VALUE>; 
 
type SV = <SESSION,CFIER,VALUE>; 
 
var Set<CV> cvalues = Set{}; 
var Set<CFIER> cpts = Set{}; 
var Set<USER> users = Set{}; 
var Set<SV> session_values = Set{}; 
var Set<UA> ua = Set{}; 
var Set<OPA> opa = Set{}; 
var Set<OBA> oba = Set{}; 
 
Map<SESSION,USER> session_user = Map{}; 
 
invariant 
Forall{<a,b,c> in session_values; <a,b,c> in relComp(session_user,ua)}; 
3.7.4 Main Method 
A main method is needed for an executable model.  The main method calls Scenario 1. 
 
void Main() 
{ 
  Scenario1(); 
} 
 
[Action] 
void AddUser(USER! user) 
requires user notin users; 
{ 
  users[user] = true; 
} 
 
[Action] 
void DeleteUser(USER! user) 
requires user in users;  
{ 
  parallel  
  { 
  users[user] = false; 
    foreach (<u,c,v> in ua)  
    { 
    ua[<user,c,v>] = false; 
    } 
    foreach (<s,u> in session_user, <t,c,f> in session_values, u == 
user, s==t) 
    {  
    session_values[<s,c,f>] = false; 
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    } 
  } 
} 
 
[Action] 
void AddCValue(CFIER cfier, VALUE val) 
requires <cfier,val> notin cvalues; 
{ 
  cvalues[<cfier,val>] = true; 
} 
 
[Action] 
void DeleteCValue(CFIER cfier, VALUE val) 
requires <cfier,val> in cvalues;{ 
  cvalues[<cfier,val>] = false; 
  foreach (<u,c,f> in ua) { 
    ua[<u,cfier,val>] = false; 
  } 
  foreach (<o,c,f> in oba) { 
    oba[<o,cfier,val>] = false; 
  } 
  foreach (<o,c,f> in opa) { 
    opa[<o,cfier,val>] = false; 
  } 
  foreach (<s,c,f> in session_values) { 
    session_values[<s,cfier,val>] = false; 
  } 
} 
 
[Action] 
void AssignUser(USER user, CFIER cfier, VALUE val)  
requires user in users && <cfier,val> in cvalues; 
{ 
  ua[<user,cfier,val>] = true;  
} 
 
Set<<string,string>> relComp(Set<<string,string>> U, 
Set<<string,string>> V) { 
  return Set{<a,b> in U, <c,d> in V, b==c; <a,d>}; 
} 
 
Set<<string,string>>relComp(Map<string,string> U,Set<<string,string>> V) 
{ 
  return Set{<a,b> in U, <c,d> in V, b==c; <a,d>}; 
} 
 
Set<<string,string,string>> relComp(Map<string,string> U, 
Set<<string,string,string>> V) { 
  return Set{<a,b> in U, <c,d,e> in V, b==c; <a,d,e>}; 
} 
 
Set<CFIER> user_cfiers(Set<<USER,CFIER,VALUE>> UA) { 
  return Set{<u,c,f> in UA; c}; 
} 
 
Set<CFIER> op_cfiers(Set<<OP,CFIER,VALUE>> OPA) { 
  return Set{<o,c,f> in OPA; c}; 
} 
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Set<CFIER> obj_cfiers(Set<<OB,CFIER,VALUE>> OBA) { 
  return Set{<o,c,f> in OBA; c}; 
} 
 
Set<<string,string>> domRes(Set<string> S, Set<<string,string>> R) { 
  return Set{s in S, <x,y> in R, s==x; <x,y>}; 
} 
3.7.5 Scenario 
A scenario is a method that invokes model actions.  A scenario method is itself an action of 
the model.  However, unlike other kinds of actions, when a scenario calls other actions 
Spec Explorer records the intermediate states. 
 
[Action(Kind=ActionAttributeKind.Scenario)] 
void Scenario1()  
{ 
  AddUser(null); 
  AddCValue(“”,””); 
  AddUser(“Jim”); 
  AddUser(“Bob”); 
  AddCValue(“Role”,“Doctor”); 
  AddCValue(“Role”,“Healthworker”); 
  AddCValue(“Role”,“GP”); 
  AddCValue(“Location”,”NTUH”); 
  foreach (u in users) 
  WriteLine(u); 
  var i = 0; 
  AssignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”Doctor”); 
  AssignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”GP”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Role”,”Healthworker”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Location”,”NTUH”); 
  foreach (s in ua) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = s; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  ReadLine(); 
  DeleteUser(“Jim”); 
  foreach (u in users) 
  WriteLine(u); 
  foreach (s in ua) 
  {let <a,b,c> = s; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c);} 
  ReadLine(); 
  var Set<<string,string>> setone = Set{}; 
  setone[<”blob”,”blob”>] = true; 
  setone[<”blob1”,”blob2”>] = true; 
  setone[<”blob2”,”blob3”>] = true; 
  setone[<”blob3”,”blob5”>] = true; 
  setone = relComp(setone,setone); 
  foreach (p in setone) 
  {let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b);} 
  ReadLine(); 
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  var Set<CFIER> uc = user_cfiers(ua); 
  WriteLine(“User Classifiers are: “); 
 foreach (u in uc) 
  WriteLine(u); 
  ReadLine(); 
} 
 
3.7.6 Output 
The following is the output from the executable: 
 
 
Console 2 
3.8 Part-Application using SQL 
A part application has been developed to demonstrate the use of the TCM.  The B-Method 
can be translated directly into code written in C.  This is not applicable here.  However, the 
formal specification enables SQL to be written in a way that closely follows the B, giving 
the benefits of reusability as well as the benefits of consistency and verification normally 
associated with formal specification.  In addition, the use of the CLR9 in SQL Server 2005 
may at some stage allow direct code translation. 
None of this has applied to the code written for the TCM before this.  Each demonstration 
has been written using a one-off „hacked‟ version.  In addition, whilst this may be 
acceptable (and even beneficial) in non safety-critical applications, the use of formal 
                                                 
9 CLR = “Common Language Runtime” 
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specification is essential in such a sensitive area as health service authorisation. 
The part application discussed below and used as part of the development and testing of 
the TCM is more fully developed when used with TCM3 (6.10). 
3.8.1 Example: B-Method and SQL 
A given CP gives access for a particular user and data item according to the following 
expression: 
CPPermitAccess (cp, acvals) ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp]) = dom (cp)) 
For a particular instance, acvals is derived from the current user and the data item to which 
access is requested.  So the above can be rewritten. 
CPPermitAccess (cp, UserId, DataId) ≔ 
   bool (dom (acvals (UserId, DataId) ⋂ ad [cp]) = dom (cp)) 
The SQL that corresponds to this is below.  Note that the parameters correspond, and note 
the use of the functionality in SQL of „intersect‟ and „except‟ which corresponds neatly to 
the B.  
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnGivenCPPermitsAccess] 
(@CPid int, @UserId sql_variant = null, @DataId nvarchar(50) = null) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
declare  @intersect table (Classifier nvarchar(50),CValue nvarchar(50)) 
declare  @except table (Classifier nvarchar(50)) 
 
 
insert @intersect 
select  Classifier,CValue from dbo.fnActiveCValues(@UserId,@DataId) 
intersect 
select Classifier,CValue from fnDescendants(@CPid) 
 
 
 
insert @except 
select Classifier from tcm_PermitCPs p where p.CPid = @CPid 
except 
select Classifier from @intersect 
 
IF NOT EXISTS 
(select Classifier from @except) 
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SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
 
The function fnActiveCValues(@UserId,@DataId)gives the assigned classifier 
values, and fnDescendants(@CPid)corresponds to ad [cp] i.e. the classifier values of 
the given CP and all their descendants. The correlation, and the ability to translate from B 
to code (even though this is not done automatically) is apparent. 
Similarly, the B operation GivenCPTPermitsAccess is written: 
CPTPermitAccess (cpt, acvals) ≙  
bool (cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ dom (acvals ⋂ ad [cp]) = cpt)) 
This can be rewritten as: 
CPTPermitAccess (cpt, UserId, DataId) ≙  
bool (cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ dom (cp) = cpt ⋀ 
    CPPermitAccess (cp, UserId, DataId)))  
To program this in SQL firstly there is a SQL function to determine whether a given CP 
matches a given CPT i.e. to satisfy the expression dom (cp) = cpt.  Again, the „intersect‟ 
and „except‟ functionality is used in SQL to match the B. 
 
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnCPTtoCPmatch] 
(@CPTid int,@CPid int) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
declare  @unionAB table (Classifier nvarchar(50)) 
declare  @intersectAB table (Classifier nvarchar(50)) 
 
insert @unionAB 
select Classifier from tcm_CPT t where t.CPTid = @CPTid 
union 
select Classifier from tcm_PermitCPs p where p.CPid = @CPid 
 
insert @intersectAB 
select Classifier from tcm_PermitCPs p where p.CPid = @CPid 
intersect 
select Classifier from tcm_CPT t where t.CPTid = @CPTid 
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IF NOT EXISTS 
(select Classifier from @unionAB 
except 
select Classifier from @intersectAB) 
SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
Using the function created above I can now write the function to determine whether a 
given CPT grants access as: 
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnGivenCPTPermitsAccess] 
(@CPTid int, @UserId sql_variant = null, @DataId nvarchar(50) = null) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
IF EXISTS 
(select CPid from tcm_PermitCPs 
where [dbo].[fnCPTtoCPmatch](@CPTid,CPid)=1 
and [dbo].[fnGivenCPPermitsAccess](CPid,@UserId,@DataId)=1) 
SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
Similar programming in SQL can be done for all the B-method operations.  It should be 
noted that the emerging technology of LinQtoSQL enables a much closer tie in between C# 
code and SQL, and thus a more obvious match to the B specification.  In the final 
development of a TCM class, detailed in Section 6, which covers all versions of the TCM, 
only one basic stored procedure is used, in order to determine all the descendants of a CP.  
This becomes a method in LinQtoSQL.  It is a possible area of further work, to determine 
which approach is optimal for large databases. 
3.9 Summary 
Following some discussion of the background of TCM concepts and the motivating health 
care scenario the TCM has been completely specified in B.  The specification paralleled 
the RBAC specification with, of necessity, some increased complexity.  The specification 
highlighted some areas where improvements could be made to the TCM and these were 
introduced, resulting in TCM2.  Using the robust B specification as a basis, some 
specification was re-made in Spec Explorer as a means of animating the specification, and 
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as a step towards implementation in code.  In addition, some SQL functions were created 
to show how they could be implemented in correspondence to the B.  
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4 TCM3 
4.1 Introduction 
The use of an authorisation model is a compromise between specifying every permission 
individually in an Access Control List (which was used in early models) and being able to 
simplify the administration whilst keeping sufficient granularity to apply the permissions 
as required.  RBAC was a significant step along this path allowing collections of 
permissions to be given to collections of individuals based on role or inherited role.  This 
greatly simplified administration and paralleled the „real world‟.  However, in many cases 
the granularity has proved insufficient and occasioned the development of various add-ons 
to RBAC e.g. parameterised RBAC, which uses role plus some other factor, such as 
location as an additional parameter.  
The TCM is another significant step.  Essentially an authorisation model uses some form 
of collections to connect users, operations, and objects in order to simplify administration. 
In RBAC, this is collections of users by role, and collections of permissions.  In the TCM, 
this is generalised and „role‟ is not given a special place.  In the TCM, collections are 
based on classifiers of which role is but one option.  The TCM allows collections of 
operations and objects as well as users, and uses classifiers and classifier values to 
facilitate that.  
 The TCM as it has been presented in various papers and applied in practice is fully 
detailed in the previous section (3), and is shown to be an extension of RBAC.  During the 
modelling of TCM2 questions arose such as: 
 What does the model look like if we generalise it still further and allow any set of 
classifier values to be a CP?  i.e. the CPs no longer have to conform to a fixed set of 
CPTs 
 If we no longer have a fixed set of CPTs can we eliminate CPT (and Classifier) 
ordering and still retain the power of the model? 
It could be said thatTCM3 is a step back from the implementation of TCM2 and consists of 
those elements of the TCM that generalise RBAC as a first step, without some of the 
additional features included in TCM2 such as fixed CPTs and CPT ordering. 
From the research viewpoint in TCM3 we are considering what are the essential elements 
of an authorisation system that no longer has to have „role‟ as its central mechanism and 
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which allows not only multiple user classifiers to be used for authorisation, but also 
operation and object classifiers.  TCM3 could be said to be a generic authorisation system 
that is generalisation of RBAC and is also a generalisation and simplication of TCM2. 
It is the proposition for TCM3 that the use of different CPTs and CPT ordering in TCM2 
adds a great deal of complexity to the model without the corresponding increase in useful 
granularity.  The experience in the „real world‟ is that if authorisations are difficult for 
administrators to apply in their day-to-day work, they end up giving much wider 
authorisation than is really necessary.  This defeats the increased granularity of a 
complicated model. 
 It is the proposition here that there is a use for a simplified TCM, which is called TCM3.  
TCM3 is a generalisation of RBAC and I believe it can be shown to be a great 
improvement over RBAC.  Any authorisation requirement expressible in ordinary 
language can be applied e.g., “A member of an ambulance crew with a legitimate relation 
with the patient has access to all of a patient‟s unsealed data.  In an emergency situation, 
the crewmember has access to a patient‟s sealed data.  This access would be audited and 
justification required (at a later stage if necessary)”.  If we examine the above statement, it 
will be seen that we are simply applying authorisation to various collections.  It is the 
proposition here that this simplified TCM simplifies administration through the use of 
collections whilst providing sufficient granularity for complex permissions – which RBAC 
with it‟s insistence on collection by role does not. 
A simplified TCM is presented along these lines together with examples of how this can be 
applied to real life scenarios.  If required the features of TCM2 such fixed CPTs and CPT 
ordering can be added back in if required in a particular implementation.  However, it is 
the proposition here that there is plenty of power in the simplified TCM without needing to 
do that. 
4.2 TCM3 Reference Model 
4.2.1 Re-examination of EHR Scenario 
The EHR scenario detailed in 3.1.1 has been used in every presentation of the TCM.  It has 
been used to justify the necessity for using different CPTs with an ordering on those CPTs.  
I wish now to re-examine these requirements with a view to applying a simplified TCM. 
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Firstly, these requirements require further discussion to ensure that the person setting the 
permissions (system administrator) has understood exactly what is wanted by the person 
requiring the permissions (health service manager?).  
This is normal and would occur in a real-life situation, and acknowledges that there is a 
process of permissions‟ design that needs to be entered into.  This scenario has, up until 
now, not been subject to that process.  This is an essential stage in the process and needs to 
be done before meaningful discussion of how to apply the permissions.  The requirements 
will now be restated with discussion. 
1. My GP, Fred, can see all my data.  Whether this permission is for Fred as an 
individual or in his role as a GP has been discussed in previous papers, and it has 
usually been decided to allocate the permission to Fred as an individual.  However, 
does Fred really need the permission when he has retired and living in France?  In most 
GP practices, there is shared practice responsibility amongst practice GPs.  However, 
patients usually do have their own allocated GP even if they can see any GP.  I would 
suggest that permissions could be given to any GP who has a legitimate relationship 
with the patient.  If any permission was required to be given only to Fred then I would 
add the additional requirement that Fred was at that time a GP with a legitimate 
relationship with the patient. 
2. Nobody must know about my termination except my GP, any Gynaecological 
Consultant, and the Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon who operated on me.  If 
nobody must know about this data then do not give anyone else permission to see this 
data.  Or, does this mean nobody must ever know except the stipulated people.  I would 
think that most system administrators would be reluctant to give up the right to change 
permissions when and if necessary.  However, this can be done, and has been done 
with standard RBAC: some system administrators even removing their own rights 
from the system (not intentionally) at vast reinstall expense.   
3. My GP, Consultant Renal Transplant Surgeon, and Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon 
can see my psychosis data, but no one else.  Once again, do not give the permission.  If 
it is thought desirable to lock the permissions this can be done.  
4. I do not wish the members of the hospital team who carried out my termination 
operation to ever be able to see my psychosis data, except if they are viewing in a 
psychiatric role.  The requirement „ever‟ is a peculiar one.  What if one of the team 
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became the patient‟s GP?  Although this is unlikely, I think it is valid to question this 
admittedly contrived example.  Are we saying that the system administrator cannot 
change permissions whatever happens?  Leaving „ever‟ to the side for the moment, I 
presume there are a large number of other people who the patient would not want 
viewing the data.  So perhaps it is better just to specify who can see the data and under 
what circumstances.  I would think it not unreasonable that any psychiatrist with a 
legitimate relationship with the patient would be allowed to see the data, and this would 
cover the case given. 
In summary, permissions design is a whole field of expertise in itself, one that has not been 
tackled in any great depth as regards the TCM, this being to do with Administration 
whereas we have largely concentrated on Authorisation.  One of the jobs of any 
Administrator is to discuss in depth exactly what permissions will implement the correct 
requirements.  I would expect such a discussion to occur if the EHR scenario was a real life 
scenario, and I would expect the points raised above to be part of that discussion.  The job 
of the TCM is to make things as easy and useful as possible for the Administrator(s), 
otherwise they just end up giving far greater permissions than are actually necessary, with 
the corresponding security risks. 
4.2.2 Authentication 
Identity and access management systems consist of three main parts: authentication, 
authorisation, and administration.  Techniques are being developed, in particular SAML, 
which enable single sign-on by allowing users to authenticate at an identity provider, and 
then access service providers without additional authentication.  As far as authorisation is 
concerned, in TCM3 authentication is regarded as just another user classifier: the user is 
either authenticated or not, and a session is just that period of time during which the user is 
authenticated and interacting with the system.  The expansion of Single Sign On and 
Federated Identity means that a user is authenticated if he has a token, or if he has a 
certificate, or if he is authenticated by another system and that system‟s authentication is 
recognized by the current system.  This is consistent with the TCM3 view.  The type or 
class SESSION is omitted from TCM3 as different from TCM2, a session just being 
regarded as the period of time during which a user is authenticated. 
TCM3 uses the following sets (types or classes): 
  USER; OP; OB; CFIER; VALUE 
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The users of the system (machine or person) are of type USER. 
  users ⊆ USER 
Classifier values are of type CVALUE, which is defined as: 
  CVALUE = CFIER x VALUE 
4.2.3 Assigned Classifier Values 
The assigned classifier values (acv) are given by the following relation: 
  acv ∈ USER x OP x OB ↔ CVALUE 
This relation can be written in the form below (and this has been found useful in practice): 
  acv = ua + opa +oba +uoba +svals10 
where 
  ua ∈ USER ↔ CVALUE 
  opa ∈ OP ↔ CVALUE 
  oba ∈ OB ↔ CVALUE 
This is the normal user, operation, and object assignment used before in the TCM2 
specification.  The relation uoba is given by: 
  uoba ∈ USER x OB ↔ CVALUE 
This includes those classifier values such legitimate relationship, which depend on both the 
user and the object.  Additionally there can be system values such as time or system 
condition, which are independent of user, operation and object. 
  svals ⊆ CVALUE 
The full expression for acv is given in the footnotes.  It is not used here because it does not 
(at present) correspond to any practical examples.  However, the full expression is used for 
the Spec# specification (Section 4.4). 
                                                 
10 The full expression would be acv = ua + opa +oba +uoba +uopa + obopa + uobopa + 
svals where uopa ∈ USER x OP ↔ CVALUE; obopa ∈ OB x OP ↔ CVALUE;  uobopa 
∈ USER x OB x OP ↔ CVALUE 
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4.2.4 Permissions and Prohibitions 
As permissions can be specified, using an access control list, which lists every user, 
operation, and object there is no essential need for prohibitions in an authorisation model 
except as and where it helps the administration.  However it has proved useful e.g. in 
Microsoft‟s Active Directory, to have a prohibition which overrules all permissions.  As a 
justification for this, one can imagine a situation in which the system administrator just 
wishes to deny access without any great study of interacting permissions in a permissions‟ 
design exercise.   
 Permissions design is a complex topic on its own, and permissions can be designed to give 
exactly what is required in fine detail.  In TCM3, I apply the rule that any deny overrules 
all permits, but allow denies (and permits) to be refined.  So the rule in TCM3 now 
becomes “Any unrefined deny overrules everything else”.  There are no CPTs (as used in 
TCM2) just permissions and prohibitions with the simple rule that an unrefined prohibition 
overrules all permissions. 
It is the contention that this gives the best balance between granularity of permission and 
ease of administration.  The administrator can add a prohibition and could then be 
immediately shown those (if any) permissions which refine that prohibition.  These can 
then be removed or further refinements added at the appropriate level of granularity.  
In TCM3, the rule that an unrefined prohibition overrules all permission applies 
irrespective of the permission type.  In TCM2 permission at a higher level of CPT ordering 
is more important than a prohibition at lower level, and vice versa.  Otherwise, in TCM2 
permissions and prohibitions carry essentially the same weight, and interact within the 
CPT.  This can make it difficult to see what the overall outcome of applying a permission 
or a prohibition is supposed to be. 
Finally, even though TCM3 is a simplified version of TCM2 it is still a valuable 
generalisation of RBAC.  It has a wider scope than RBAC and can be used to model 
current developments of RBAC e.g. parameterised RBAC and much more.  The 
permissions and prohibitions are defined as below: 
 permit_cps ⊆ F (CVALUE) 
 deny_cps    ⊆ F (CVALUE) 
 128 
4.2.5 Inheritance 
Inheritance is essential to TCM3 because the concept of deny CPs refining permit CPs (and 
vice versa) is essential to TCM3.  Additionally the concept of more complex CPs (this will 
be explained later) refining less complex CPs is important to TCM3.  Inheritance is 
implemented through a single classifier to parent to child relation. 
cpc  ⊆ CFIER x (VALUE x VALUE) 
Specifying inheritance as a triple reflects the fact that inheritance is a partition on 
classifiers i.e. confined within roles, or locations, or data types etc., and is a development 
on the way it was defined in TCM2. 
A classifier to ancestor to descendant relation is derived from the classifier to parent to 
child relation (cpc), as shown below. 
cad ≙ {cfier, ad | cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ ad ∈ VALUExVALUE ⋀ ad ∈ (ran ({cfier}◁ cpc))*} 
This is the closure of the parent to child relation with each parent to child relation confined 
to its own classifier.  As in TCM2, this relation includes that a value is counted as its own 
descendant. 
A confidentiality permission grants (or denies) permission according to its classifier values 
and all the descendants of those classifier values.  The definition desc is the set of all 
descendants of the classifier values in the confidentiality permission (x) defined as follows. 
desc(x) ≙ {cfier, childval | cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ childval ∈ VALUE ⋀ 
  parentval. (parentval ∈ VALUE ⋀ cfier ↦ parentval ∈ x ⋀ 
 (parentval ↦ childval ∈ (ran ({cfier} ◁ cpc))*} 
 
The definition gives the original classifier values plus all descendants of those values.  
Each subset of descendants is confined to its own classifier. 
4.2.6 No CPT Ordering in TCM3 
In TCM1 and TCM2, there is a set of CPTs on which there is an ordering.  These CPTs 
effectively constrain the CPs that can be created and the ordering determines how the 
permissions given by each CPT are processed to give the overall permission.  It could be 
said that in TCM3 there are no CPTs.  However, it would be more truthful to say that there 
are no constraints so that every possible CPT is allowed.  In addition, there is no ordering 
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on the CPTs and this removes much of the complexity of processing permissions.  Every 
CP is equal except where one CP refines another (see 4.2.8 below). 
4.2.7 No Classifier Ordering in TCM3 
Classifier ordering in the original TCM was used for two reasons: firstly to enable a default 
ordering on the CPTs and secondly to determine which CP had preference within a CPT.  
This was because TCM1 adopted a nearest match policy for CPs within the same CPT.  
However, TCM2 modified this nearest match policy as discussed in 3.6.  For example, 
suppose there is a GP Fred with a permitCP 
PCP1 = {<Identity, Fred>, <Role, GP>, <PatientID, Alice>} 
 
In addition, that for some reason Fred is banned from seeing records at the James Cook 
Hospital, and in effect, there exists the following denyCP for Alice‟s records at the hospital 
DCP1 = {<Identity, Fred>, <Location, JCUH>, <PatientID, Alice>} 
 
The TCM1 approach would say that role is more important than location, therefore access 
is granted.  TCM2 would say that these are two different permissions, one of which grants 
access while the other denies.  Therefore the system default must operate, which is that 
deny overrules permit, therefore permission is denied.  The TCM2 approach is continued 
to TCM3 with an extension to the concept of CP refinement, as discussed in the next 
section. 
4.2.8 TCM3 Inheritance and Refinement 
In TCM2, there is the case where one CP modifies or refines another CP.  In TCM2, this 
modifying or refining is done within the same CPT through inheritance.  For example the 
permit CP 
PCP2 = {<Identity, Fred>, <Location, JCUH Outpatients>, <PatientID, Alice>}  
refines DCP1 in the above paragraph where there is the inheritance triple <Location, 
JCUH, JCUH Outpatients> and grants Fred access in the outpatients department even 
though he is denied in JCUH as a whole. 
It can be seen that DCP1 and PCP2 belong to the same CPT i.e. {Identity, Location, 
PatientId} 
In TCM3 refinement is extended so that a CP can also be refined by another CP which 
belongs to more complex CPT e.g. the deny CP  
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DCP1 = {<Identity, Fred>, <Location, JCUH>, <PatientID, Alice>} 
 is refined by 
PCP3 = {<Identity, Fred>, <Role, OutpatientsLocum>, <Location, JCUH>, <PatientID, 
Alice>}  
so that although Fred is banned from seeing Alice‟s data through his own identity, he is 
allowed if he is in the role of an outpatient‟s session doctor. 
For one CP cp2 to refine another CP cp1 in TCM3 there are two conditions that have to 
apply: 
1. The CPT for cp2 must be the same as, or include the CPT for cp1 i.e.  
 dom (cp1) ⊆ dom (cp2) 
2. For the classifiers which cp2 and cp1 have in common (i.e. the classifiers of cp1) 
there must be classifier values of cp1 higher up the inheritance tree than the 
classifier values of cp2.  This is enforced by: 
 dom (cp1) ◁ desc (cp2) ⊆ desc (cp1) 
I believe that this is what is behind (in TCM1 and TCM2) the more general rule that the 
more complex CPTs take precedence over the less complex, but in TCM1 and TCM2 this 
is taken to apply to even disparate CPTs.  In TCM3 CPs can refine other CPs as above.  
Otherwise the system default operates where CPs belong to disparate CPTs i.e. deny 
overrules permit.  The B description for some CP to deny access for a set of assigned 
classifier values acvals is: 
da ← SomeCPDeniesAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  da ≔ bool (∃ cp1. (cp1 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp1)) = dom (cp1) ⋀ 
   (∃ cp2. (cp2 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp2)) = dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ⊆ dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ◁ desc (cp2) ⊆ desc (cp1))))) 
 END 
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This might seem complex but there are no further levels of complexity as in TCM1 and 
TCM2.  The expression says that access is denied if there exists a CP cp1 which denies 
access (either by itself or though inheritance) and there does not exists a CP cp2 which 
refines cp1 and permits access. 
If the system default is „deny‟ this would be tested first, and if some CP denies access then 
the TCM as a whole denies access.  (In keeping with the generic nature of the 
specification, it is easy to switch to a system default of „permit‟).  If there does not exist a 
CP that denies access then the following is evaluated. 
pa ← SomeCPPermitsAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔bool (∃ cp1. (cp1 ∈ permit_cps ⋀  
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp1)) = dom (cp1) ⋀ 
   (∃ cp2. (cp2 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp2)) = dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ⊆ dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ◁ desc (cp2) ⊆ desc (cp1))))) 
 END 
 
If the above returns true then the TCM permits access.  If there is no CP to either permit or 
deny access then the system default operates which is usually that access is denied.  This is 
given by: 
 pa ← TCMPermitsAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F (cvalues)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔  SomeCPDeniesAccess (acvals) ⋀ SomeCPPermitsAccess (acvals)  
 END 
4.2.9 Overrides 
Overrides are widely used in the application of TCM1 and TCM2.  The way they normally 
operate is that some CPTs are removed from the permission processing in an override 
situation.  A widely used example is that data in a „sealed envelope‟ is accessible to certain 
individuals in certain situations.  E.g., restrictions on access to the „sealed envelope‟ are 
removed in an „emergency‟ situation.  Any access in this situation is strictly audited. 
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Essentially an override is just increased permissions in certain situations.  From the 
viewpoint of TCM3, the „situation‟ can be regarded as a system classifier.  Those people 
who can override can be specified using a user classifier; the data is classified as „in sealed 
envelope‟ and the condition can be specified as a system classifier value e.g. <situation, 
emergency>.  Whatever the situation they will be some classifier for those who can 
override and they will be either able to use permissions normally denied or use new 
permissions in the override situation.  This can be implemented using a prohibition of the 
form. 
DCP = {<role, HCP>, <LegRel, Yes>, <Situation, Normal>, <DataCat, Sealed Envelope>} 
which would prohibit access to sealed envelope data in any non-emergency situation, but 
allow any given permissions to operate in an emergency situation irrespective of whether 
they were in a sealed envelope or not.  This could also be implemented using a permission 
PCP = {<role, HCP>, <LegRel, Yes>, <Situation, Emergency>, <DataCat, Sealed 
Envelope > 
However, this might grant someone permissions to which they were not normally entitled.  
Detailed permission design would depend on the actual implementation.  However, the 
principle of treating an override situation as a classifier is clear. 
4.2.10 Constrained TCM3 
For TCM3 static separation of values is ignored, this not being used in many current 
RBAC applications e.g. Microsoft‟s role provider and access control.  In addition, the 
increased use of single sign on (SSO) and federated identity means that only dynamic 
separation of duties at runtime is considered. 
As far as dynamic separation of values is concerned, constrained TCM can be regarded as 
just another confidentiality permission e.g. the deny CP 
DCP = {<constrained values, yes>} 
4.2.11 TCM3 Functional Specification Overview 
For TCM3 the specification is not divided into Core, Hierarchical, and Constrained 
although some of the operations are specified without inheritance or refinement for 
development and testing purposes.  The reason for not dividing TCM3 is that firstly 
inheritance and refinement is an essential part of TCM3, and secondly that a constraint can 
be regarded as just another classifier (see above). 
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4.2.12  Administrative Operations for TCM3 
Administrators create and delete users, assign and deassign users to classifier values 
(which could include roles), and add or remove Confidentiality Permissions.  
Confidentiality Permissions give authorisation through user classifier values in 
combination with operation and object classifier values. 
 AddUser: adds a user to the set users.  Details of users are usually inputted before any 
authorisation is assigned, and may be kept on the system after they have left the company. 
 DeleteUser: deletes a user. 
 AssignUser: assigns a user to a classifier value.  This could be a role, location, team, or 
any attribute the user could have. 
 DeassignUser: deassigns a user from a classifier value. 
 AddPermitCP: adds a Confidentiality Permission. 
 RemovePermitCP: removes a Confidentiality Permission. 
 AddDenyCP: adds a Confidentiality Prohibition. 
 RemovePermitCP: removes a Confidentiality Prohibition 
Additional administrative operations are concerned with the creation and maintenance of 
the classifier parent to child relationship cpc. 
 AddInheritance: establishes a new immediate inheritance relationship between two 
classifier values.   
 DeleteInheritance: deletes an existing immediate inheritance relationship between two 
classifier values. 
4.2.13 Supporting System Operations for TCM3. 
These operations are specified without inheritance and refinement, with inheritance but 
without refinement, and with both inheritance and refinement.  It is only the last case that 
is used in a TCM3 implementation.  The other cases are used for development and testing. 
 GivenCPPermitsAccess: returns TRUE if the given CP permits access. 
 GivenCPDeniesAccess: returns TRUE if the given CP denies access. 
 SomeCPPermitsAccess: returns TRUE if some CP permits access. 
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 SomeCPDeniesAccess: returns TRUE if some CP denies access. 
 SomeCPPermitsAccessI: returns TRUE if the given CP permits access through its own 
values or the descendants of those values. 
 SomeCPDeniesAccessI: returns TRUE if the given CP denies access through its own 
values or the descendants of those values. 
 SomeCPPermitsAccessIR: returns TRUE if the given CP permits access through its own 
values or the descendants of those values and the permission is not refined by a deny CP. 
 SomeCPDeniesAccessIR: returns TRUE if the given CP denies access through its own 
values or the descendants of those values and the prohibition is not refined by a permit CP. 
 TCMPermitsAccess: returns TRUE if the Tees Confidentiality Model overall permits 
access.  Usually where SomeCPDeniesAccessIR is not true and SomeCPPermitsAccessIR 
is true, i.e. the system default is that “deny overrules permit”. 
4.2.14 Review Operations for TCM3 
 AssignedUsers: returns the set of users assigned to a given classifier value. 
 UserCValues: returns the set of classifier values assigned to a given user. 
 AssignedCValues: returns the set of classifier values assigned for given user, operation, 
and object.  These classifier values together with the CPs determine whether the operation 
is allowed on the object in the session. 
 Permissions: returns the set of permissions available to a given user. 
 OperationsOnObject: returns the set of operations that can be performed on the given 
object by a given user. 
4.3 TCM3 Functional Specification in B 
4.3.1 Administrative Operations 
AddUser 
This operation creates a new TCM user.  The operation is valid only if the new user is of 
type USER and not already a member of users.   
AddUser (user) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ USER - users 
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 THEN 
  user ≔ users ⋃ {user} 
 END 
 
DeleteUser 
This operation deletes a user from the TCM.  All user assignments are also deleted. 
DeleteUser (user) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users 
 THEN 
  users ≔ users - {user} || 
  acv := {user} x OP x OB ⩤ acv 
 END 
 
AssignUser 
This operation assigns a classifier value to a user.  The operation is valid if the user is a 
member of users and the assignment does not already exist. 
AssignUser (user, cfier, val) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀val ∈ VALUE ⋀ 
  user ↦ (cfier ↦ val) ∉ ua 
 THEN 
  ua ≔ ua ⋃ {user ↦ (cfier ↦ val)} 
 END 
 
DeassignUser 
This operation deletes the assignment of a classifier value to a user.  The classifier value 
must be one of the user‟s assigned classifier values. 
DeassignUser (user, cval) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ users ⋀ 
  user ↦ cval ∈ ua 
 THEN 
  ua ≔ ua – {user ↦ cval} 
 END 
 
AddPermitCP 
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This operation adds a Confidentiality Permission that acts to permit access.  The CP 
consists of a set of classifier values and must not already be a CP.   
AddPermitCP (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ F(CVALUE) ⋀ 
  cvals ∉ permit_cps ⋃ deny_cps 
 THEN 
  permit_cps ≔ permit_cps ⋃ {cvals} 
 END 
 
RemovePermitCP 
This operation removes a permit CP, which by definition is a set of classifier values.  The 
CP must already be a member of permit_cps. 
RemovePermitCP (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ permit_cps 
 THEN 
  permit_cps ≔ permit_cps - {cvals} 
 END 
 
AddDenyCP 
This operation adds a Confidentiality Prohibition, which acts to deny access.  The CP 
consists of a set of classifier values and must not already be a CP.   
AddDenyCP (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ F(CVALUE) ⋀ 
  cvals ∉ permit_cps ⋃ deny_cps 
 THEN 
  deny_cps ≔ deny_cps ⋃ {cvals} 
 END 
 
RemoveDenyCP 
This operation removes a deny CP which by definition is a set of classifier values.  The CP 
must already be a member of deny_cps.  
RemoveDenyCP (cvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cvals ∈ deny_cps 
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 THEN 
  deny_cps ≔ deny_cps - {cvals} 
 END 
 
AddInheritance 
This operation establishes a new parent/ child relationship.  The preconditions are that the 
relationship does not already exist and that cycle creation is avoided i.e. that the parent 
does not inherit from the child through the ancestor/ descendant relation ad. 
AddInheritance (cfier, pval, cval) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ pval ∈ VALUE ⋀ cval ∈ VALUE 
  cfier ↦ pval ∉ cvalues ⋀ cfier ↦ cval ∉ cvalues 
  cfier ↦ (pval ↦ cval) ∉ cpc ⋀ 
  cfier ↦ (cval ↦ pval) ∉ cad 
 THEN 
  cpc ≔ cpc ⋃ {cfier ↦ (pval ↦ cval)} 
 END 
 
DeleteInheritance 
This operation deletes a parent/ child relationship.  
DeleteInheritance (cfier, pval, cval) ≙ 
 PRE 
  cfier ∈ CFIER ⋀ pval ∈ VALUE ⋀ cval ∈ VALUE 
 THEN 
  cpc ≔ cpc - {cfier ↦ (pval ↦ cval)} 
 END 
 
4.3.2 Supporting System Operations 
GivenCPPermitsAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP permits access for the user, operation, and 
object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is without inheritance or 
refinement. 
 pa ← GivenCPPermitsAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
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 END 
 
GivenCPDeniesAccess 
This operation returns true if the given CP denies access for the user, operation, and object 
with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is without inheritance or refinement. 
 da ← GivenCPDeniesAccess (cp, acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔ bool (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp)) 
 END 
 
SomeCPPermitsAccess 
This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to permit_cps that permits access 
for the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
without inheritance or refinement. 
 pa ← SomeCPPermitsAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔ bool (cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀ 
  (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp))) 
 END 
 
SomeCPDeniesAccess 
This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to deny_cps that denies access for 
the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
without inheritance or refinement. 
 da ← SomeCPDeniesAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔bool (cp. (cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀ 
  (dom (acvals ⋂ cp) = dom (cp))) 
 END 
 
SomeCPPermitsAccessI 
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This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to permit_cps that permits access 
for the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
with inheritance but without refinement.  The difference is that desc(cp) i.e. the set of all 
descendants of cp including cp itself, is used for authorisation instead of just cp itself. 
pa ← SomeCPPermitsAccessI (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔ bool (cp. (cp ∈ permit_cps ⋀  
  (dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp)) = dom (cp))) 
 END 
 
SomeCPDeniesAccessI 
This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to deny_cps that denies access to 
the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
with inheritance but without refinement.  The difference is that desc(cp) i.e. the set of all 
descendants of cp including cp itself, is used for authorisation instead of just cp itself. 
da ← SomeCPDeniesAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE  
 acvals ∈ F(CVALUE) 
 THEN  
  pa ≔bool (cp. (cp ∈ deny_cps ⋀  
  (dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp)) = dom (cp))) 
 END 
 
SomeCPPermitsAccessIR 
This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to permit_cps that permits access 
for the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
with inheritance and with refinement.  For a detailed explanation of how inheritance and 
refinement work in TCM3 see 4.2.8. 
pa ← SomeCPPermitsAccessIR (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(CVALUE)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔bool (∃cp1. (cp1 ∈ permit_cps ⋀  
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp1)) = dom (cp1) ⋀ 
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   (∃cp2. (cp2 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp2)) = dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ⊆ dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ◁ desc (cp2) ⊆ desc (cp1))))) 
 END 
 
SomeCPDeniesAccessIR 
This operation returns true if there exists a CP belonging to deny_cps that denies access for 
the user, operation, and object with the assigned set of classifier values acvals.  This is 
with inheritance and with refinement.  For a detailed explanation of how inheritance and 
refinement work in TCM3 see 4.2.8. 
da ← SomeCPDeniesAccessIR (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(CVALUE)  
 THEN 
  da ≔bool (∃cp1. (cp1 ∈ deny_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp1)) = dom (cp1) ⋀ 
   (∃cp2. (cp2 ∈ permit_cps ⋀ 
  dom (acvals ⋂ desc (cp2)) = dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ⊆ dom (cp2) ⋀ 
  dom (cp1) ◁ desc (cp2) ⊆ desc (cp1))))) 
 END 
 
TCMPermitsAccess 
This operation returns true if the TCM overall permits access.  Access is permitted if and 
only if it is not denied by some CP (with inheritance and refinement) and is also permitted 
by some CP (with inheritance and refinement). 
pa ← TCMPermitsAccess (acvals) ≙ 
 PRE 
  acvals ∈ F(CVALUE)  
 THEN 
  pa ≔  SomeCPDeniesAccessIR (acvals) ⋀ 
  SomeCPPermitsAccessIR (acvals)  
 END 
 
4.3.3 Review Operations 
AssignedCValues 
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This operation returns the assigned classifier values for a given user, op, ob.  It is these 
values that are used for authorisation together with the CPs. 
acvals ← AssignedCValues (user, op, ob) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ USER ⋀ op ∈ OP ⋀ ob ∈ OB 
 THEN 
  acvals ≔ acv [{user ↦op ↦ob}] 
 END 
 
Permissions 
This operation returns the permissions granted to a given user. 
prms ← Permissions (user) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ USER 
 THEN 
  prms ≔ {op, ob | op ∈ OP ⋀ ob ∈ OB ⋀ 
  TCMPermitsAccess (acv [{user ↦op ↦ob}]) 
 END 
 
OperationsOnObject 
This operation returns the operations allowed for a given user on a given object. 
ooos ←OperationsOnObject (user, ob) ≙ 
 PRE 
  user ∈ USER ⋀ ob ∈ OB  
 THEN 
  ooos ≔  {op | op ∈ OP ⋀ TCMPermitsAccess (acv [{user ↦op ↦ob}]) 
 END 
 
4.4 TCM3 Functional Specification in Spec# 
4.4.1 Introduction  
This section contains a Spec# model of TCM3.  This is a mixture of actual code that can be 
run, and comments.  The code is written in a special style and so only the code is compiled.   
4.4.2 System State 
The similarities to the B specification can be seen in that there are a number of types and 
variables.  Variables are written as tuples, so there is an immediate correspondence to 
working with a database.  The methods (operations) are written using the standard C# 
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method format with the addition of “requires” which corresponds to the precondition in B.  
The similarity to the B specification is such that comments on the code have been kept to a 
minimum.  Writing a specification in Spec# while using the B specification as a basis 
allows the specification to be animated, and is a step towards final implementation. 
type USER = string!; 
type OP = string!; 
type OB = string!; 
type CFIER = string!; 
type VALUE = string!; 
 
type CVALUE = <CFIER,VALUE>; 
 
type CP = Set<<CFIER,VALUE>>; 
As in all specifications, there is a set of users. 
var Set<USER> users = Set{}; 
The relations ua, opa, oba represent the assignment of users, operations and objects to their 
corresponding classifier values. 
var Set<<USER,CFIER,VALUE>> ua = Set{}; 
var Set<<OP,CFIER,VALUE>> opa = Set{}; 
var Set<<OB,CFIER,VALUE>> oba = Set{}; 
Some classifier values are dependent on both user and object e.g. whether there is a 
legitimate relationship between the user and object, or the relative location of user and 
object.  These are modelled by the relation uoba. 
var Set<<USER,OB,CFIER,VALUE>> uoba = Set{}; 
Other classifier values are independent of user, operation, object e.g. whether there is an 
emergency situation, or what the time is.  These are modelled by the variable svals. 
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> svals = Set{}; 
For completeness, I include relations that model cases where classifier values are 
dependent on user and operation, operation and object, and where dependent on user, 
operation, and object together.  
var Set<<USER,OP,CFIER,VALUE>> uopa = Set{}; 
var Set<<OP,OB,CFIER,VALUE>> opba = Set{}; 
var Set<<USER,OP,OB,CFIER,VALUE>> uopba = Set{}; 
In a TCM implementation, the data for all the above relations would be stored in tables.  
Only those tables useful for a particular application would be created.  In the case studies 
so far tables for the above three relations have not been necessary.  However, there may be 
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applications where they are needed.  Having defined the type CP as a set of classifier 
values, permit_cps and deny_cps are defined as below. 
var Set<CP> permit_cps = Set{}; 
var Set<CP> deny_cps = Set{}; 
The inheritance relation is defined as a set of triples. 
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> cpc = Set{}; 
 
4.4.3 Administrative Methods 
4.4.3.1 A new user is added 
 
[Action] 
void AddUser(USER! user) 
requires user notin users; 
{ 
  users[user] = true; 
} 
4.4.3.2 A user is deleted 
[Action] 
void DeleteUser(USER! user) 
requires user in users;  
{ 
  parallel  
  { 
  users[user] = false; 
    foreach (<u,c,v> in ua)  
    { 
    ua[<user,c,v>] = false; 
    } 
    foreach (<u,b,c,v> in uoba) 
    {  
    uoba[<user,b,c,v>] = false; 
    } 
    foreach (<u,p,b,c,v> in uopba) 
    {  
    uopba[<user,p,b,c,v>] = false; 
    } 
  } 
} 
4.4.3.3 A user is assigned to a classifier value. 
[Action] 
void AssignUser(USER! user, CFIER! cfier, VALUE val) 
requires user in users && ua[<user,cfier,val>] == false; 
{ 
  ua[<user,cfier,val>] = true;  
} 
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4.4.3.4 A user is deassigned from a classifier value. 
[Action] 
void DeassignUser(USER! user, CFIER! cfier, VALUE val) 
requires user in users && <user,cfier,val> in ua; 
{ 
  ua[<user,cfier,val>] = false;  
} 
4.4.3.5 A permit CP is created. 
[Action] 
void AddPermitCP(CP pcp) 
requires pcp notin permit_cps; 
requires pcp notin deny_cps; 
{ 
  permit_cps[pcp] = true;  
} 
4.4.3.6 A permit CP is removed. 
[Action] 
void RemovePermitCP(CP pcp) 
requires pcp in permit_cps; 
{ 
  permit_cps[pcp] = false;  
} 
4.4.3.7 A deny CP is created. 
[Action] 
void AddDenyCP(CP dcp) 
requires dcp notin permit_cps; 
requires dcp notin deny_cps; 
{ 
  deny_cps[dcp] = true;  
} 
4.4.3.8 A deny CP is removed. 
[Action] 
void RemoveDenyCP(CP dcp) 
requires dcp in deny_cps; 
{ 
  deny_cps[dcp] = false;  
} 
4.4.3.9 An inheritance relation is added. 
The added classifier-parent-child triple must not already exist and must not create a cycle. 
[Action] 
void AddInheritance(CFIER! cfier, VALUE pval, VALUE cval) 
requires <cfier,pval,cval> notin cpc && 
<cfier,cval,pval> notin closure(cpc); 
{ 
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  cpc[<cfier,pval,cval>] = true;  
} 
4.4.3.10 An inheritance relation is deleted. 
[Action] 
void DeleteInheritance(CFIER! cfier, VALUE pval, VALUE cval) 
requires <cfier,pval,cval> in cpc; 
{ 
  cpc[<cfier,pval,cval>] = false;  
} 
4.4.4 System Methods 
4.4.4.1 Without Inheritance: Given CP permits access 
This method and the next three methods are as they would be without inheritance or 
refinement.  They were used for testing in the development of the model.  Because 
inheritance and refinement are essential to TCM3, they are not used in the final model.  
This is shown by the absence of the [Action] attribute. 
bool  PermitAccessNoIR(CP pcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires pcp in permit_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*pcp)==dom(pcp); 
} 
4.4.4.2 Without Inheritance: Given CP denies access 
 This is without inheritance or refinement. 
bool  DenyAccessNoIR(CP dcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires dcp in deny_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*dcp)==dom(dcp); 
} 
4.4.4.3 Without Inheritance: Some CP permits access. 
This is without inheritance or refinement. 
bool  PermitAccessNoIR(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return Exists{cp in permit_cps; PermitAccessNoIR(cp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
4.4.4.4 Without Inheritance: Some CP denies access. 
This is without inheritance or refinement. 
bool  DenyAccessNoIR(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
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  return Exists{cp in deny_cps; DenyAccessNoIR(cp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
4.4.4.5 With Inheritance: Given CP permits access 
This method and the three methods below return true if a given CP or the CPs as a whole 
permit or deny access through their own values or any inherited values.  Permit CPs are not 
refined by Deny CPs or vice versa.  Similar to the B specification, these were used for 
testing in the development of the model. They are not used in the final model, as shown by 
the absence of the [Action] attribute. 
bool  PermitAccessNoR(CP pcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires pcp in permit_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*closure(pcp,cpc))==dom(pcp); 
} 
4.4.4.6 With Inheritance: Given CP denies access 
This is with inheritance, but without refinement. 
bool  DenyAccessNoR(CP dcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires dcp in deny_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*closure(dcp,cpc))==dom(dcp); 
} 
4.4.4.7 With Inheritance: Some CP permits access 
This is with inheritance, but without refinement. 
bool  PermitAccessNoR(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return Exists{cp in permit_cps; PermitAccessNoR(cp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
4.4.4.8 With Inheritance: Some CP denies access 
This is with inheritance, but without refinement. 
bool  DenyAccessNoR(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return Exists{cp in deny_cps; DenyAccessNoR(cp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
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4.4.4.9 With Refinement: Given CP permits access 
This is with inheritance and refinement.  Used in the model.  The given CP permits access 
if there is no refinement by a Deny CP to deny access.  The specification parallels the B 
specification (4.3.2). 
[Action] 
bool  PermitAccess(CP pcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires pcp in permit_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*closure(pcp,cpc))==dom(pcp) && 
  !Exists{dcp in deny_cps; 
  dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*closure(dcp,cpc))==dom(dcp) && 
  dom(pcp) <= dom(dcp) && 
  domRestriction(dom(pcp),descendants(dcp)) < descendants(pcp) 
  }; 
} 
4.4.4.10 With Refinement: Given CP denies access 
This is with inheritance and refinement.  Used in the model.  The specification parallels the 
B specification 4.4.4.10. 
[Action] 
bool  DenyAccess(CP dcp, USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires dcp in deny_cps && user in users; 
{ 
  return dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*dcp)==dom(dcp) && 
  !Exists{pcp in permit_cps; 
  dom(AssignedCValues(user,op,ob)*closure(pcp,cpc))==dom(pcp)&& 
  dom(dcp) <= dom(pcp) && 
  domRestriction(dom(dcp),descendants(pcp)) < descendants(dcp) 
  }; 
} 
4.4.4.11 With Refinement: Some CP permits access 
This is with inheritance and refinement.  Used in the model.  The specification parallels the 
B specification (4.3.2). 
[Action] 
bool  PermitAccess(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return Exists{pcp in permit_cps; PermitAccess(pcp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
4.4.4.12 With Refinement: Some CP denies access 
This is with inheritance and refinement.  Used in the model. The specification parallels the 
B specification (4.3.2). 
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[Action] 
bool  DenyAccess(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return Exists{dcp in deny_cps; DenyAccess(dcp,user,op,ob)}; 
} 
 
The TCM permits access depending on whether the system default is “permit overrules 
deny” or vice versa.  Following the more usual practice that deny overrules everything, the 
method for the TCM permitting access is given as follows: 
[Action] 
bool  TCMPermitAccess(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users; 
{ 
  return !DenyAccess(user,op,ob) && PermitAccess(user,op,ob); 
} 
4.4.5 Review Methods 
4.4.5.1 Users 
This simply returns the set of users. 
[Action] 
Set<USER> ViewUsers() 
{ 
  return  
      Set{u in users; u}; 
} 
4.4.5.2 Permissions 
This method returns the set of permissions obtained by the given user. 
[Action] 
Set<<OP,OB>> Permissions(USER! user) 
{ 
  return  
       Set{u in users, p in Operations(), b in Objects(), 
TCMPermitAccess(u,p,b),u==user;<p,b>}; 
} 
4.4.5.3 Operations on Object 
This method returns the set of operations allowed by the given user on the given object. 
[Action] 
Set<OP> OperationsOnObject(USER! user, OB! ob) 
{ 
  return  
      Set{<u,p,b> in Set<<USER,OP,OB>>, 
      TCMPermitAccess(u,p,b),u==user,b==ob;p}; 
} 
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4.4.6 Definitions 
4.4.6.1 AssignedCValues 
The method below returns the set of assigned classifier values related to a particular user, 
operation, object, and used for authorisation.  As stated previously some of the terms may 
not be necessary in a particular application. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> AssignedCValues(USER! user, OP! op, OB! ob) 
requires user in users;  
{ 
  return  
   
        Set{<u,c,v> in ua, u==user; <c,v>} +  
        Set{<p,c,v> in opa, p==op; <c,v>} + 
        Set{<b,c,v> in oba, b==ob; <c,v>} + 
 
        Set{<u,b,c,v> in uoba, u==user,b==ob; <c,v>} + 
        Set{<u,p,c,v> in uopa, u==user,p==op; <c,v>} + 
        Set{<p,b,c,v> in opba, p==op,b==ob; <c,v>} + 
 
        Set{<u,p,b,c,v> in uopba, u==user,p==op,b==ob; <c,v>} + 
 
        svals; 
} 
4.4.6.2 Operations 
This simply returns the set of operations 
Set<OP> Operations() 
{ 
  return 
   
        Set{<p,c,v> in opa; p} + 
        Set{<u,p,c,v> in uopa; p} + 
        Set{<p,b,c,v> in opba; p} + 
        Set{<u,p,b,c,v> in uopba; p}; 
} 
4.4.6.3 Objects 
This simply returns the set of objects 
Set<OB> Objects() 
{ 
  return 
   
        Set{<b,c,v> in oba; b} + 
        Set{<u,b,c,v> in uoba; b} + 
        Set{<p,b,c,v> in opba; b} + 
        Set{<u,p,b,c,v> in uopba; b}; 
} 
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4.4.6.4 Descendants 
The set of all descendants of the classifier values in a confidentiality permission, including 
the original classifier values of the confidentiality permission. This gives a new set of 
classifier values that are themselves a confidentiality permission, and can be used to give 
permission (or prohibition) through inheritance. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> descendants(Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> CP) 
{ 
  return  closure(CP,cpc); 
} 
4.4.7 Relational Operators 
A number of relational operators, that came by default with the B Toolkit, had to be 
explicitly written in Spec#.  This enabled the Spec# specification to follow, and take 
advantage of, previous work done in in the B specification.  These relational operators, 
such as Domain and Range are given in Appendix B. 
4.4.8 Main Method 
You need a main method for an executable model.  It can be used to call different 
scenarios.  The scenarios are used during model development, to check the model‟s correct 
working.  The third scenario is being called here. 
void Main() { 
  Scenario3(); 
} 
4.4.8.1 Scenario 1 
This first scenario adds users, assigns classifier values, creates two permit cps, and outputs 
the cps and the domain of one of them. 
[Action(Kind=ActionAttributeKind.Scenario)] 
void Scenario1()  
{ 
  AddUser(“Jim”); 
  AddUser(“Bob”); 
  foreach (u in users) 
  WriteLine(u); 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  AssignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”GP”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Role”,”HCP”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Location”,”NTUH”); 
  foreach (s in ua) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = s; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
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  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp1 = Set{}; 
  pcp1[<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp1[<”Location”,”JCUH”>] = true; 
  pcp1[<”Security”,”Unsealed”>] = true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp1); 
 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp2 = Set{}; 
  pcp2[<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp2[<”RelativeLocation”,”SOST”>] = true; 
  pcp2[<”Security”,”Sealed”>] = true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp2); 
   
  foreach (p in permit_cps) 
  { 
  foreach (cv in p) 
  {let <a,b> = cv; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b);} 
  WriteLine(“”);} 
  WriteLine(“”); 
   
  foreach (c in dom(pcp1)) 
  WriteLine(c); 
  ReadLine(); 
   
  RemovePermitCP(pcp1); 
  RemovePermitCP(pcp2); 
  DeassignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”GP”); 
  DeassignUser(“Bob”,”Role”,”HCP”); 
  DeassignUser(“Bob”,”Location”,”NTUH”); 
  DeleteUser(“Jim”); 
  DeleteUser(“Bob”);  
} 
The output from this Scenario 1 is shown in Console 3 below: 
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Console 3 
4.4.8.2 Scenario 2 
This scenario tests iterates, closure, and descendants. 
[Action(Kind=ActionAttributeKind.Scenario)] 
void Scenario2()  
{ 
  cpc[<”Role”,”HCP”,”Registrar”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Role”,”Registrar”,”Consultant”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Location”,”TVAH”,”JCUH”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Location”,”JCUH”,”Obstetrics”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Location”,”Obstetrics”,”Ward12”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Location”,”JCUH”,”Neurology”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Location”,”Neurology”,”Ward15”>] = true; 
 
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> res0 = iterate(cpc,0); 
  foreach (r in res0) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
   
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> res1 = iterate(cpc,1); 
  foreach (r in res1) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> res2 = iterate(cpc,2); 
  foreach (r in res2) 
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  { 
  let <a,b,c> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> res3 = iterate(cpc,3); 
  foreach (r in res3) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
 
 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> clos = closure(cpc); 
  foreach (r in clos) 
  { 
  let <a,b,c> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b + “, “ + c); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp = Set{}; 
  pcp[<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp[<”Location”,”JCUH”>] = true; 
  pcp[<”Security”,”Unsealed”>] = true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp); 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> desc = descendants(pcp); 
  foreach (d in desc) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = d; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
 
   
  ReadLine(); 
 
} 
 
  The output of the first four iterates is shown in Console 4 below. 
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Console 4 
The output for closure and descendants is shown in Console 5 below. 
 
Console 5 
4.4.8.3 Scenario 3 
Alice has sealed and locked her data at North Tees University Hospital (NTUH) that refers 
to her termination.  Consultant Jim at NTUH can see the data, although he is warned that it 
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is sensitive.  Consultant Bob at James Cook University Hospital (JCUH) cannot see the 
data, and indeed is unaware that the data exists.  Alice is referred for an operation at JCUH 
and confides in consultant Bob, who feels it is important that the surgical team have access 
to the data.  There are two possibilities: Alice can downgrade the security of her data to 
just „sealed‟ which would mean that any other Health Care Professional could view the 
data (although this access would be audited), or the prohibition could be refined (with 
Alice‟s explicit written consent) to allow access by the surgical team.  Refinement is 
explored in this scenario. 
[Action(Kind=ActionAttributeKind.Scenario)] 
void Scenario3()  
{ 
  AddUser(“Jim”); 
  AddUser(“Bob”); 
   
  //User Classifier Values 
  AssignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”Consultant”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Role”,”Consultant”); 
  AssignUser(“Jim”,”Location”,”NTUH”); 
  AssignUser(“Bob”,”Location”,”JCUH”); 
 
  //single operation classified by its own identity. 
  opa[<”read”,”OpID”,”read”>]=true; 
 
  //Object Classifier Values for some of Alice‟s Electronic Health 
Records 
  oba[<”EHR1”,”PatientID”,”Alice”>]=true; 
  oba[<”EHR1”,”DataType”,”Obstetric”>]=true; 
  oba[<”EHR1”,”Security”,”Unsealed”>]=true; 
  oba[<”EHR11”,”PatientID”,”Alice”>]=true; 
  oba[<”EHR11”,”DataType”,”Termination”>]=true; 
  oba[<”EHR11”,”Security”,”Locked”>]=true; 
 
  //Inheritance Relationships 
  cpc[<”Role”,”HCP”,”Registrar”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”Role”,”Registrar”,”Consultant”>] = true; 
  cpc[<”DataType”,”Obstetric”,”Termination”>] = true; 
 
  //Classifier Values which depend on both user and object 
  uoba[<”Jim”,”EHR1”,”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Jim”,”EHR11”,”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Jim”,”EHR1”,”RelativeLocation”,”SO”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Jim”,”EHR11”,”RelativeLocation”,”SO”>]=true; 
 
WriteLine(“Assigned CValues Jim,EHR1,EHR2”); 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> acvals = AssignedCValues(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”); 
  foreach (r in acvals) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
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  acvals = AssignedCValues(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR11”); 
  foreach (r in acvals) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
   
 
  WriteLine(“Results of Boolean Methods”); 
  //Create Permit CP 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp1 = Set{}; 
  pcp1[<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp1[<”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>] = true; 
  pcp1[<”Security”,”Unsealed”>] = true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp1); 
   
  //Create Permit CP. SO = „Same Organisation‟ 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp2 = Set{}; 
  pcp2[<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp2 [<”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>] = true; 
  pcp2 [<”RelativeLocation”,”SO”>] = true; 
  pcp2 [<”Security”,”Locked”>] = true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp2); 
 
  //Create Deny CP. DO = „Different Organisation‟ 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> dcp1 = Set{}; 
  dcp1 [<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  dcp1 [<”RelativeLocation”,”DO”>] = true; 
  dcp1 [<”Security”,”Locked”>] = true; 
  AddDenyCP(dcp1); 
 
   
  WriteLine(PermitAccessNoIR(pcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(PermitAccessNoR(pcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(PermitAccess(pcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
   
  WriteLine(PermitAccessNoIR(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(PermitAccessNoR(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(PermitAccess(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
 
  WriteLine(DenyAccessNoIR(dcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(DenyAccessNoR(dcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(DenyAccess(dcp1,“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
   
  WriteLine(DenyAccessNoIR(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(DenyAccessNoR(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(DenyAccess(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
  WriteLine(“”); 
  WriteLine(“TCMPermitAccess”); 
  WriteLine(TCMPermitAccess(“Jim”,”Read”,”EHR1”)); 
 
  WriteLine(“Jim and Bob‟s Permissions before referral to Bob”); 
  WriteLine(“Jim‟s Permissions”); 
  var Set<<OP,OB>> jprms = Permissions(“Jim”); 
  foreach (p in jprms) 
  { 
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  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  WriteLine(“Bob‟s Permissions”); 
  var Set<<OP,OB>> bprms = Permissions(“Bob”); 
  foreach (p in bprms) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
//Referral to consultant Bob at JCUH 
  uoba[<”Bob”,”EHR1”,”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Bob”,”EHR11”,”LegitimateRelationship”,”yes”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Bob”,”EHR1”,”RelativeLocation”,”DO”>]=true; 
  uoba[<”Bob”,”EHR11”,”RelativeLocation”,”DO”>]=true; 
 
WriteLine(“Assigned CValues Bob,EHR1,EHR2”); 
  acvals = AssignedCValues(“Bob”,”Read”,”EHR1”); 
  foreach (r in acvals) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  acvals = AssignedCValues(“Bob”,”Read”,”EHR11”); 
  foreach (r in acvals) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = r; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
WriteLine(“Jim and Bob‟s Permissions after referral to Bob”); 
WriteLine(“Jim‟s Permissions”); 
  jprms = Permissions(“Jim”); 
  foreach (p in jprms) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  WriteLine(“Bob‟s Permissions”); 
  bprms = Permissions(“Bob”); 
  foreach (p in bprms) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
   
AssignUser(“Bob”,”Team”,”Surgical1”); 
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// Add a new permit CP which refines a deny CP. 
var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> pcp3 = Set{}; 
  pcp3 [<”Role”,”HCP”>] = true; 
  pcp3 [<”RelativeLocation”,”DO”>] = true; 
  pcp3 [<”Security”,”Locked”>] = true; 
  pcp3 [<”Team”,”Surgical1”>] =true; 
  AddPermitCP(pcp3); 
 
 
WriteLine(“Jim and Bob‟s Permissions after Permission Refinement”); 
WriteLine(“Jim‟s Permissions”); 
  jprms = Permissions(“Jim”); 
  foreach (p in jprms) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
  WriteLine(“Bob‟s Permissions”); 
  bprms = Permissions(“Bob”); 
  foreach (p in bprms) 
  { 
  let <a,b> = p; 
  WriteLine(a + “, “ + b); 
  } 
  WriteLine(“”); 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  DeassignUser(“Jim”,”Role”,”Consultant”); 
  DeassignUser(“Bob”,”Role”,”Consultant”); 
  DeassignUser(“Bob”,”Location”,”NTUH”); 
  DeleteUser(“Jim”); 
  DeleteUser(“Bob”);  
} 
Console 6 below shows the set of assigned classifer values for Consultant Jim and 
Electronic Health Record EHR1, followed by the set of assigned classifer values for 
Consultant Jim and Electronic Health Record EHR11. 
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Console 6 
The Boolean values returned by the various “Permit Access” expressions in the scenario 
are shown in Console 7. 
 
Console 7 
Console 8 shows Jim and Bob‟s permissions before referral to Bob. 
 
Console 8 
Console 9 shows the assigned classifier values for Bob & EHR1, followed by the assigned 
classifier values for Bob & EHR11.  The permissions for Jim and Bob are shown after 
referral to Bob i.e. when Bob has a legitimate relationship with Alice. 
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Console 9 
The permissions for Jim are now shown (Console 10) after refinement of the 
Confidentiality Permision denying access, to allow access to Surgical Team 1 of which 
Bob is a member. 
 
Console 10 
4.4.9 Exploration 
Spec Explorer includes an exploration feature.  The output consists of possible runs of the 
model program that it discovers.  Spec Explorer represents this data as a finite-state 
machine [FSM].  The nodes of the FSM are the states of the model program before and 
after the invocation of a top-level method (an action); the transitions or links of the FSM 
represent method invocations, including arguments and return values.  Some small parts of 
the FSM are shown graphically below.  In reality, they can all be run together, and are 
better viewed through the SpecExplorer program.  The FSMs are used to generate test 
suites for the implementation. 
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4.4.9.1 AddUser, DeleteUser, AssignUser, DeassignUser 
 
4.4.9.2 AddPermitCP, RemovePermitCP, AddDenyCP, RemoveDenyCP. 
 
 
4.4.9.3 AddPermitCP, AddInheritance, Permissions. 
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4.4.10 Test Suites 
FSMs may be used to produce one or more test suites, which can be run against the 
implementation of the system.  An API driver program can be written to make this easier.  
The purpose of the API driver is to do whatever is necessary in order to invoke the 
individual actions of the test suites in the implementation under test.  In the simplest case, 
this is just a pass-through call to another .NET assembly.  The application test suites to a 
TCM class are shown after presentation of the TCM class in the next section. 
4.5 Comparison of Spec# with the B-Method 
It has to be acknowledged that creating the model in B first, made it easier to rewrite it in 
Spec#.  However, I can see no major difference as regards creating the model once the 
different syntaxes have been understood.   
One advantage of the B-Method is that the model in B can be verified; whilst in Spec# it 
can only be explored using finite state machines.  However, verification in B can require 
considerable effort even in quite simple models.  It is only because of the suitability of 
RBAC and the TCM to specification in B, that it was not too hard to do it in these cases.   
An advantage of Spec# is that, used in SpecExplorer, Spec# has all the features of an 
object-oriented language: classes, structs, overloading, polymorphism, enumerations etc.  
The model can then be used for testing with any object-oriented language by writing 
harnesses to the implementation.  Of course, it works best with C#.  The B Method as used 
in this research is not properly object oriented. 
The Spec# code as written in SpecExplorer, using sets and relations, can be compiled and 
run.  The B-Method model can be refined to an implementation in C.  However, most 
modern application are unlikely to be written in C, so it may be that the „harness‟ approach 
is best. 
The way the B Method and Spec# have been used together in this research is that the initial 
specification has been done in B, which allows the specification to be verified.  The B has 
then been used to write the specification in Spec Explorer, which allows the model to be 
animated.  This is also a stage towards final implementation and allows the final 
implementation to be tested using harnesses created in Spec Explorer. 
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4.6 Translation to SQL 
4.6.1 Descendants 
It is possible to use the B specification to guide the SQL as shown previously.  The 
introduction of CTE (Common Table Expressions) in SQL Server 2005 makes it easier to 
write recursive expressions.  The following SQL uses the WITH clause to produce a set of 
descendants from a given CP (including the original ancestors): 
WITH descs (Classifier,CValue) 
AS 
(SELECT Classifier, CValue from tcm_CPs 
WHERE CPid = '11' 
UNION ALL 
SELECT  i.Classifier, i.Child from Inheritance i 
 INNER JOIN descs on  
  descs.Classifier = i.Classifier 
AND  descs.CValue = i.Parent 
) 
SELECT DISTINCT * FROM descs 
 
This is quite neat for a recursive function in SQL – certainly considerably neater than 
before.  As an example, if we have the Confidentiality Permission below where CPid = 
„11‟: 
 
CP = {<Role, HCP>, <Location, TVAH>, <DataType, Admin>} 
 
Together with the following inheritance table: 
 
Classifier Parent Child 
Role HCP GP 
Role HCP Registrar 
Role Registrar Consultant 
Location TVHA JCUH 
Location JCUH Ward 3 
DataType Admin Finance 
DataType Finance Salaries 
Table 1: SQL Inheritance  
 
Then the output from the above SQL is: 
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Screen 1: Descendants 
 
A “descendants” function can then be used as part of the specification of the main 
authorisation (with inheritance) functions for TCM3 written in SQL (as follows). 
4.6.2 Given CP Permits Access 
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnGivenCPPermitsAccess] 
(@CPid int, @UserId sql_variant = null, @DataId nvarchar(50) = null) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
declare  @intersect table (Classifier nvarchar(50),CValue nvarchar(50)) 
declare  @except table (Classifier nvarchar(50)) 
 
insert @intersect 
select  Classifier,CValue from dbo.fnActiveCValues(@UserId,@DataId) 
intersect 
select Classifier,CValue from fnDescendants(@CPid) 
 
insert @except 
select Classifier from tcm_PermitCPs p where p.CPid = @CPid 
except 
select Classifier from @intersect 
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IF NOT EXISTS 
(select Classifier from @except) 
 
SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
4.6.3 Some CP Permits Access 
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnSomeCPPermitsAccess] 
(@UserId sql_variant = null, @DataId nvarchar(50) = null) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
IF  EXISTS 
(select CPid from TCM_PermitCPs  
where dbo.fnGivenCPPermitsAccess(CPid,@UserId,@DataId)=1) 
SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
 
The SQL functions for GivenCPDeniesAccess and SomeCPDeniesAccess are almost exact 
copies of the functions above with permit replaced by deny. 
4.6.4 TCM Permits Access 
The SQL function below determines whether the TCM overall permits access.  It closely 
follows the B specification. 
CREATE FUNCTION [dbo].[fnTCMPermitsAccess] 
(@UserId sql_variant = null, @DataId nvarchar(50) = null) 
RETURNS int 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
declare @output int 
set @output = 0 
 
IF EXISTS 
(select * from TCM_PermitCPs p 
where dbo.fnGivenCPPermitsAccess(p.CPid,@UserId,@DataId)=1 
AND NOT EXISTS 
(select * from TCM_DenyCPs d 
where dbo.fnGivenCPDeniesAccess(d.CPid,@UserId,@DataId)=1 
AND NOT EXISTS 
(select Classifier from TCM_PermitCPs where CPid = p.CPid 
except 
select Classifier from TCM_DenyCPs where CPid = d.CPid) 
AND NOT EXISTS 
(select * from dbo.fnDescendants(d.CPid) r 
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where r.Classifier IN (select Classifier from TCM_PermitCPs where CPid = 
p.CPid) 
except 
select * from dbo.fnDescendants(p.CPid)))) 
SET @output = 1 
 
RETURN @output 
END 
 
4.6.5 Query Results 
The query below shows what is accessible by user F.Jones.  He is allowed to see these 
records because of his role as a Health Care Professional (HCP), and because the data is 
classified for security purposes as „Unsealed‟ 
 
Screen 2: Accessible Records 
 
If the Deny CP 
DCP = {<Role, GP>, <Security, Unsealed>, <DataType, Endocrinology>}  
is added together with the inheritance relationship 
<Role, HCP, GP> 
then the results are: 
 
 167 
 
Screen 3: Accessible Data Changed 
The screen above shows that access to the diabetes record has been removed.  If the 
PermitCP 
PCP = {<Role, GP>, <Security, Unsealed>, <DataType, Endocrinology>, <Location, 
Newlands>}  
is added back in the output reverts to the original screen. 
 
4.7 Summary 
The TCM was re-examined in the light of the formal specification.  The question of what 
makes the TCM unique and a contribution to access control was addressed.  A model was 
specified in B that includes those essential components.  To animate the model and as a 
step towards implementation the model was re-specified in Spec# using the B specification 
as a basis.  Some model exploration was demonstrated, and some translation to the SQL 
that would be used in an implementation was given. 
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5 Case Study 
This chapter is a case study that explores how TCM3 would be implemented as discussed 
in the previous chapter and given current health service thinking. 
5.1 Introduction 
This case study is based loosely on the original Fred and Alice scenario, but also 
incorporates new health care information thinking on „legitimate relationship‟ and „sealed 
and locked data‟.  It demonstrates how these concepts can be easily implemented using 
TCM3. 
For this case study, we envisage two local GP practices (Newlands, Linthorpe) and a local 
hospital (JCUH - James Cook University Hospital).  All data is fictitious. 
5.2 Logical Assertions 
The model implements the following logical assertions. 
1. A Health Care Professional can see a patient‟s data if he has a legitimate 
relationship with the patient and the data is unsealed. 
2. A Health Care Professional can see a patient‟s data if he has a legitimate 
relationship with the patient and the data belongs to the same organisation and the 
same team/workgroup as the Health Care Professional. 
3. A Health Care Professional can see a patient‟s data if he has a legitimate 
relationship with the patient, the data is classified as sealed, the data does not 
belong to the same organisation and the same team/workgroup as the Health Care 
Professional and the access is audited. 
4. A Health Care Professional cannot see a patient‟s data if the data does not belong to 
the same organisation and the same team/workgroup as the Health Care 
Professional and the data is classified as locked. 
5.3 Implementation 
Various aspects of a TCM3 implementation are discussed below, together with screenshots 
of a working model. 
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5.3.1 Login 
 
Screen 4: Login 
Login uses asp.net‟s membership and role providers.  This has been modified to use 
classifiers and classifier values.  Data is stored on SQL Server.  Active Directory or 
anything using LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) could be used.  ADAM 
(Active Directory Application Mode) could also be used. 
5.3.2 User Accounts 
 
Screen 5: User Accounts 
The above screen shows the user accounts, taken from asp.net‟s membership provider. 
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5.3.3 User Classifier Values 
 
Screen 6: User Classifier Values 
This above screen shows the classifier values active for a particular user. 
5.3.4 Sealed and Locked Data 
The application demonstrates the rules that apply to „normal‟, „sealed‟, and „sealed and 
locked‟ data.  The rules for sealed data can be expressed as follows: 
 A user in the same team/workgroup and organisation can see a patient‟s sensitive 
(sealed) data.  The user is to be made aware that it is sensitive data, but no warning 
or auditing is carried out. 
 A user in a different team or organisation can also see sensitive data.  However, a 
warning is given and access is audited. 
If these were expressed using classifier values then they could be written as: 
PCP1 = {<role, HCP>, <relativelocation, SOST>, <security, sealed>} 
PCP2 = {<role, HCP>, <relativelocation, SODT>, <Audited, true>, <security, sealed>} 
PCP3 = {<role, HCP>, <relativelocation, DO>, <Audited, true>, <security, sealed>} 
HCP = „Health Care Professional‟ 
SOST  = „Same Organisation, Same Team/Workgroup‟ 
SODT  = „Same Organisation, Different Team/Workgroup‟ 
DO  = „Different Organisation‟ 
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The rule for „sealed and locked‟ data is that it cannot be seen by anyone who is not in the 
same team and organisation.  This could be expressed by two deny_cps. 
DCP1 = {<role, HCP>, <relativelocation, SODT>, <op_type, view>, <security, locked>} 
DCP2 = {<role, HCP>, <relativelocation, DO>, <op_type, view>, <security, locked>} 
The application tests three users as follows: 
Name Password Organisation Location Data 
Location 
Bill Smith billsmith JCUH Linthorpe Newlands 
F.Jones ffones JCUH Newlands Newlands 
J.Wright jwright NTUH A&E Team Newlands 
 
5.3.5 Active Classifier Values 
 
Screen 7: Active Classifier Values 
This screen shows the active classifier values for a particular user and data object.  These 
are the classifier values that could be used for authorisation.  The only requirement for a 
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value to be a „classifier value‟ is that it is persistent in the application.  Note that 
LegitimateYN and RelativeLocation, which depend on both the user and the object, are 
present. 
5.3.6 Permissions 
Confidentiality Permissions can be stored as relational data in a database or as an XML 
file.  The database tables are shown in below in Figure 9. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: CP Tables 
 
The XML below is for a CP that permits access in an audited/ override situation for sealed 
data in the same organisation, different team.  Storing as an XML file would be in line with 
much current practice 
  <CP Cpid="8" Access="permit    "> 
    <Classifier Name="Role"> 
      <CValue Value="HCP" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="RelativeLocation"> 
      <CValue Value="SODT" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="Security"> 
      <CValue Value="Sealed" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="Override"> 
      <CValue Value="1" /> 
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    </Classifier> 
  </CP> 
 
The CPs together with the inheritance relationship provide a complete permission 
description.  Inheritance can be stored in XML as shown below. 
  <Inheritance>   
    <Classifier Name="Role"> 
      <Relationship Parent="HCP" Child=“Registrar”/> 
      <Relationship Parent="Registrar" Child=“Consultant”/> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="Location"> 
      <Relationship Parent="TVAH" Child=“JCUH”/> 
      <Relationship Parent="JCUH" Child=“JCUH A&E”/> 
    </Classifier> 
  </Inheritance>  
 
Applying the inheritance to the CP above gives a new effective CP to be used for 
authorisation: 
<CP Cpid="8" Access="permit    "> 
    <Classifier Name="Role"> 
      <CValue Value="HCP" /> 
      <CValue Value="Registrar" /> 
      <CValue Value="Consultant" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="RelativeLocation"> 
      <CValue Value="SODT" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="Security"> 
      <CValue Value="Sealed" /> 
    </Classifier> 
    <Classifier Name="Override"> 
      <CValue Value="1" /> 
    </Classifier> 
  </CP> 
 
 
Below is a stored procedure that takes advantage of functionality in SQL Server 2005 to 
manipulate XML files: 
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[spXMLCPs]  
 -- Add the parameters for the stored procedure here 
AS 
 
BEGIN 
 
 SELECT CPid AS '@Cpid', 
   PorD AS '@Access', 
   (SELECT cpc.Classifier AS '@Name', 
   (SELECT CValue AS '@Value' 
   FROM TCM_CPCValues AS cpcv 
   WHERE cpc.CPid = cpcv.CPid 
   AND cpc.Classifier = cpcv.Classifier 
   FOR XML PATH ('CValue'), type) 
   FROM TCM_CPClassifiers AS cpc 
   WHERE cp.CPid = cpc.CPid 
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   FOR XML PATH ('Classifier'), type) 
   FROM TCM_CPs AS cp 
   ORDER BY CPid 
   FOR XML PATH ('CP'), ROOT ('CPs') 
END 
 
The screen print below shows some of the CPs used in the model.  The display is produced 
using the above stored procedure. 
 
Screen 8: CP Display 
5.3.7 Patient Records 
The screen below shows the patient details available to the current user through the active 
classifier values of both the user and the data objects. 
 
 175 
 
Screen 9: Patient Records 
The screen below demonstrates the different output when override is employed with the 
same user and data objects. 
 
Screen 10: Patient Records with Override 
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5.4 Comparison of TCM3 with RBAC 
RBAC greatly simplified access control through the assignment of roles to users, and the 
assignment of permissions to roles, thus modelling the real world and allowing for change 
of personnel within an organisation.  Any new employee has only to be assigned to the 
appropriate role(s) for them to receive the correct permissions if the role permissions are 
set correctly.  Permissions design for roles in RBAC is thus a large area of study and is part 
of the „administration‟ that goes together with RBAC. 
However faced with legitimate access assertions such as 
 GP Fred is allowed access to orthopaedic patient records at James Cook University 
Hospital if he is employed as an out-patients‟ session-doctor at the hospital, or  
 A trainee pharmacist can read but not write prescriptions only in the dispensing 
clinic, or 
 A research paper cannot be reviewed by someone belonging to the same 
department as the author, or who has previously co-authored a paper with the 
author, or  
 An assistant engineer has all the permissions of an engineer if he is acting in a 
delegated role. 
It is difficult to see how RBAC can be applied without a lot of tinkering with the basic 
concepts, or with very elaborate permissions design.  In general, this is the way that 
progress has gone – keeping the basic idea of RBAC but with added extras. 
It is in this area we see the benefits of the TCM in general and in particular TCM3.  The 
TCM takes access control back to first principles.  This had already been done intuitively 
to a large extent by Dr. Longstaff.  The application of formal methods enables this „back to 
first principles‟ to be rigorously applied.  Any logical assertion, such as those above, can 
be converted to a Confidentiality Permission using persistent classifier values.  Moreover, 
in a database such as SQL Server all classifier values can be made persistent by supplying 
default values.  
Another name for the TCM could be CBAC (Classifier Based Access Control) i.e. a 
generalisation of RBAC.  A moment‟s study of the access assertions above enable the 
classifiers to be picked out - Role, Identity, Data Type, Patient Identity, Location, 
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Employment Status etc. etc.  This complexity is endemic to the TCM whilst the 
mainstream has continued to be RBAC centred with add-ons. 
5.5 Comparison of TCM3 with TCM1, TCM2. 
It is not claimed that TCM3 is an improved development of TCM1 and TCM2.  What is 
claimed is that it is an improvement on RBAC and contains the essential ideas of the TCM 
in their most elemental form.  Features of TCM1 and TCM2 can be added back into TCM3 
but it is the contention that TCM3 can cope with most (if not all) authorisation situations. 
The day-to-day demands on a systems administrator can be exacting.  When applying a 
new permission or prohibition the system‟s administrator wants to know clearly the effect 
it is going to have.  They would still want to know this even when working with different 
CPTs as in the more general models of TCM1 and TCM2.  E.g. an elemental question such 
as “Can Fred Smith with a GP role at Newlands Medical Practice access Alice Jone‟s 
obstetric data?”.  No doubt, there can be some graphical display that interprets the different 
layers of TCM1 and TCM2 to this effect, but the point here is that TCM3 implements this 
directly, and if it can be implemented directly why add extra layers of complication.   
In TCM2 Confidentiality Permission Types act as a constraint on the CPs that can be 
created.  Additionally an ordering is placed on the CPTs that changes how the CPs are 
processed.  The question arises as to whether that this unnecessarily complicates things for 
the system administrator.  If it does, then in practice, what happens then is that greater 
permissions than necessary are allocated in response to petitions from users that they do 
not have the permissions they need.  This defeats the point of a having a complicated 
system in the first place.   
In TCM3, the administrator has an instant response from the way the TCM3 is set up e.g. 
you do not have permission because although James Cook Consultants normally have read 
access to administrative data, they do not have access to financial data in the Personnel 
department. 
One of the criticisms levelled at TCM2 in one of the paper submissions was as follows: 
 “Why should {Role, EHR_object_id} precede {Role, EHR_obj_type}?  How do 
you define "more complex"?” 
When approaching the model from a mathematical viewpoint the same questions arise.  
The answer from the viewpoint of the TCM2 is that the classifier ordering is determined by 
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the application designer, and that there is no special reason why one classifier should be 
more important than the other is.  The classifier ordering determines the CPT ordering.  
The actual rules for „more complex‟ are given in the TCM2 specification, but basically, 
„more classifiers‟ in the CPT means „more complex‟. 
In TCM3, the requirement that there be an ordering on classifiers or classifier types has 
been removed, although this could be added back in to meet the demands of a particular 
application. 
The essential thinking behind the phrase „more complex‟ has been kept in that more 
complex CPs refine less complex CPs, although the idea that any „more complex‟ CP has 
precedence over a less complex CP irrespective of whether it refines that CP has been 
discarded. 
TCM3 also removes the idea of overrides.  Instead, it treats particular override situations as 
classifiers and classifier values e.g. <condition, orange> for a security situation.  Perhaps 
more controversially TCM3 looks at authentication as a classifier with values e.g. 
<authenticated, yes>.  A session is then just defined as that period during which a user is 
continuously authenticated. 
5.6 Summary 
A TCM3 model implementation of a modified „Alice‟ scenario has been produced using 
current health service thinking on sealed and locked data.  The implementation of 
Confidentiality Permissions stored as tables in a relational database or in XML was 
explored.  The implementation enabled some comparisons to be made between TCM3 and 
RBAC, and between TCM3 and TCM1 and TCM2.    
 179 
6 TCM Classes using LinQ 
6.1 Introduction 
This section shows the creation of a TCM class which can then be used as an 
ObjectDataSource in the development of an application.  The methods of this class are 
written using the relatively new LinQ described below, although they could be written 
using the more usual ADO.NET procedure calls. 
6.2 LinQ 
LINQ Project is a set of extensions to the .NET Framework that encompass language-
integrated query, set, and transform operations.  It extends C# and Visual Basic with native 
language syntax for queries and provides class libraries to take advantage of these 
capabilities.  It is an attempt to bridge the divide between programming languages such as 
C# and database languages such as TRANSACT SQL.  It enables calls to any data source, 
including XML, using programming language syntax. 
6.3 The Cfier Class 
This class is used in TCM1, TCM2.  It is not needed in TCM3 because TCM3 works 
primarily with a cvalue i.e. a classifier, value combination.  TCM1, TCM2 have 
Confidentiality Permission Types which are sets of classifiers. 
public class cfier 
{ 
    public string CFIER { get; set; } 
 
 
    public override bool Equals(object obj) 
    { 
        if (!(obj is cfier)) 
            return false; 
 
        else 
        { 
            cfier cf = (cfier)obj; 
            return (cf.CFIER.Trim() == this.CFIER.Trim()); 
        } 
    } 
 
    public override int GetHashCode() 
    { 
        return string.Format("{0}", this.CFIER.Trim()).GetHashCode(); 
    } 
} 
 
6.4 The CValue Class 
The CValue class is used by TCM1, TCM2, and TCM3. 
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public class cvalue 
{ 
    public string CFIER { get; set; } 
    public string VAL { get; set; } 
 
    public override bool Equals(object obj) 
    { 
        if (!(obj is cvalue)) 
            return false; 
 
        else 
        { 
            cvalue cv = (cvalue)obj; 
            return (cv.CFIER.Trim() == this.CFIER.Trim() && 
                cv.VAL.Trim() == this.VAL.Trim()); 
        } 
    } 
 
    public override int GetHashCode() 
    { 
        return string.Format("{0}|{1}", this.CFIER.Trim(), 
this.VAL.Trim()).GetHashCode(); 
    } 
} 
 
6.5 The TCM Class 
Ninety percent of the methods for TCM1, TCM2, and TCM3 are in common.  The 
following specifies a TCM class of those common methods which can used as an 
authorisation source for any application, 
using System; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Configuration; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Linq.Expressions; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
 
 
public class TCM 
{ 
    public static void AddUser(string FirstName, 
                               string SecondName, 
                               string LogonName, 
                               string Password) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = new USER(); 
        user.FirstName = FirstName; 
        user.SecondName = SecondName; 
        user.LogonName = LogonName; 
        user.Password = Password; 
        db.USERs.Add(user); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void DeleteUser(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.UserId == UserId); 
        db.USERs.Remove(user); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
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    public static void UpdateUser(Int32 UserId, 
                                 string FirstName, 
                                 string SecondName, 
                                 string LogonName, 
                                 string Password) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.UserId == UserId); 
        user.FirstName = FirstName; 
        user.SecondName = SecondName; 
        user.LogonName = LogonName; 
        user.Password = Password; 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewUsers() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from u in db.USERs select u; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
     
    public static object ViewUser(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from u in db.USERs 
                    where u.UserId == UserId 
                    select u; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static USER FindUser(string LogonName) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
        return user; 
    } 
 
    public static void AssignUser(Int32 UserId, string Cfier, string 
Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        UA ua = new UA(); 
        ua.UserId = UserId; 
        ua.Cfier = Cfier; 
        ua.Value = Value; 
        db.UAs.Add(ua); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void DeassignUser(Int32 UserId, string Cfier, string 
Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        UA ua = db.UAs.Single(u => u.UserId == UserId && 
                                u.Cfier == Cfier && 
                                u.Value == Value); 
        db.UAs.Remove(ua); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewUAs() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from ua in db.UAs select ua; 
        return query; 
    } 
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    public static object ViewUAs(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from ua in db.UAs  
                    where ua.UserId == UserId 
                    select ua; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewOBAs() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from oba in db.OBAs select oba; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewOBAs(Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from oba in db.OBAs 
        where oba.RecordId == RecordId select oba; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewUOBAs() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from uoba in db.UOBAs select uoba; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewUOBAs(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from uoba in db.UOBAs 
                    where uoba.UserId == UserId && 
                    uoba.RecordId == RecordId select uoba; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static void AddPermitCPElement(Int32 PcpId, string Cfier, 
string Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        PERMITCP pcp = new PERMITCP(); 
        pcp.PcpId = PcpId; 
        pcp.Cfier = Cfier; 
        pcp.Value = Value; 
        db.PERMITCPs.Add(pcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void RemovePermitCPElement(Int32 PcpId, string Cfier, 
string Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        PERMITCP pcp = db.PERMITCPs.Single(p => p.PcpId == PcpId && 
                                p.Cfier == Cfier && 
                                p.Value == Value); 
        db.PERMITCPs.Remove(pcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void RemovePermitCP(Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        PERMITCP pcp = db.PERMITCPs.Single(p => p.PcpId == PcpId); 
        db.PERMITCPs.Remove(pcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
 183 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewPermitCPs() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from pcp in db.PERMITCPs 
                    orderby pcp.PcpId, pcp.Cfier, pcp.Value 
                    select pcp; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
 
    public static object ViewPermitCP(Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from pcp in db.PERMITCPs 
                    where pcp.PcpId == PcpId 
                    select pcp; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static void AddDenyCPElement(Int32 DcpId, string Cfier, 
string Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        DENYCP dcp = new DENYCP(); 
        dcp.DcpId = DcpId; 
        dcp.Cfier = Cfier; 
        dcp.Value = Value; 
        db.DENYCPs.Add(dcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void RemoveDenyCPElement(Int32 DcpId, string Cfier, 
string Value) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        DENYCP dcp = db.DENYCPs.Single(p => p.DcpId == DcpId && 
                                p.Cfier == Cfier && 
                                p.Value == Value); 
        db.DENYCPs.Remove(dcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void RemoveDenyCP(Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        DENYCP dcp = db.DENYCPs.Single(p => p.DcpId == DcpId); 
        db.DENYCPs.Remove(dcp); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewDenyCPs() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from dcp in db.DENYCPs 
                    orderby dcp.DcpId, dcp.Cfier, dcp.Value 
                    select dcp; 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewDenyCP(Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from dcp in db.DENYCPs 
                    where dcp.DcpId == DcpId 
                    select dcp; 
        return query; 
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    } 
 
    public static void AddInheritance(string Cfier, string Pval, string 
Cval) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        CPC cpc = new CPC(); 
        cpc.Cfier = Cfier; 
        cpc.Pval = Pval; 
        cpc.Cval = Cval; 
        db.CPCs.Add(cpc); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static void DeleteInheritance(string Cfier, string Pval, 
string Cval) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        CPC cpc = db.CPCs.Single(i => i.Cfier == Cfier && 
                                i.Pval == Pval && 
                                i.Cval == Cval); 
        db.CPCs.Remove(cpc); 
        db.SubmitChanges(); 
    } 
 
    public static object ViewInheritance() 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from cpc in db.CPCs 
                    orderby cpc.Cfier, cpc.Pval, cpc.Cval 
                    select cpc; 
        return query; 
    } 
     
 
    public static IEnumerable<cvalue> AssignedCValues(Int32 UserId, 
Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
       IEnumerable<cvalue> ucvs = db.UAs.Where(ua => ua.UserId == 
UserId).Select(ua => 
            new cvalue {CFIER = ua.Cfier,VAL = ua.Value }); 
 
IEnumerable<cvalue> obcvs = db.OBAs.Where(oba => oba.RecordId ==            
RecordId).Select(oba => 
            new cvalue { CFIER = oba.Cfier, VAL = oba.Value }); 
 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> uobcvs = db.UOBAs.Where(uoba => uoba.UserId 
== UserId && 
                     uoba.RecordId == RecordId).Select(uoba => 
            new cvalue { CFIER = uoba.Cfier, VAL = uoba.Value }); 
 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> query = ucvs.Union(obcvs).Union(uobcvs); 
 
        return query; 
             
    } 
 
 
    public static bool PermitAccess(Int32 PcpId, Int32 UserId, Int32 
RecordId) 
    { 
        var cfiersofcommoncvalues = AssignedCValues(UserId, 
RecordId).Intersect( 
            PermitCpCValues(PcpId)).Select(a => a.CFIER.Trim()); 
 
        bool permit = 
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             (PermitCpCValues(PcpId).Select(p=>p.CFIER.Trim()) 
              .Except(cfiersofcommoncvalues)).Count() == 0; 
 
        return permit; 
 
    } 
 
    public static bool DenyAccess(Int32 DcpId, Int32 UserId, Int32 
RecordId) 
    { 
        var cfiersofcommoncvalues = AssignedCValues(UserId, 
RecordId).Intersect( 
            DenyCpCValues(DcpId)).Select(a => a.CFIER.Trim()); 
 
        bool deny = 
             (DenyCpCValues(DcpId).Select(d => d.CFIER.Trim()). 
               Except(cfiersofcommoncvalues)).Count() == 0; 
 
        return deny; 
    } 
 
 
    //helper methods 
    public static bool PermitRefines(Int32 DcpId, Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        IEnumerable<string> domDenyCp = from d in db.DENYCPs 
                                        where (d.DcpId == DcpId) 
                                        select d.Cfier.Trim(); 
 
        IEnumerable<string> domPermitCp = from p in db.PERMITCPs 
                                          where (p.PcpId == PcpId) 
                                          select p.Cfier.Trim(); 
 
 
        if (domDenyCp.Except(domPermitCp).Count() == 0) 
        { 
            IEnumerable<cvalue> pdescs = 
                RestrictedPermitCpCValues(PcpId, DcpId); 
            IEnumerable<cvalue> ddescs = 
                DenyCpCValues(DcpId); 
 
            int PexD = domPermitCp.Except(domDenyCp).Count(); 
            int DexP = ddescs.Except(pdescs).Count(); 
 
            if ((PexD > 0) && (DexP >= 0)) 
            { 
                return true; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
 
                if ((PexD == 0) && (DexP > 0)) 
                { 
                    return true; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    return false; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            return false; 
        } 
 
    } 
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    public static bool DenyRefines(Int32 PcpId, Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        IEnumerable<string> domPermitCp = from p in db.PERMITCPs 
                                          where (p.PcpId == PcpId) 
                                          select p.Cfier.Trim(); 
         
        IEnumerable<string> domDenyCp = from d in db.DENYCPs 
                                        where (d.DcpId == DcpId) 
                                        select d.Cfier.Trim(); 
 
         
 
 
        if (domPermitCp.Except(domDenyCp).Count() == 0) 
        { 
            IEnumerable<cvalue> ddescs = 
                RestrictedDenyCpCValues(DcpId, PcpId); 
            IEnumerable<cvalue> pdescs = 
                PermitCpCValues(PcpId); 
 
            int DexP = domDenyCp.Except(domPermitCp).Count(); 
            int PexD = pdescs.Except(ddescs).Count(); 
 
 
            if ((DexP > 0) && (PexD >= 0)) 
            { 
                return true; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                if ((DexP == 0) && (PexD > 0)) 
                { 
                    return true; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    return false; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            return false; 
        } 
 
    } 
 
 
    public static IEnumerable<string> Dom(IEnumerable<cvalue> cvs) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        var query = from cv in cvs select cv.CFIER.Trim(); ; 
        return query; 
    } 
     
 
    public static IEnumerable<cvalue> PermitCpCValues(Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> query = from pcp in db.spPERMITCPS(PcpId) 
                    select new cvalue { CFIER = pcp.Cfier.Trim(), VAL = 
pcp.Value.Trim() }; 
        return query; 
    } 
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    public static IEnumerable<cvalue> DenyCpCValues(Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> query = db.spDENYCPS(DcpId).Select(dcp => 
            new cvalue { CFIER = dcp.Cfier.Trim(), VAL = 
dcp.Value.Trim()}); 
 
        return query; 
    } 
 
    public static IEnumerable<cvalue> RestrictedPermitCpCValues(Int32 
PcpId, Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> pdescs 
                = from pcp in db.spPERMITCPS(PcpId) 
                  from d in db.DENYCPs 
                  where (d.DcpId == DcpId) && 
                  d.Cfier.Trim() == pcp.Cfier.Trim() 
                  select new cvalue { CFIER = pcp.Cfier.Trim(), VAL = 
pcp.Value.Trim() }; 
 
        return pdescs; 
    } 
 
    public static IEnumerable<cvalue> RestrictedDenyCpCValues(Int32 
DcpId, Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        IEnumerable<cvalue> ddescs 
                = from dcp in db.spDENYCPS(DcpId) 
                  from p in db.PERMITCPs 
                  where (p.PcpId == PcpId) && 
                  p.Cfier.Trim() == dcp.Cfier.Trim() 
                  select new cvalue { CFIER = dcp.Cfier.Trim(), VAL = 
dcp.Value.Trim()}; 
 
        return ddescs; 
    } 
 
     
} 
 
6.6 TCM2 Class 
A TCM2 class is specified which derives from the TCM class.  
using System; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Configuration; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Linq.Expressions; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
 
public class TCM2:TCM 
{ 
    public static bool CptToPermitCpMatch(Int32 CptId, Int32 PcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        bool result = false; 
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        IEnumerable<cfier> PcpCfiers = db.PERMITCPs.Where(p => p.PcpId 
== PcpId).Select(p => new cfier{ CFIER = p.Cfier.Trim() }).Distinct(); 
        IEnumerable<cfier> CptCfiers = db.CPTs.Where(c => c.CptId == 
CptId).Select(c => new cfier { CFIER = c.Cfier.Trim() }).Distinct(); 
 
        if (PcpCfiers.Except(CptCfiers).Count() == 0 && 
CptCfiers.Except(PcpCfiers).Count() == 0) 
        { 
            result = true; 
        }      
 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static bool CptToDenyCpMatch(Int32 CptId, Int32 DcpId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        bool result = false; 
 
        IEnumerable<cfier> DcpCfiers = db.DENYCPs.Where(d => d.DcpId == 
DcpId).Select(d => new cfier { CFIER = d.Cfier.Trim() }).Distinct(); 
 
        IEnumerable<cfier> CptCfiers = db.CPTs.Where(c => c.CptId == 
CptId).Select(c => new cfier { CFIER = c.Cfier.Trim() }).Distinct(); 
 
        if (DcpCfiers.Except(CptCfiers).Count() == 0 && 
CptCfiers.Except(DcpCfiers).Count() == 0) 
        { 
            result = true; 
        } 
 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static bool CptPermitAccess(Int32 CptId, Int32 UserId, Int32 
RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        bool result = false; 
            foreach (PERMITCP pcp in db.PERMITCPs) 
            { 
                if (PermitAccess(pcp.PcpId, UserId, RecordId)&& 
                    CptToPermitCpMatch(CptId,pcp.PcpId)) 
                { 
                    result = true; 
                } 
                break; 
            } 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static bool CptDenyAccess(Int32 CptId, Int32 UserId, Int32 
RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        bool result = false; 
        foreach (DENYCP dcp in db.DENYCPs) 
        { 
            if (DenyAccess(dcp.DcpId, UserId, RecordId) && 
                CptToDenyCpMatch(CptId, dcp.DcpId)) 
            { 
                result = true; 
            } 
            break; 
        } 
        return result; 
    } 
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    public static bool TCM2PermitAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        bool result = false; 
 
        IQueryable<CPT> cpts = from c in db.CPTs 
                         orderby c.CptId ascending 
                         select c; 
 
        foreach (CPT cpt in cpts) 
        { 
             
            if (CptDenyAccess(cpt.CptId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                break; 
            } 
 
            if (CptPermitAccess(cpt.CptId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                result = true; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
        return result; 
     } 
 
    //This includes an override level. 
    public static bool TCM2PermitAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId, 
Int16 OverrideLevel) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        bool result = false; 
 
        IQueryable<CPT> cpts = from c in db.CPTs 
                               orderby c.CptId ascending 
                               select c; 
 
        foreach (CPT cpt in cpts) 
        { 
 
            if (cpt.CptId > OverrideLevel && (CptDenyAccess(cpt.CptId, 
UserId, RecordId)))  
            { 
                break; 
            } 
 
            if (CptPermitAccess(cpt.CptId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                result = true; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
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        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId, Int16 OverrideLevel) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId, OverrideLevel)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName, Int16 
OverrideLevel) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId, 
OverrideLevel)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId, Int32 PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
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    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId, Int32 PatientId, 
Int16 OverrideLevel) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId, OverrideLevel)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName, Int32 PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
 
        return perms; 
 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName, Int32 PatientId, 
Int16 OverrideLevel) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM2PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId, 
OverrideLevel)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
 
        return perms; 
 
    } 
 
    public static bool TCM2GlobalAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        bool result = false; 
        foreach (PERMITCP pcp in db.PERMITCPs) 
        { 
            if (PermitAccess(pcp.PcpId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
 192 
                result = true; 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static object GlobalPermissions(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2GlobalAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
 
 
    public static object GlobalPermissions(String LogonName) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM2GlobalAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object GlobalPermissions(Int32 UserId, Int32 
PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM2GlobalAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object GlobalPermissions(String LogonName, Int32 
PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
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        { 
            if (TCM2GlobalAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
 
        return perms; 
 
    } 
 
 
} 
 
6.7 TCM3 Class 
A TCM3 class is specified which derives from the TCM class.  TCM2 and TCM3 differ in 
that TCM2 uses CPTs and the permissions are derived in a different way.  There are fewer 
methods in the TCM class, because override is regarded as just another classifier, and there 
is no necessity to match to Confidentiality Permission Types. 
using System; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Configuration; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Linq.Expressions; 
using System.Collections; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Xml.Linq; 
 
public class TCM3:TCM 
{ 
    public static bool PermitAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        bool result = false; 
        foreach (PERMITCP pcp in db.PERMITCPs) 
        { 
            if (PermitAccess(pcp.PcpId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                result = true; 
                foreach (DENYCP dcp in db.DENYCPs) 
                { 
                    if (DenyAccess(dcp.DcpId, UserId, RecordId) && 
                        DenyRefines(pcp.PcpId, dcp.DcpId)) 
                    { 
                        result = false; ; 
                        break; 
                    } 
                } 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
 
        return result; 
    } 
 
    public static bool DenyAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        bool result = false; 
        foreach (DENYCP dcp in db.DENYCPs) 
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        { 
            if (DenyAccess(dcp.DcpId, UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                result = true; 
                foreach (PERMITCP pcp in db.PERMITCPs) 
                { 
                    if (PermitAccess(pcp.PcpId, UserId, RecordId) && 
                        PermitRefines(dcp.DcpId, pcp.PcpId)) 
                    { 
                        result = false; 
                        break; 
                    } 
                } 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
 
        return result; 
    } 
 
 
 
    public static bool TCM3PermitAccess(Int32 UserId, Int32 RecordId) 
    { 
 
 
        if (DenyAccess(UserId, RecordId)) 
        { 
            return false; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            if (PermitAccess(UserId, RecordId)) 
            { 
                return true; 
            } 
        } 
        return false; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM3PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs) 
        { 
            if (TCM3PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
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        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(Int32 UserId, Int32 PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId == 
PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM3PermitAccess(UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
        return perms; 
    } 
 
    public static object Permissions(String LogonName, Int32 PatientId) 
    { 
        TCMDataContext db = new TCMDataContext(); 
        USER user = db.USERs.Single(u => u.LogonName == LogonName); 
 
        List<RECORD> perms = new List<RECORD>(); 
        foreach (RECORD r in db.RECORDs.Where(rec => rec.PatientId ==  
          PatientId)) 
        { 
            if (TCM3PermitAccess(user.UserId, r.RecordId)) 
            { 
                perms.Add(r); 
            } 
        } 
 
        return perms; 
 
    } 
} 
6.8 Using the TCM class as a source. 
The piece of HTML below is part of the source code for a webpage that displays, adds, and 
deletes users: 
<asp:ObjectDataSource ID="ObjectDataSource1" runat="server"  
  DeleteMethod="DeleteUser" InsertMethod="AddUser" 
SelectMethod="ViewUsers"  
  TypeName="TCM" UpdateMethod="UpdateUser"> 
 
The object data source is used the source for a GridView and a Details View.  It can be 
seen that it is of type TCM and is using the methods of the TCM class.  The TCM class can 
be similarly used to show and use all the features of the TCM. 
6.9 Active Classifiers Values 
Active classifiers values are those classifier values present in a system that the 
confidentiality permissions use to permit or deny access.  The method that returns the set 
of active classifier values for a particular user, operation, and object is unique for a TCM 
 196 
application instance.  This method is written as an interface and requires detailing for each 
instance.  
The source of user classifier values is usually user assignment.  Operation and object 
classifiers may be properties or just the operation and object identifiers.  Some classifiers 
e.g. those that depend on both user and object may need to be derived or obtained from a 
dedicated server.  Examples of those would be “relative location” and “legitimate 
relationship”. 
LinQ is ideal for collecting the set of all active classifier values, because of its ability to 
combine data from different data sources using the same syntax. 
6.10 Visual Studio Website 
The website is to demonstrate the use of the TCM class and the use of LinQ to SQL.  In 
order to demonstrate these we revisit Alice‟s scenario and add some additional 
requirements 
6.10.1 Alice’s Scenario Revisited 
To look at Alice‟s scenario in the light of current health service thinking then Alice has the 
right to mark her health data as „sealed‟ or „sealed and locked‟.  Let us suppose that she 
marks her psychosis data as „sealed‟ and her termination data as „sealed and locked‟.  All 
other data is „unsealed‟.  This means that any data on the two sensitive areas in Alice‟s GP 
practice is available to any GP in that practice with whom Alice has a legitimate 
relationship i.e. any GP in that practice she decides to consult.  However, the GP is made 
aware that Alice has marked the data as sensitive.  The psychosis and termination data is 
also available to anyone in the corresponding departments of the hospital e.g. the 
psychiatric and obstetric departments respectively, with whom she has a legitimate 
relationship.  Once again, they are made aware that it is marked sensitive. 
The psychosis data is available to anyone outside the GP practice and psychiatric 
department, with whom Alice has a legitimate relationship, but access is strictly audited. 
The termination data is not available, and indeed no one is aware of its existence, outside 
the GP practice, and the obstetrics department. 
 197 
6.10.2 Additional Requirements 
Let us suppose that Alice is referred to a psychiatric consultant at a different hospital e.g. 
from James Cook University Hospital to North Tees University Hospital, and Alice wishes 
them to see the termination data.  Either she can reclassify the data as „sealed‟ instead of 
„sealed and locked‟, or the prohibition can be refined to allow the North Tees psychiatric 
consultant access.  This second option would not be available with current models, but is 
available with the TCM.  Reclassifying the data as „sealed‟ opens up the access to a wide 
range of users.  TCM refinement makes an adjustment allowing access to a specific user. 
6.10.3 LinQ to SQL dbml 
The two screen shots below show how LinQ to SQL enables tables to be treated as objects 
with properties.  The screen shots together show the LinQ to SQL designer.: 
 
 
Screen 11: Sql Objects Top 
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Screen 12: Sql Objects Bottom 
 
The CPT object in the above screen is only needed if implementing TCM2. 
6.10.4 Stored Procedures 
The versatility of LinQ means that only two stored procedures are required to implement 
TCM2 or TCM3.  The two stored procedures give all the inherited values of a 
Confidentiality Permission.  These stored procedures become methods when dragged onto 
the LinQ to SQL designer. 
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[spPERMITCPS]  
@PcpId int 
  
AS 
BEGIN 
WITH descs (Cfier,Value) 
AS 
(SELECT Cfier, Value from PERMITCPs 
WHERE PcpId = @PcpId 
UNION ALL 
SELECT  c.Cfier, c.Cval from CPCS c 
INNER JOIN descs on  
  descs.Cfier = c.Cfier 
AND  descs.Value = c.Pval 
) 
SELECT * FROM descs 
END 
 
 
 
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[spDENYCPS]  
@DcpId int 
  
AS 
BEGIN 
WITH descs (Cfier,Value) 
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AS 
(SELECT Cfier, Value from DENYCPs 
WHERE DcpId = @DcpId 
UNION ALL 
SELECT  c.Cfier, c.Cval from CPCS c 
INNER JOIN descs on  
  descs.Cfier = c.Cfier 
AND  descs.Value = c.Pval 
) 
SELECT * FROM descs 
END 
6.10.5 Implementation 
The web pages below are to demonstrate the use of the TCM class to apply all the different 
TCM methods.  The web pages demonstrate functionality.  The data source for each 
GridView or other control is the TCM class.  More sophisticated design layouts would be 
used in an application, whilst still using the same functionality. 
6.10.6 Users 
Users are stored using the TCM membership class which is a custom membership class 
overriding the asp.net membership class.  All the features of the asp.net membership class 
are available, including the use of user profiles, and the ability to add additional user 
properties.  Although an integer UserId and a plain text password is shown here, in an 
application use would be made of unique identifiers and encryption, both of which are 
available through the asp.net membership class. 
 
 
Screen 13: Users 
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In the screen above, users can be added.  A logon name and password can be allocated.   
6.10.7 User Assignment 
 
Screen 14: User Assignment 
In the screen above, users can be assigned to different classifier values. 
6.10.8 Confidentiality Permissions 
 
Screen 15: Confidentiality Permissions 
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CPs are created using multiple classifier values in the above screen. 
6.10.9 Inheritance 
 
Screen 16: Inheritance 
The above screen adds classifier to parent to child values. 
6.10.10 Records 
 
Screen 17: Patient Records 
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The screen above shows three tiers of patient records: Patient Details, Referral Description, 
and Drugs Prescribed. 
6.10.11 Testing 
The following set of Assigned Classifier Values belong to UserId = 1, and RecordId = 1.  
They are used to test whether the Confidentiality Permissions are working correctly.
 
Screen 18: Active Classifier Values 
These are used together with the inheritance relationship given by the table below. 
Classifier Parent Child 
Location                  JCUH                      Ward5                    
Location                  JCUH                      Ward23                    
Location                  TVAH                      JCUH                     
Location                  TVAH                      NTUH                      
Role                      HCP Registrar                
Role                      Registrar                 Consultant   
Table 2: Model Inheritance 
The following table shows the tests and the results, which are as expected. 
PermitCp DenyCp Permit 
Access 
Deny 
Access 
TCM 
PermitAccess 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Sealed> 
True False True 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
True True False 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,Registrar> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
True False True 
<Role,Registrar> <Role,HCP> False True False 
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<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,TVAH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
True False True 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,TVAH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
False True False 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<LegitimateRelation 
ship,True> 
False True False 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<LegitimateRelation 
ship,True> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
True False True 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<LegitimateRelation 
ship,False> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
False True False 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<LegitimateRelation 
ship,False> 
<Role,HCP> 
<Location,JCUH> 
<Security,Unsealed> 
<LegitimateRelation 
ship,False> 
False False False 
Table 3: Test Results 
 
6.11 Summary 
Classes have been developed which enable the TCM to be applied in any authorisation 
scenario.  The procedure to apply the classes is given in the appendix.  For completeness, 
classes are given for both TCM2 and TCM3.  A website has been developed which 
demonstrates the use of these classes, and some testing has been included. 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Advances made to Access Control 
Authorisation is a very important part of Identity and Access Management, yet has 
arguably not received the research and development attention that Authentication and 
Federated Identity Management have.  It appears from the research literature that much of 
the development of authorisation has been influenced by Role Based Access Control, with 
many elaborations of this basic concept.  The TCM, as originally proposed, and further 
developed in this thesis, is an attempt to investigate and develop authorisation from first 
principles. 
Accordingly, the first contribution of the thesis is a thorough examination of RBAC.  This 
was accomplished by developing a formal model (B Model) of the RBAC ANSI Standard, 
which itself was the culmination of many years of research.  In the process of doing this, 
improvements were identified, and incorporated into the B Model.  These improvements 
were possible because B enables the specification to be verified.  There were many errors 
in the mathematics of the RBAC ANSI Standard that were identified and eliminated to 
provide a more robust model and one suitable for further development. 
Following this, a B model of authorisation based on the original TCM was developed.  
During the course of this development, it became apparent that a fundamental 
improvement to the original TCM (referred to as TCM1 in the text) was desirable, namely 
replacing the concept of collection with classifier value hierarchy, with single inheritance.  
A formal framework with more general concepts than RBAC (e.g. „classifier‟ performing a 
more general function than „role‟) was developed.  
The worth of these improvements was demonstrated in that they were used in ongoing 
work to develop a USA-based healthcare application of the TCM (by Dr Longstaff); the 
original TCM would have been unable to handle this demanding application.  The impact 
of the original TCM, and particularly of the enhancements presented in this thesis, is that 
on the basis of seen publications, and other communications, Dr Longstaff was invited to 
sit on an Expert Panel on healthcare software development in the USA in January 2008 
(ASPE 2008).   
In addition to the above, the thesis reports work on developing a further, simplified version 
of the TCM, and implementing and applying it using the most modern developments in 
programming software.  TCM3 uses Spec#, Spec Explorer and LinQ to develop classes 
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that can be applied to any authorisation scenario.  For completeness classes for TCM2 have 
also been developed.  
Therefore, the thesis has made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of 
access control, which has been recognised and applied in commercial settings. 
7.2 Further Work 
It is intended that the modelling work on the RBAC standard, together with the detailing of 
faults detected in the RBAC standard, be communicated to the ANSI INCITS technical 
committee.  The basis of the work was presented at a B conference in 2008 (Dunne, et al., 
2008).  
Other further work would be the application of the TCM to various „real world‟ situations, 
and to continue to demonstrate that the TCM as described in this thesis has both the 
flexibility and the simplicity to cope with the most demanding authorisation scenarios. 
The application of both TCM2 and TCM3 would help determine which of these models is 
most suitable for use in general authorisation scenarios.  It is my belief that TCM3 can be 
shown to be powerful enough for all scenarios. 
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Appendices 
A. Notation
P ⋀Q  Conjunction: `` P and Q''.  
P ⋁Q  Disjunction: `` P or Q''.  
P ⇒ Q Implication: ``P implies Q'' or ``if P then Q''.  
P  Negation: ``Not P''. 
∀z.(Q => P) Universal quantification: ``For all z where Q, P''. 
∃z.P  Existential quantification: ``For some z, P holds''. 
E ↦ F  Ordered pair (maplet). 
E ∈ S  Set membership: the predicate ``E belongs to S''. 
E ∉ S  Set non-membership: the predicate ``E does not belong to S''. 
S ⊆ T  Set inclusion: the predicate ``S is included in T''. 
S ⊈ T  Set non-inclusion: the negation of the predicate S ⊆ T. 
S ⋃ T  Set union: the set of elements which are elements of S or T.  
S ⋂ T  Set intersection: the set of elements which are elements of S and T. 
ϕ  Empty set: the set with no elements. 
F(S)  Finite subsets: Set of all finite subsets of S. 
S ↔ T  Relation: Set of relations from S to T. 
dom(r)  Domain of r:  The set {x | x: S & ∃y.(x,y: r)}.  
ran(r)  Range of r: The set {y | y: T & ∃x.(x,y: r)}.  
p;q  Relational composition: Composition of relations p and q. 
s ◁ r  Restriction of r by s. Also known as domain restriction. 
r ▷ t  Co-restriction of r by t. Also known as range restriction. 
s ⩤ r  Anti-restriction of r by s. Also known as domain subtraction. 
r ⩥ t  Anti-co-restriction of r by t. Also known as range subtraction. 
r-1  Inverse of r. 
r[s]  Image of set s under relation r. 
S ⇸T  Set of partial functions from S to T  
S → T  Set of total functions from S to T. 
iseq(S)  The set of injective sequences of elements from S. 
x ≔E  Simple substitution. 
x ≔E || y ≔F Simultaneous substitution. 
N1  Non-zero natural numbers. 
∐  Generalised union. 
  
A full listing is available at www.b-core.com 
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B. Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ACL  Access Control List: a list of permissions attached to an object. The list 
  specifies who or what is allowed to access the object and what  
  operations are allowed to be performed on the object 
AHIMA American Health Information Management Association: an association 
  of health information management professionals 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute: a private organisation that  
  oversees the development of voluntary consensus standards for  
  products, services, processes, systems, and personnel in the United  
  States. 
CP  Confidentiality Permission: the fundamental mechanism for granting 
  or denying permission in the TCM. 
CPT  Confidentiality Permission Type: the type to which a CP belongs.   
  Defined as the set of classifiers contained in a CP. 
DAC  Discretionary Access Control: a means of restricting access to objects 
  based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. 
  The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain 
  access permission is capable of passing that permission (perhaps  
  indirectly) on to any other subject 
DSD  Dynamic Separation of Duties: the enforcement of rules regarding  
  those duties (roles) that a user can activate at login 
EEMA  European Electronic Messaging Association: an independent, trade 
  association for e-Business, working to further e-Business technology 
  and legislation with its European members, governmental bodies,  
  standards organisations and e-Business initiatives. 
EHR  Electronic Health Records: an individual patient's medical record in 
  digital format 
ERDIP  Electronic Records Development and Information Programme 
INCITS International Committee for IT Standards: an ANSI-accredited forum 
  of IT developers 
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MAC  Mandatory Access Control: A system of access control that assigns 
  security labels or classifications to system resources and allows access 
  only to entities (people, processes, devices) with distinct levels of  
  authorisation or clearance 
NHSIA National Health Service Information Authority: part of the UK  
  National Health Service (NHS),  established by an Act of Parliament in 
  1999, superseded in 2004. 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology: a non-regulatory  
  agency of the United States Department of Commerce 
OASIS  Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information  
  Standards: a global consortium that drives the development,  
  convergence and adoption of e-business and web service standards 
PHR  Personal Health Record: The personal health record (PHR) is an  
  electronic, universally available, lifelong resource of health  
  information needed by individuals to make health decisions.  
  Individuals own and manage the information in the PHR, which comes 
  from healthcare providers and the individual. The PHR is maintained 
  in a secure and private environment, with the individual determining 
  rights of access. The PHR is separate from and does not replace the 
  legal record of any provider 
RBAC  Role Based Access Control: an approach to granting system access to 
  authorised users based on their roles 
SAML  Security Assertion Markup Language: an XML-based standard for  
  exchanging authentication and authorisation data between security  
  domains 
SSD  Static Separation of Duties: the enforcement of rules regarding  
  those duties (roles) to which a user can activate be assigned 
TCM  Tees Confidentiality Model: an authorisation model which is suitable 
  for complex web applications 
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language: a declarative access  
  control policy language implemented in XML 
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XML  Extensible Markup Language: a general-purpose specification for  
  creating custom markup languages 
 
C. Relational Operators in Spec# 
Domain 
The domain of a set of classifier values 
Set<CFIER> dom(Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S) 
{ 
  return Set{<c,v>in S; c}; 
} 
Range 
The range of a set of classifier values 
Set<CFIER> ran(Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S) 
{ 
  return Set{<c,v> in S; v}; 
} 
Domain Restriction 
The set of classifier values in S restricted to the given set of classifiers C 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> domRestriction(Set<CFIER> C, Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> 
S) { 
  return Set{c1 in C, <c2,v> in S, c1==c2; <c1,v>}; 
} 
Domain Anti-Restriction 
The set of classifier values in S restricted to classifiers not in the given set of 
classifiers C 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> domAntiRestriction(Set<CFIER> C, 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S) { 
  return Set{c1 in dom(S)-C, <c2,v> in S, c1==c2; <c1,v>}; 
} 
Range  Restriction 
The set of classifier values in S restricted to the given set of values V 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> ranRestriction(Set<VALUE> V, Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> 
S) { 
  return Set{<c,v1> in S, v2 in V, v1==v2; <c,v1>}; 
} 
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Range Anti-Restriction 
The set of classifier values in S restricted to values not in the given set of values V 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> ranAntiRestriction(Set<CFIER> V, 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S) { 
  return Set{<c,v1> in S, v2 in ran(S)-V, v1==v2; <c,v1>}; 
} 
Relational Image 
The set of values in S corresponding to the given set of classifiers C 
Set<VALUE> relImage(Set<CFIER> C, Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S) { 
  return Set{c1 in C, <c2,v> in S, c1==c2; v}; 
} 
Relational Inverse 
The inverse of relation R 
Set<<VALUE,CFIER>> relInverse(Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> R) { 
  return Set{<c,v> in R; <v,c>}; 
} 
Relational Composition 
The composition of two inheritance relationships R0 and R1 with the relationships 
partitioned in classifiers 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> relComposition(Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R0, 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R1) { 
  return Set{<c0,vp0,vc0> in R0, <c1,vp1,vc1> in R1,c0==c1,vc0==vp1; 
<c0,vp0,vc1>}; 
} 
Relational Override 
Overriding one inheritance relationship R0 by another one R1,  i.e. R0 applies outside 
the domain of R1; else R1 applies. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> relOverride(Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R0, 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R1) { 
  return  
  Set{<c0,vp0,vc0> in R0, <c1,vp1,vc1> in R0-
R1,c0==c1,vp0==vp1,vc0==vc1; <c0,vp0,vc0>} +  
  Set{<c0,vp0,vc0> in R0, <c1,vp1,vc1> in 
R1,c0==c1,vp0==vp1,vc0==vc1; <c1,vp1,vc1>}; 
} 
Identity 
Identity relation on R. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> id(Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R) 
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{ 
  return Set{<c,vp,vc> in R;<c,vp,vp>}; 
} 
Iterate 
The nth iterate of relation R. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> iterate(Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R, int n) 
{ 
  switch (n) 
  { 
  case 0: return id(R); 
  case 1: return R; 
  default: n-=1; 
  return Set{<c1,vp1,vc1> in iterate(R,n), <c2,vp2,vc2>  
  in R,vc1==vp2; <c1,vp1,vc2>};  
  } 
} 
Closure 
The reflexive transitive closure of relation R. 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> closure(Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> S, 
Set<<CFIER,VALUE,VALUE>> R) 
{ 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> clos = Set{}; 
  var Set<<CFIER,VALUE>> add = S; 
  int i=1; 
  while(add - clos > Set{}) 
  { 
    clos = clos + add; 
    add = Set{<c1,v>in S, <c2,pv,cv> in 
iterate(R,i),c1==c2,v==pv;<c1,cv>}; 
    i+=1; 
  } 
  return clos; 
} 
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D. Implementing a Web Application Using the TCM 
 
1. Create a new website using Visual Studio 2008. 
2. Add the TCM class. 
3. Add the TCM2 or TCM3 class depending on which version you are using. 
4. Add the TCM database to the App_Data folder.  (Alternatively, attach to another 
SQL Server instance and modify the connection string accordingly). 
5. Add a new LinQ to SQL TCM data class: .dbml file. 
6. From Server Explorer drag the tables, views and stored procedures onto the 
TCM.dbml designer. 
7. Use the TCM methods in the development of your application. 
Additionally there is a TCM membership class that can be used in the application.  
Asp.net‟s own membership class can be used or any other membership provider such 
as Active Directory.  The TCM membership class can be further customised to suit 
individual requirements.  To use TCM membership: 
8. Add TCM membership class. 
9. In the web.config file, change the authentication mode.  <authentication 
mode="Forms"/> 
10. Just below <authentication mode="Forms"/> add the following. 
<membership defaultProvider = "TCMMembershipProvider" 
UserIsOnlineTimeWindow="15"> 
      <providers> 
        <add name="TCMMembershipProvider" 
          type="TCMMembershipProvider" 
          enablePasswordRetrieval="false" 
          enablePasswordReset="false" 
          requiresQuestionAndAnswer="false" 
          QuestionRequired ="false" 
          applicationName="/" 
          requiresUniqueEmail="false" 
          passwordFormat="Clear" 
          description="Stores and retrieves membership data from SQL Server" 
          decryptionKey="68d288624f967bce6d93957b5341f931f73d25fef798ba75" 
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          validationKey="65a31e547b659a6e35fdc029de3acce43f8914cb1b2 
                         4fff3e1aef13be438505b3f5becb5702d15bc7b98cd 
                         6fd2b7702b46ff63fdc9ea8979f6508c82638b129a" 
        /> 
      </providers> 
    </membership> 
11. Customise as required in web.config and the membership class. 
 
